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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appeal herein is from an Order of the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, dismissing with prejudice Petition For 
Modification of a Divorce Decree of appellant and sentencing 
appellant to 60 days in the Salt Lake County Jail for contempt for 
failure to pay child support under original decree. 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is pursuant to authority 
as follows: 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 3 [Appeal as of right: how taken.] 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 4 [Appeal as of right: when taken.] 
U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2)(h) [Court of Appeals Jurisdiction 
[1990 Cumulative Supplement] 
Appeals From District Court Involving Domestic 
Relations Cases 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
Defendants Petition For Modification of Divorce Decree be 
re-instated and contempt vacated allowing defendant trial on both 
issues. 
Brief of Appellant Case No. 920050-CA Page 2 
Houston v Houston Utah Court of Appeals 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. Defendant Misled [?] Did the court affirmatively 
mislead the defendant as to the courts familiarity with the file, 
preparation for the hearing, and knowledge of the issues herein 
such that it constituted a fraud upon the defendant? 
2. Lack of Preparation Was the courts obvious lack of 
preparation and familiarty with the file deficient to such extent 
that it denied due process to the defendant given that the court 
was unaware of pleadings in the file? 
3. Lack of Notice Was the defendant denied due process 
for lack of notice as to the issues that he would have to defend 
against in any hearing including but not limited to issues of 
contempt? 
4. Lack of Neutrality Did the court lack sufficient 
neutrality by virtue of its conduct of the proceedings such that 
it denied due process to the defendant? 
5. Procedural Defects Were the procedural defects in this 
case alone sufficient to justify the dismissal being set aside and 
the contempt being vacated? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case arises within the context of question of judicial 
performance and lack thereof thus and therefore counsel is unable 
to locate in the state of Utah any standard of review dealing with 
the issues herein which primarily affect the judiciary as opposed 
to the conduct of the opposing party and the court very well may 
have to develop a standard of review in this case consistent with 
the issues herein. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
Provisions upon which the defendant relies are set out in 
body of brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The matter herein came before the court for a hearing for 
sanctions brought by the plaintiff. 
Timely and proper objections had been made to all prior 
Commissioners Recommendations and no rulings had been sent to 
either counsel. 
After hearing evidence in the case to which objection was 
taken the court dismissed the defendants Petition For Modification 
and sentenced him to jail for contempt. 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
December 1, 1986 (Mon.) parties were divorced pursuant to a 
Decree of Divorce in the Fifth District Court, Washington County, 
[R249-250] 
Supplemental and Final Decree of Divorce was entered in the 
case November 30, 1987 (Mon.) which set out the rights and 
responsibilities of each party hereto and awarded custody of the 
children of this divorce to the appellee. [R374-406] 
February 16, 1989 (Thurs.) pursuant to Stipulation both 
parties having removed their residence from Washington County the 
case was filed in Salt Lake County, Third District Court. 
[R439-440J 
September 13, 1989 (Wed.) modification of the original 
support order was entered pursuant to an order. [R525-527] 
October 11, 1990 (Thurs.) counsel herein first became 
involved in the court proceedings and at such time filed a 
Petition For Modification with the court based upon the fact that 
there had been continuing acrimony between the parties and refusal 
and failure of the plaintiff to follow the terms of the parties 
original decree. This was the first involvement of counsel 
herein. [R554-569] 
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Plaintiff filed sundry and assorted motions and other matters 
piece meal before the Commissioner pursuant to provisions then 
existing dealing with Commissioners. 
Minute Entry 12/6/90 Commissioner, Sandra N. Peuler 
[R591] 
Defendants Objection To Commissioners Recommendation 
12/6/90 filed with court 12/17/90 [R592-599] 
Minute Entry 1/29/91 Commissioner, Sandra N. Peuler 
[R622] 
Minute Entry 2/5/91 Commissioner, Sandra N. Peuler 
[R625] 
Defendants Objection To Commissioners Recommendation 
1/29/91 filed with court 2/8/91 [R637-649] 
Defendants Objection To Commissioners Recommendation 
2/5/91 filed with court 2/15/91 [R652-664] 
Plaintiffs Certificate of Readiness For Trial filed 4/15/91 
[R698J 
Plaintiffs Motion To Compel And For Sanctions filed 5/16/91 
[R700-7013 
Minute Entry 6/10/91 Commissioner, Sandra N. Peuler 
[R712] 
Plaintiffs Renewed Motion For Sanctions filed 6/25/91 
[R724-725] 
Minute Entry 9/9/91 Commissioner, Sandra N. Peuler 
[R765J 
Defendants Objection To Commissioners Recommendation 
9/9/91 filed with court 9/19/91 [R767-775] 
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Minute Entry 11/27/91 Judge, Leslie A. Lewis 
[R790] 
Defendants Objection To Order As Drafted filed 12/6/91 
[R791-794] 
Order [R795J 
In each instance the defendant filed a proper and appropriate 
objection pursuant to CJA Rule 6-401 "Domestic Relations 
Commissioner"; however, neither counsel was ever given any notice 
of rulings upon any of the objections and thus appropriate 
assumption was that none had been ruled upon. 
There had been various rulings by the Commissioners and 
recommendations, each of which were memorialized by Minute Entry. 
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It should be noted that even though the District Court is 
required to keep a record that at least one of these hearings no 
record was kept and it is something which is an error committed by 
the Commissioner herein [R712]; however, the defendant at no time 
ever had opportunity for hearing at which he could present 
testimony under oath in any cf these, this being so despite the 
fact that the petition was pending. 
June 24, 1991 (Mon.) plaintiff eventually filed a "Renewed 
Motion For Sanctions & Attorneys Fees11 for failure to attend the 
deposition, which documents are what led to the current 
proceedings in which immediate appeal is taken therefrom 
[R724-725]. 
November 27, 1991 case came before the court on plaintiffs 
"Motion For Sanctions & Attorneys Fees For Failure To Attend 
Deposition11. The court at that time indicated "it had reviewed 
the entire file", dismissed the defendants petition to reduce his 
child support and other modifications as requested in his petition 
for modification filed October 11, 1990. 
The court in response to questions about contempt and 
attorneys fees advised plaintiffs counsel that he could file an 
affidavit and a motion regarding "further contempt proceedings and 
that when the plaintiff had filed the motion he should file a 
motion clarifying what is to be heard at which time a hearing 
would be set. 
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Plaintiff was then directed to prepare an order and 
subsequent objection was filed to the order as drafted [R791-794]. 
December 17, 1991 the court caused to be sent out a notice 
setting the case for hearing on issue of contempt and attorneys 
fees January 3, 1992. 
Janauary 3, 1992 Counsel appeared before the court at said 
time, pursuant to notice of the court, and counsel for the 
defendant protested proceeding for reason that plaintiff had filed 
neither affidavit, motion, or any other pleadings as the court had 
so directed and so ordered; therefore there was nothing before the 
court and the matter should appropriately be dismissed or in the 
alternative denied. 
The court indicated that it had simply "suggested" not 
ordered Mr. Nemelka to do so. Furthermore the defendant through 
counsel objected that he was not present for reason that he was 
never ordered to be present nor was there any document mandating 
or commanding his presence and he would object to the courts use 
of "raw judicial power" to simply command things in violation of 
statutory requirements. .Furthermore it was pointed out that there 
had been no notification or any other notification as to rulings 
on objections to the Commissioners recommendations, all of which 
have been properly objected to and none of which have there been 
rulings upon and/or notification to defendant or his counsel. 
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The court then from the bench indicated that it would 
reschedule the matter for January 17, 1992 and the defendant would 
be there or the court would issue a bench warrant for him. 
Plaintiff would be heard on the issue of contempt. 
January 17, 1992 All parties appeared before the court 
with counsel. Defendant herein as a matter of prudence filed a 
"Hearing Brief" in support of his contentions and reasserted that 
plaintiff had not complied with the order of the court. The court 
however continued to insist that they were simply "suggestions" 
and furthermore would not allow counsel for defendant to verbally 
make a complete record however the "Hearing Brief", copy attached, 
supports contentions as made herein. R809-825] 
Defendant objected to going forth since there was not basis 
for contempt in terms of procedural statutory provisions complied 
with herein or compliance with courts directive to plaintiffs 
counsel. 
Plaintiffs counsel April 15, 1991 (Fri.) mailed to counsel 
for defendant and filed with the court "Certification of Readiness 
For Trial" and certified therein by his signature thereon "that 
counsel has completed all discovery" and otherwise certified that 
there was nothing further to be done and the case was ready for 
trial. Defendant never opposed that certification and if in fact 
it is not true than plaintiffs counsel knowingly and intentionally 
misled the defendant and the court. R698] 
See: Walker v State 624 P.2d 687 (UT 1981) 
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At conclusion of the hearing 1/17/92 (Fri.) the court found 
the defendant in "contempt11 and also found that he owed support 
arrearages of $11,343.00 and judgment was due. 
Attorneys fees the defendant objected to or a proffer on the 
same basis that no affidavit or other pleading had been filed as 
the court had ordered 11/27/91. 
The court ordered the defendant to serve IT60 days in the Salt 
Lake County Jail forthwith11, half the medical and dental expense, 
the court would not order interest for reason that the defendant 
had "no notice of those matters". 
Finally the court indicated that defendant could purge the 
contempt after serving four (4) days in jail by paying $11,343.00. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial courts lack of preparation in even being familiar 
with the file combined with its lack of notice to the defendant in 
compliance with its direction to the plaintiff as well as the 
procedural errors herein denied the defendant due process. 
Dismissal with prejudice of the defendants claim constituting 
a termination on the merits is contrary to the law and 
procedurally was flawed under court rules. 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AS A CONSEQUENCE 
OF MULTIPLE ERRORS OF THE COURT. 
(A) DEFENDANT MISLED 
Walker v State 624 P.2d 687 (UT 1981) 
11
. . . @pg 691... The false impression which the 
prosecution knowingly fostered in the present case 
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct which seriously 
interferred with the trial court's truth seeking function. 
We believe this to be analgous to the prosecutions knowing 
use of false testimony and therefore subject to the same 
standard of materiality used in those cases....1' 
Commentary 
Walker v State, supra, was a criminal case in which the 
prosecution created a "false impression11 and the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed holding it to be a fraud upon the court and a fraud 
upon the defendant. In the case herein the trial court was not 
totally candid with the defendant regarding its level of 
preparation and review of the case files in order that the 
defendant could adequately address issues before the trial court 
and not make assumptions as to the trial courts degree of 
preparation based upon its own representation which created a 
fffalse impression". 
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If a lffalse impression11 by counsel for a party is a "fraud 
upon the court11 the opposite is or should be true, that being that 
a fffalse impression11 or representation by the trial court itself 
is a fraud upon the defendant such that it would demand and 
necessitate that the ruling of the court be reversed and defendant 
given an opportunity to pursue issues in his modification 
petition. Every party in a case should be able to expect that the 
court will be absolutely candid in its representations to the 
parties. 
The totality of all proceedings before the trial court as 
contained in transcripts are as follows: 
Transcript November 27, 1992 Record 975 thru 993 
Transcript January 23, 1992 Record 965 thru 975 
Transcript January 17, 1992 Record 911 thru 964 
This constitutes the totality of all proceedings before the 
trial court and the only time that there were proceedings before 
the court [as opposed to Commissioner] or under oath. The court 
clearly misled the defendant suggesting that the court was 
familiar with the entire contents of the file which subsequently 
turned out not to be true. 
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NOVEMBER 27, 1991 
"False impression11 conveyed to the defendant is set out as 
follows: 
Transcript November 27, 1991 T14 Line 25 
"THE COURT; I reviewed the file, I'm well aware 
that the defendant has been represented by a number of 
different attorneys.ff 
Transcript November 27, 1991 T17 Line 14-15 
"THE COURT: I reviewed the entire file Mr. Payton." 
The court clearly was making it clear to counsel that the 
court was familiar with the "entire file", had read the entire 
file, and was familiar with it. This in fact turned out to be 
untrue and is belied by the later transcripts of proceedings. 
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JANUARY 3, 1992 
November 27, 1991 proceeding was adjourned and continued to 
January 3, 1992 at which time the courts lack of knowledge of 
documents in the file is demonstrated by statement to counsel by 
the trial court in the record as follows: 
Transcript January 3, 1992 T8 Line 8-24 
"MR. NEMELKA: There's just one other item. We still 
have a counter-petition on the modification which deals 
toward-- We also, in the counter-petition, indicated he 
was in contempt of some previous orders, plus there was 
a minor issue, and I just wanted to make sure that we're 
going to have that heard at the same time. 
THE COURT; Well I was not aware that the counter-
petition had Seen filed. Let me apologize for that, and 
indicate that there's so many pleadings in the file that 
it's hard to keep track of them. If there are some 
issues in connection with your counter-petition, I'll 
note for the record that the defendant's petition for 
modification was dismissed. If there remain issues 
beyond the contempt issue in the counter-petition, then 
you certainly will have the right to bring those up on 
the 17th. 
MR. NEMELKA: Fine." 
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The court January 3, 1992 acknowledged it did not know there 
was a counterpetition in the file, after such time as it had 
dismissed the defendants petition for modification. This then 
supports the inappropriateness of the courts dismissal of the 
defendants Petition containing issues related to the parties 
children and assertions that the plaintiff, despite her counter 
petition, did not come to court with clean hands. Clearly the 
court indicated on November 27, 1991 it had "reviewed the entire 
file" and then on January 3, 1992 clearly stated that it was 
unaware of documents in the file and then sought to explain it by 
the fact that there are so many pleadings in the file it is hard 
to keep track of them. 
This is the duty of a court. The court went on in that same 
hearing however to further acknowledge that the court had not read 
the cross-petition which raised some concern about the candor of 
the court on November 27, 1991 and the appropriateness of its 
actions. 
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The acknowledgment by the court it had not read the cross 
petition is in the transcript as follows: 
Transcript January 3, 1992, T9 Line 16 thru 22 
"THE COURT: If you believe that this is beyond 
what Mr. Nemelka has put in writing in his cross-petition 
to modify, then I guess you'll need to so advise me on 
the 17th. I can't tell you what is in that cross-
Setition, because I haven't read it, and I'll certainly ook at the file before the hearing, and I'd suggest 
you do the same. 
MR. PAYTON: Fine. 
The court further carried on the pattern of misleading the 
defendant as to the courts examination of the file and it was 
apparent that the court in fact had not reviewed the file nor was 
it even familiar with the contents thereof including transcripts 
of the two prior hearings November 27, 1991 and January 3, 1992. 
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JANUARY 17, 1992 
Clearly the court still was not prepared and the court then 
attempted to bully counsel by clearly indicating the court had not 
said something which the transcript in fact preserved. 
Transcript January 17, 1992 T5 Line 14 thru 25; T6 Line 1-2 
THE COURT: Mr. Payton, I know better than you what 
was in my mind, and I recall very clearly the hearing in 
question. And again, let me state very clearly that I 
told Mr. Nemelka, I gave him a deadline for filing a 
motion if he wished to file it. And suggested that that 
might be helpful in clarifying the issues. I did not 
order him to file it. 
Now, we're here for the hearing today. Actually 
we were here before on this hearing, and that was on 
January 3rd, and your client was not here, despite a 
court order asking him to be here, so we set it over to 
today's date. We don't have a great deal of time on these 
counter-petitions or motions. I'd like to move forward, 
if there's nothing further. 
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It was apparent that the court had not read the file based 
upon its comments. The court seemed to be concerned about 
correspondence "concerning the St. George deposition11 and counsel 
was adamant that he was not involved in the case when it was in 
St. George; however, it was apparent that the court by its 
representations had in fact not read the file since counsel in 
fact never at anytime was involved in any proceedings with the 
court in St. George. 
Evidence of this exchange between counsel and the court is as 
follows: 
Transcript January 17, 1992 T47 Line 13 thru 25; T48 Line 1-3 
f,THE COURT: Mr. Pay ton, there's so much 
correspondence in the file, much of it from you, concerning 
the St. George depositions. Are you now contending you 
don't know anything about that? 
MR. PAYTON: That's correct. And I suggest the 
court there's no-- I don't know anything about any 
depositions in St. George, and I've never written such a 
Tetter regarding any depositions in St. George. 
THE COURT: Are you aware that depositions were 
scheduled of your client, Mr. Payton, and that you advised 
him not to appear at the deposition? 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, I wasn't involved in any 
proceedings in St. Ge^ brge. And I have had no communication 
with anybody about what occurred in St. George. 
THE COURT: All right, is there anything further, 
Mr. Payton? 
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This constitutes the totality of matters with regards to the 
courts representation of its familiarity with the file; however, 
when taken individually and collectively it was clear that the 
court apparently at no time had ever reviewed the file and read 
it, otherwise it would have been familiar with documents and 
tagged them since they were central and critical at all times to 
the issues involved. Clearly the court had not read the file, had 
not reviewed it, and was in temper, tenor, and tone unwilling to 
allow counsel to assist it. 
This misleading of the defendant by the court should be just 
as egregious as the situation in Walker v State, supra, where the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the prosecutors actions left a "false 
impression11. On this basis alone given what appeared to be the 
courts clear misrepresentations or "false impression11 to the 
defendant, its order dismissing his petition for modification was 
improper as well as its order of contempt, both of which should be 
vacated, set aside, and defendant allowed to pursue his Petition 
For Modification herein. 
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(B) LACK OF PREPARATION 
State v Crestani 771 P.2d 1085 (UT App. 1989) 
[Duty of defense counsel to investigate witnesses, 
facts surrounding incident and conduct 
discovery] 
State v Moritzky 771 P.2d 688 (UT App, 1989) 
[Duty of counsel to investigate and research 
the law] 
Fernandez v Cook 783 P.2d 547 (UT 1989) 
[Duty of counsel to investigate and interview 
witnesses] 
Duran v Cook 788 P.2d 1083 (UT App. 1990) 
[Duty of counsel to adequately prepare for trial] 
State v Templin 805 P.2d 182 (UT 1990) 
[Duty of counsel to investigate and interview 
witnesses] 
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Commentary 
Defendant cites criminal cases set out herein. This is so 
for reason that these cases are specific and direct as to duties 
of counsel in a criminal case to be prepared, conduct including 
legal research, factual research, and witness research. It is 
appropriate to cite to said case in a civil case for reason that 
civil and criminal rules are unified if they do not conflict with 
constitutional principles. It would follow by logic and law that 
principles of law set in those cases likewise would be applicable. 
U.C.A. 78-27-19 "Law" defined 
"Where the term "law11 is used in this code, it 
means the Utah Constitution, the Utah Code, court rules, 
Judicial Council rules, and decisions of the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals." 
State v Anderson 797 P.2d 1114 (UT App. 1990) 
"...@pg 1116...Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 81(e), 
which serves generally to unify civil and criminal procedure 
in Utah except where a statute or rule provides otherwise for 
criminal cases...." 
Brigham City v Valencia 779 P.2d 1149 (UT App. 1989) 
"...@pg 1150...[T]he rules of civil procedure 
govern in criminal proceedings where not inconsistent 
with applicable rule or statute. Utah R.Civ.P. 81(e)...." 
Brief of Appellant Case No. 920050-CA Page 21 
Houston v Houston Utah Court of Appeals 
Relevance of these cases to the trial court in this case and 
the defendants rights are the fact that it is demonstrated in 
heading (A) that defendant was misled. The trial court clearly 
was unprepared in this case having not reviewed the files and not 
being familiar with the pleadings. If such conduct were 
acknowledged or discovered of an attorney clearly and 
unequivocally the case would be reversed based upon case law 
relevant to duties of counsel. 
It is of particular concern in this case for reason that the 
trial court in addition to its lack of preparation then purported 
to sentence the defendant to 60 days in jail for contempt. 
Defendants counsel protested such action by the court and 
immediately indicated the court had no such power to do and that 
it was clearly beyond said power, statutory provision relevant at 
the time applicable to contempt provided as follows: 
U.C.A. 78-32-10 "Contempt -- Action By Court" 
"Upon the answer and evidence taken, the court shall 
determine whether the person proceeded against is guilty 
of the contempt charged. If the court finds the person is 
guilty of the contempt, the court may impose a fine not 
exceeding $200, order the person imprisoned in the county 
jail not exceeding 30 days, or order both fine and 
imprisonment. However, a justice court judge or court 
commissioner may punish for contempt by a fine not to 
exceed $100 or by imprisonment for one day, or by both 
the fine and imprisonment." 
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Not only was the court not prepared in terms of facts of the 
case but it likewise had not reviewed the pleadings in the case 
and finally it was unfamiliar with the law. It is significant 
that the court refused to grant a stay and it was not until the 
following week that the courts clerk called both counsel and 
acknowledged that the court had gone back and read the statute. 
The entire course of the proceedings herein demonstrate a 
distinct lack of attentiveness to judicial duties or even minimal 
review of statutory provisions in this case. 
Fundamental principles under the state constitution as well 
as the due process rights of the defendant were violated as 
follows: 
Article I Section 27 Constitution of Utah 
"Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is 
essential to the security of individual rights and the 
perpetuity of free government11. 
Article I Section 7 Constitution of Utah 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law11. 
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In this case for the trial court to be as unprepared as it 
was in all aspects of this case, facts, law, file review, and 
proceedings and then to sentence the defendant to jail was a 
violation of the "public trust11 which the court holds and 
furthermore the constitutional due process rights of the defendant 
to have a judge and a court that was adequately prepared in the 
cause. 
The cases discuss the duties of counsel; however, those 
duties if they apply to advocates clearly should be applicable to 
the tribunal itself, otherwise the standard would be that the 
court itself would have no responsibility even minimally to read 
the file, be familiar with pleadings, and to at a minimum be 
familiar with the statutory provisions relating to sanctions that 
the court purported to impose. The transcripts clearly indicate 
the statutory limitations upon the courts power were exceeded. 
Transcript reference to the courts exceeding its statutory 
authority are as follows: 
January 17, 1992 T51 Line 21 thru 25; T52 Line 1; 
"Additionally, it's the court's order that the 
defendant is to serve sixty days in the Salt Lake County 
Jail in connection with contempt, and that is to commence 
forthwith. You are to submit yourself to the jurisdiction 
of the law enforcement officers in this court. You're 
going to the Salt Lake County Jail." 
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January 17, 1992 T53 Line 20 thru 24 
"And I can assure you that not only will you do 
this sixty days in connection with the contempt, unless 
you bring the arrearages current and purge yourself, but 
I will entertain future motions for contempt if you don't 
bring the arrearages current and keep up your monthly 
payments.11 
Not only was the court not versed in the law but even 
ordering it forthwith the court denied a request for a stay of the 
courts order for purposes of perfecting appeal during which time 
the court could have discovered its error before the following 
week when it was corrected. Indication where counsel did in fact 
request a stay of that order is as follows: 
Transcript January 17, 1992 T54 Line 12 thru 16 
"THE COURT: Just a moment, please. What is it, 
Mr. Payton? 
MR. PAYTON: We would request a stay of the court's 
order for purposes of perfecting an appeal. 
THE COURT: Denied." 
Conclusion to be reached herein is that there was a 
continuing pattern of lack of preparation by the court in both the 
facts and the law such to deny the defendant due process. 
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(C) LACK OF NOTICE 
Nelson v Jacobsen 669 P.2d 1207 (UT 1983) 
"...@pg 1211...Timely and adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are the 
very heart of procedural fairness. Worrall v Ogden 
City Fire Department, Utah, 616 P.2d 598, 601-02 (1980); 
Goss v Lopez 419 U.S. 565, 579, 95 S. Ct. 729, 738, 
42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). The much cited case of Mullane 
v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 3l4T 70 
S. Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed 865 (1950), sets ouFThe classic 
requirements of adequate notice: 
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due 
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded 
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all 
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of 
the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections. The 
notice must be of such nature as reasonably to 
convey the required information and it must afford 
a reasonable time for those interested to make their 
appearance. [Citations omitted]. 
Many cases have held that where notice is ambiguous 
or inadequate to inform a party of the nature of the 
proceedings against him or not given sufficiently in 
advance of the proceeding to permit preparation, a party 
is deprived of due process. Graham v Sawaya, Utah, 632 
P.2d 851 (1981); Uhler v Secretary of Health & Mental 
Hygiene, 45 Md.App. 282, 412 A.2d 1287 (1980); Myers v 
Moreno, Mo.App., 564 S.W.2d 83 (1978). 
Applying these standards to the record in this case, we 
conclude that the notice of trial was constitutionally 
deficient as to this unrepresented defendant because it 
described the nature of the proceedings against him in such 
ambiguous terms that it deprived him of adequate time to 
prepare his defense...." 
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"...@pg 1213...To satisfy an essential requisite of 
procedural due process a hearing must be prefaced by 
timely notice which adequately informs the parties of 
the specific issues they must prepare to meet. State 
v Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908,914, 500 P.2d 209, 215 (1979) ,f 
"...@pg 1213...Due process is not a technical 
concept that can be reduced to a formula with a fixed 
content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. 
Rather, the demands of due process rest on the concept of 
basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure 
appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved. 
Rupp v Grantsville City, Utah, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (1980) " 
Boggs v Boggs 824 P.2d 478 (UT App. 1991) 
"...@pg 481...As the trial court stated, the contempt 
judgment was based on both Husband's failure to pay 
child support and failure to respond to discovery... 
The record does not reveal any copy of an order to show 
cause regarding contempt, court approval or authorization 
of an order, or service of an order on Husband requiring 
him to appear at any time or place to show cause why he 
should not be held in contempt for failure to pay child 
support. "An order to show cause is an order from the 
court, directed to the defendant to appear and show cause 
why he should not be held in contempt for willfully 
disobeying the previous order of the court.ff Coleman v. 
Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Utah 1983) (per curiam) 
(emphasis in original). Further, the notice of hearing 
issued by the court simply notified counsel that the hearing 
was to be an "evidentiary hearing on divorce 
modification...." 
"...@pg 481...[I]n a case of indirect contempt, an 
affidavit must be presented to the court reciting the 
facts constituting the contempt in order to ensure that 
the court and the person charged are informed of the 
conduct alleged to be contemptuous. .. .ff 
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"...@pg 482...In the present case, no notice or 
order to show cause was issued by the trial judge or 
personally served on Husband. Husband appeared for a 
modification hearing and was ushered into a contempt 
proceeding. On the foregoing facts, it was not appropriate 
for the court to use the summary procedures provided in 
section 78-32-3. Thus, we reverse the contempt judgment 
based on Husband's conduct regarding child support...." 
Commentary 
Case herein is analogous to Boggs, supra, in that the 
defendant was "ushered into a contempt hearing" contrary to the 
trial courts own direction to counsel. In order to 
chronologically outline what occurred it is perhaps most 
convenient and useful to proceed chronologically by date of 
hearings and transcripts involved in which there are a total of 
three. 
NOVEMBER 27, 1991 (WED.) 
Case is a divorce action and came before the trial court on a 
"Motion For Sanctions and Attorneys Fees" for failure to attend a 
deposition. The trial court after having indicated it had 
"reviewed the entire file" dismissed the defendants Petition to 
reduce his child support and for other modifications as requested 
in his Petition For Modification filed October 11, 1990. 
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The court furthermore in response to questions about contempt 
and attorneys fees advised counsel for the plaintiff as follows: 
Transcript November 27, 1991 T-16 Line 1 thru 24 
"MR NEMELKA: May we also prepare an affidavit for 
attorneys fees? We've asked for attorneys fees in this 
matter. Or would you -- Let me go one step further. We 
have a contempt issue that needs to be heard in an 
evidentiary hearing. Commissioner Peuler has ruled that 
those issues of contempt for all of these things that 
he's done wrong should be heard at the time of the 
petition for modification. 
It being dismissed, then we want to notice up a 
hearing for the contempt issue. May we discuss the 
attorneys fees at that --
THE COURT: When you say the contempt issue, you're 
not talking now about contempt in connection with the 
failure to appear at depositions? 
ME. NEMELKA: No. We're talking about his failure 
to pay the child support. 
THE COURT: All right. I believe that there's an 
order in place as to back child support, but if there 
are remaining issues in connection with that, you 
certainly may notice that up, and I think the attorneys 
fee issue needs to be addressed. 
You can file an affidavit and motion. I'll give 
Mr. Payton, certainly, the opportunity to address that. 
Anything else?" (Emphasis AddecT) 
Transcript November 27, 1991 T-17 Line 20-25; T-18 Line 1 
"THE COURT: As soon as there's a final order, 
you certainly may do so. And as I say, you certainly 
may address this issue of the further contempt proceedings 
when Mr. Nemelka files his motion in connection with that, 
clarifying what is to be heard, and we'll set it for a 
hearing. And also you can address the issue of attorneys 
fees at that time. (Emphasis Added) 
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Transcript November 27, 1991 T-18 Line 2-20 
"MR. PAYTON: May I suggest, however, to the court, 
so that the record's clear, if you dismiss the petition, 
then he doesn't have any basis to bring contempt, because 
its based upon and predicated upon matters pertaining to 
the petition. 
THE COURT: I believe, as I understand it, that 
the contempt that he's alluding to -- and I've asked him 
to file a motion so it's clarified -- had to do with the 
failure to pay support on the original order; is that 
correct Mr. Nemelka? 
MR. NEMELKA: That's correct, Your Honor. In regard 
to his refusal to pay the child support. 
MR. PAYTON: And the petition goes to that issue 
specifically, that he is without that ability. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry, it's without what? 
MR. PAYTON: He's without that ability. So I'll 
leave it to Mr. Nemelka to file whatever he need be. 
THE COURT: Fine. All right, that'll be the 
order of the court. 
It is clear that the trial court expected plaintiffs counsel 
to file further pleadings in connection with clarifying what was 
to be heard. The trial court even "ordered" plaintiff to file an 
Affidavit and a motion and also reiterated that plaintiff had been 
asked to file a motion so that it is clarified. 
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It is significant that the trial court later denied any of 
these things and from a fair reading of the transcript it is clear 
that there was an expectation by the defendant of appropriate 
notice. 
Transcript January 3, 1992 T3 Line 15-25; T4 Line 1-7 
"MR. PAYTON: Your honor, I think that the record will 
reflect, I asked Ms. Wilson at the last hearing if she 
could transcribe what took place, but I have a distinct 
recollection, and indicated to Mr. Nemelka if he wanted to, 
pursue it and file a motion and set out the issues he 
wanted to pursue. To my knowledge, no such motion or 
anything else has ever been filed. 
THE COURT: Mr. Nemelka? 
MR. NEMELKA: No, that's not even close. We indicated 
as the order states, that your minute entry states, that 
the court, on its own motion, continues the hearing of 
contempt. Previously, at that time that hearing for 
contempt and attorneys fees was scheduled by the court 
when we were here at the last hearing. 
THE COURT: That's correct, and that's my recollection, 
I recall very clearly, Mr. Payton, setting the time at that 
point, and it's my recollection that your client was 
present at that time." 
Transcript January 3, 1992 T4 Line 18 thru 25 
MR. PAYTON: If I could submit to the court, 
notwithstanding Mr. Nemelka's reference to the order, 
a proper objection was filed pursuant to 506, and despite 
the fact that he refers to the order, case law says that 
if the transcript is at odds with the order, then what 
was said in court prevails. 
THE COURT: Where is the specific transcript at 
odds with the order? Do you have a specific page reference. 
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Transcript January 3, 1992 T7 Line 20-24 
"THE COURT: All right, let me be further, further 
clarify my order. If the defendant does not appear on the 
17th promptly at 3:30, I will sign a bench warrant issued 
for his arrest. It is imperative that he appears on that 
date. 
Transcript January 3, 1992 T8 Line 8-25; T9 Line 1-2 
"MR. NEMELKA: There's just one other item. We 
still have a counter-petition on the modification which 
deals toward -- We also, in the counter-petition, 
indicated he was in contempt of some previous orders, 
plus there was minor issue, and I just wanted to make 
sure that we're going to have that heard at the same 
time. 
THE COURT: Well I was not aware that the counter-
petition had been filed. Let me apologize for that, and 
indicate that there's so many pleadings in the file that 
it's hard to keep track of them. If there are some 
issues in connection with your counter-petition, I'll 
note for the record that the defendant's petition for 
modification was dismissed. If there remains issues 
beyond the contempt issue in the counter-petition, then 
you certainly will have the right to bring those up on 
the 17th. 
MR. NEMELKA: Fine. 
THE COURT: But I am going to ask that you give 
Mr. Payton and the court written notice of what those 
issues are. 
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JANUARY 3, 1992 (FRI.) 
Counsel appeared before the court at said time and counsel 
for the defendant protested proceeding for reason that plaintiff 
had filed neither affidavit, motion, or any other pleadings as the 
court had so directed and so ordered; therefore there was nothing 
before the court and the matter should appropriately be dismissed 
or in the alternative denied. 
The court indicated that it had simply "suggested" not 
ordered Mr. Nemelka to do so. Furthermore the defendant through 
counsel objected that he was not present for reason that he was 
never ordered to be present nor was there any document mandating 
or commanding his presence. Furthermore it was pointed out that 
there had been no notification or any other notification as to 
rulings on objections to the Commissioners recommendations, all of 
which have been properly objected to and none of which have there 
been rulings upon and/or notification to defendant or his counsel. 
The court then from the bench indicated that it would 
reschedule the matter for January 17, 1992 and the defendant would 
be there or the court would issue a bench warrant for him. 
Plaintiff would be heard on the issue of contempt. 
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TRANSCRIPT JANUARY 17, 1992 
T3 Line 2-25; T4 Line 1-6 
"THE COURT: This is the time set for a hearing in 
the matter of Houston versus Houston, 890901209, in 
connection with the counter-petition for contempt and 
attorneys fees. 
The record should reflect that the plaintiff and 
defendant are both present with counsel, Mr. Nemelka, and 
Mr. Payton; is that correct, counsel? 
MR. NEMELKA: Yes, Your Honor. We're ready to 
proceed. 
THE COURT: All right, you may proceed. 
MR. NEMELKA: Thank you. We'd call Mr. Houston 
to the stand. 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, before he gets carried 
away, we do have an objection to the proceeding based 
upon the record of the transcript and some — I'd like 
to be heard on that. 
THE COURT: You can be heard very briefly. 
What's your objection to going forward, Mr. Payton? 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, I have reduced -- In 
reading the transcript of November 27, 1991, the court 
last time we were here indicated it had no recollection--
MR. NEMELKA: Your Honor, I'm going to object. I 
don't have a copy. 
THE COURT: Let's just hear what Mr. Payton has to 
say, and I'll certainly allow you to make an objection. 
Go ahead Mr. Payton, if you would. 
MR. PAYTON: My understanding is the transcript 
is on file with the court. 
THE COURT: Just move forward, if you would, 
Mr. Payton. 
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T4 Line 7-25; T5 Line 1-20 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, on November 27th, the court 
indicated to Mr. Nemelka that, "You can file an affidavit: 
and a motion, IT11 give Mr. Payton, certainly, the 
opportunity to address that. Anything else? 
The court also, in that same hearing, indicated 
that, "As soon as there's a final order you certainly 
may do so". That was to me. "And as I say, you 
certainly may address this issue of the further contempt 
proceedings when Mr. Nemelka files his motion in connection 
with that, clarifying what is to be heard! And we'11 
set it for hearing. And also you can --" 
THE COURT: What's your point, Mr. Payton? Rather 
than reading from a transcript that, as Mr. Nemelka 
points out, I don't have in front of me, he doesn't 
have, let's cut to the chase. What is your point? 
MR. PAYTON: My point in this matter is that the 
court indicated that the directions and orders should be 
followed thereof, and in dismissing our petition, it so 
indicated that it had reviewed the entire record, and 
that it believed that when the court directs a party 
to do something, they should do it. 
Mr. Nemelka, to this day, as I stand here, has 
never filed an affidavit and motion further clarifying 
the issues, or otherwise setting out the issues, as you 
so directed him. 
THE COURT: I directed him to do that if he desired 
to do so. I did not order him to file anything. That's 
discretionary with Mr. Nemelka. 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, with all due respect, 
the transcript says, your words, "I've asked him to 
file a motion so its clarified." I believe-- and that's 
the court's wording. 
THE COURT: Mr. Payton, I know better than you what 
was in my mind, and I recall very clearly the hearing in 
question. And again, let me state very clearly that I 
told Mr. NemelkaV I gave him a deadline for filing a 
motion if he wished to file it. And suggested that that 
might be helpful in clarifying the issues. I did not 
order him to file it. 
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T5 Line 21-25; T6 Line 1-25; T7 Line 1-10 
Now, we're here for the hearing today. Actually 
we were here before on this hearing, and that was on 
January 3rd, and your client was not here, despite a 
court order asking him to be here, so we set it over to 
today's date. We don't have a great deal of time on these 
counter-petitions or motions. I'd like to move forward7 
if there s nothing further. 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, with regards to that, I'd 
just simply, so the record is protected, in that same 
transcript, the Supreme Court has ruled that if the 
transcript differs with the order, the transcript controls, 
and there is no such order, and the November --
THE COURT: What are you talking about? What order? 
How does the transcript differ with what order? 
MR. PAYTON: You indicated that you had ordered the 
defendant to be here on January 3rd. I'm simply pointing 
out the record does not bear that out. 
THE COURT: We moved to another, a new issue, then, 
Mr. Payton? 
MR. PAYTON: Correct. The transcript is at odds 
with that. 
THE COURT: All right, well, the defendant is 
present today."" 
MR. PAYTON: Involuntarily, under the threat of the 
fact that you would have him arrested if he did not 
appear here. 
THE COURT: Well he's here, and we're going forward 
Mr. Payton, unless there's something else. I believe I 
have the right to order his presence on a contempt 
hearing, which has been pending for some time. 
MR. PAYTON: We have filed with the court our 
arguments in writing. I think that in terms of the 
right to be heard, that certainly if the court is now 
saying it was a directive, not an order to Mr. Nemelka, 
we certainly relied upon it. I certainly believe under 
the circumstances that we had a right to rely upon his 
filing something, and I raised that issue the last time 
we were here, and the court indicated that it had no 
recollection of even suggesting such a motion. So I 
simply make the record in this case. 
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T7 Line 11-25; T8 Line 1-18 
THE COURT: 1 don't get it, Mr. Payton. How are 
you prejudiced? You're telling me that you were unaware 
that the counter-motion on contempt would be heard today? 
Is that what you're telling me. 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor --
THE COURT: Or are you saying that you're 
prejudiced by Mr. Nemelka not filing something additional 
in writing? What is it you're saying? 
MR. PAYTON: We are not going to presume whatever 
it is that Mr. Nemelka does or does not. The Utah Court 
of Appeals has recently, from a case from Judge Brian, 
dealt with this very issue, although I have not seen 
the advance sheets, in terms of due process and of 
hearings. And there's certain steps, if he wants to 
pursue the issues that he's done, that he had to do, 
and he has not done it. 
THE COURT: What hasn't he done, Mr. Payton? 
MR. PAYTON: I think with regards to the issue of 
the affidavit and the motion, that the court was correct. 
And he has not done that. If he is relying upon his 
original pleadings, the court indicated it had read the 
entire file, and that directive was made to Mr. Nemelka 
in light of the specific representation to the court, of 
the court, that it had reviewed the entire file on 
November 27th, 1991. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. PAYTON: No. 
THE COURT: Mr. Nemelka. 
MR. NEMELKA: It's all moot, Your Honor. We 
discussed it all the last hearing, and you indicated --
We discussed what issues we were going to hear today. 
The order said he's to be here, we go forward on the 
hearing. That's what we're here for. I don't want to 
get involved in all that, because in my opinion it's 
a bunch of baloney. 
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T8 Line 19-25; T9 Line 1-14 
Let's just go forward with the hearing and do the 
contempt. There's no prejudice, there was no order. 
The counter-petition is still in effect, our order to 
show cause is in effect. There was four orders of this 
court stating that the contempt issues are reserved 
until the hearing on the petition to modify. 
When his petition to modify was thrown out by the 
court, the court specifically said, and I asked, "Will 
we need a hearing on our counter-petition?". You said, 
"Fine let's schedule it. Let's schedule it, let's go." 
THE COURT: We're going forward, Mr. Payton. 
MR. PAYTON: May I simply put into the record that 
we waived no procedural issues with regards to the four 
orders procedurally. We have never been notified of 
any rulings or anything else, and every matter from the 
commissioner, we filed an appropriate objection to. So we 
don t waive any procedural errors. 
MR. NEMELKA: We'd call Mr. Houston to the stand, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Houston, will you come forward 
please." 
All parties appeared before the court with counsel. 
Defendant herein as a matter of prudence filed a "Hearing Brief" 
in support of his contentions and reasserted that plaintiff had 
not complied with the order of the court. The court however 
continued to insist that they were simply "suggestions" and 
furthermore would not allow counsel for defendant to verbally make 
a complete record however the "Hearing Brief", copy attached, 
supports contentions as made herein. 
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Defendant objected to going forth since there was not basis 
for contempt in terms of procedural statutory provisions complied 
with herein or compliance with courts "directive" to plaintiffs 
counsel. 
Plaintiffs counsel April 12, 1991 (Fri.) mailed to counsel 
for defendant and filed with the court "Certification of Readiness 
For Trial" and certified therein by his signature thereon "that 
counsel has completed all discovery" and otherwise certified that 
there was nothing further to be done and the case was ready for 
trial. Defendant never opposed that certification and if in fact 
it is not true than plaintiffs counsel knowingly and intentionally 
misled the defendant and the court [R698]. 
See: Walker v State 624 P.2d 687 (UT 1981) 
At conclusion of the hearing 1/17/92 (Fri.) the court found 
the defendant in "contempt" and also found that he owed support 
arrearages of $11,343.00 and judgment was due. 
Attorneys fees the defendant objected to or a proffer on the 
same basis that no affidavit or other pleading had been filed as 
the court had ordered 11/27/91. 
The court ordered the defendant to serve "60 days in the Salt 
Lake County Jail forthwith", half the medical and dental expense, 
the court would not order interest for reason that the defendant 
had "no notice of those matters". 
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Defendant then was "immediately" led out of the courtroom; 
however, counsel realizing Martin Luther King Holiday being the 
following Monday 1/20/92 and the courts would be closed indicated 
to the court he was required by law to "request a stay of 
proceedings for purposes of appeal". The court indicated that 
that was "denied" and made other statements that it would 
furthermore not hesitate to take the same action again in the 
future. 
The history of this case and by the trial court 
representation to the defendant was one of denial of due process 
to him under the Utah State Constitution. The court itself 
clearly, as appears from the transcripts of all hearings herein, 
was unequivocal in terms of orders to the plaintiffs counsel. He 
was to file additional matters and even the court refers to 
"clarifying" what is to be heard and clearing those up. 
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Each time that the parties appeared before the trial court 
respective times being set out in transcripts as follows: 
Transcript November 27, 1991 Record 975 thru 993 
Transcript January 03, 1992 Record 965 thru 975 
Transcript January 17, 1992 Record 911 thru 964 
the trial court categorically denied that it had said and done 
things which were clearly set out in the transcript and which are 
and were controlling. The defendant clearly had a right to rely 
upon the comments of the court and as phrased and set out in the 
transcript they were not suggestions but appeared to be specific 
"directives11 or order of the court. 
In any case no compliance therewith existed and there was a 
right to not only expect that there be compliance with the 
statutory procedures but likewise that the trial court would 
follow through. 
Given the fact that no notice was supplied to the defendant 
clearly articulating and setting out the matters he was denied due 
process both in terms of statutory provisions relating to contempt 
and specifically what was relied upon as well as having been 
misled and clearly the trial court denying statements which the 
transcript clearly supports were made by the trial court. 
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(D) LACK OF TEMPERATE NEUTRALITY 
Bunnell v Industrial Commission of Utah 740 P.2d 1331 
(UT 1987) 
11
. . . @pg 1332.. .Plaintiff claims that he was denied due 
process of law by the manner in which the administrative law 
judge conducted the hearing...We agree with plaintiffs first 
claim; we reverse and remand for rehearing before another 
administrative law judge....11 
"...@pg 1333...[E]very person who brings a claim in a 
court or at a hearing held before an administrative agency 
has a due process right to receive a fair trial in front 
of a fair tribunal. Anderson v Industrial Commission, 
696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985). "Fairness requires not 
only an absence of actual bias, but endeavors to present 
even the possibility of unfairness11. . . 
Our review of the record persuades us that: the 
manner"in which the administrative law judge conducted 
this hearing was sufficiently unfair as to constitute 
a denial of plaintiffs constitutional right to a fair 
hearing. 
[T]he record reflects an atmosphere in which plaintiff's 
witnesses were inhibited and intimidated by the judged 
conduct, and felt defensive and hesitant to testify; the 
judge interferred with plaintiff's counsel's ability to 
make a record and argue the evidence; and the judge gave 
the appearance of having decided the case without even 
considering the medical records....11 
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"...@pg 1334...We also comment with concern on the 
atmosphere created by the administrative law judge. 
Although the record cannot fully capture the demeanor 
of the administrative law judge, it does capture his 
comments and the verbal reactions of the witnesses to 
him. . . 
The administrative law judge was also intolerant 
of counsel's argument on behalf of plaintiff. He 
refused to listen to closing argument. More shockingly 
when plaintiffs counsel offered argument assessing the 
evidence before the admission of the medical records 
on which the administrative law judge purportedly made 
his decision, the administrative law judge told plaintiff's 
counsel to save the argument for rehearing, indicating 
that he had already decided to hold against plaintiff 
without even examining the medical records. 
In short, the administrative law judge's conduct so 
far diverged from that which would be expected from an 
impartial judge that we agree with plaintiff that his 
right to due process was violated...." 
Anderson v Industrial Com'n of Utah 696 P.2d 1219 (UT 1985) 
"...@pg 1221...One of the fundamental principles of 
due process is that all parties to a case are entitled to 
an unbiased, impartial judge. "A fair trial in a fair 
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process". In 
re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 
99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). Fairness requires not only an 
absence of actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even 
the possibility of unfairnessT 
This principle applies with as much force to 
administrative proceedings as it does to judicial trials. 
Gibson v Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 
1698, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973); Vali Convalescent & Care 
Institution v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 649 P.2d 
33, 37 (1982)... 
We therefore set aside the Commission's order and 
remand this case for submission of the issue to another 
administrative law judge. 
Reversed and remanded...." 
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In Re Murchison 349 US 133, 99 L Ed 942, 75 S Ct 623 (1955) 
"...@pg 946...A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a 
basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course 
requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. 
But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent 
even the probability of unfairness...This Court has said, 
however, that "every procedure which would offer a possible 
temptation to the average man as a judge ... not to hold 
the balance nice, clear and true between the State and 
the accused, denies the latter due process of law.11 
Tumey v Ohio, 273 US 510, 532, 71 L ed 749, 758, 47 S Ct 
437, 50 ALR 1243. Such a stringent rule may sometimes 
bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would 
do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally 
between contending parties. But to perform its high 
function in the best way "justice must satisfy the 
appearance of justice.' Offutt v United States, 348 US 
11, 99 L ed 11, 75 S Ct 11 ff 
Commentary 
The overall "atmosphere of the courtroom11 at all times was an 
atmosphere which upon the judge taking the bench every time made 
it clear that there would be nothing heard in this case. Hearing 
November 27, 1991 the judge clearly was predisposed as to the 
issue on even minimal evidence without hearing of any testimony or 
otherwise. 
Furthemore in every hearing held the trial court would cut 
off defendants counsel and in temper, tenor, and tone, at times 
literally was yelling at counsel. When questions were asked by 
the trial court defendants counsel was cut off in mid-sentence 
after attempting to raise issues he believed significant to the 
law. 
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It is particularly significant that in the Third District the 
matter is taken by a written transcript; however, this raises a 
constitutional issue of equal protection in that from a technology 
standpoint and in this case that at the Commissioner level there 
are audio tapes in which linguistically and in terms of what took 
place the appellate court can actually listen although not see 
what occurred. 
The technology does not stop there; however, for in District 
Courts throughout the state and in the Third District the 
courtroom is equipped with audio/video equipment where one can see 
and hear what is taking place. The fact that some parties can 
actually have access to those technologies and demonstrate what 
the written page cannot and others as this defendant cannot, 
raises a constitutional denial. In this case the judge 
"literally" was yelling at counsel and demonstrated a clear lack 
of temperate neutrality between the parties. 
This was compounded by the fact that the trial court had 
misled the defendant in terms of knowledge of the file, had 
demonstrated a lack of preparation, and had simply attempted to 
use "raw judicial power" to compell the defendant to appear before 
it without benefit of proper proceedings and finally denying that 
there was specific directions to counsel to prepare documents but 
simply indicating they were "suggestions". 
Brief of Appellant Case No. 920050-CA Page 45 
Houston v Houston Utah Court of Appeals 
Furthermore even request for stay was denied. The fact that 
technology is available, both audio and audio/video and not being 
used requires that no adverse inference may be made against the 
defendant and that all assertions herein must be taken as true 
since defendant has literally been denied an opportunity to have 
use of technology which those aspects of the trial courts conduct 
complained of could have been preserved. 
It is not something to lightly dismiss for reason that 
evaluation of judges themselves contemplate and takes into 
consideration factors which were missing in this case by this 
judge and relevant ones are set out as provided in the Code of 
Judicial Administration as follows: 
CJA Rule 3-111 "Performance Evaluation For Certification 
of Judges and Commissioners1' 
"...(!) Objection. 
(B) Any judge or commissioner who fails to satisfy 
any of the standards set forth in this rule is deemed not 
entitled to certification. Any judge or commissioner 
deemed not entitled to certification may request a hearing 
before the Council. The Council may, after hearing if 
requested, within its sole discretion, grant certification 
based on written findings that it is in the best interests 
of the administration of justice. 
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(2) Criteria of Performance. The following shall 
be used to evaluate a judge or commissioner: 
(A) Integrity-- Factors considered shall include but 
are not limited to: 
(ii) Freedom from personal bias; 
(iv) Impartiality of actions; and 
(B) Knowledge and understanding of the law and judicial 
branch rules 
(ii) Understanding the substantive, procedural, 
and evidentiary law of the state; 
(iii) Attentiveness to the factual and legal 
issues before the court; 
(C) Ability to communicate -- Factors considered 
shall include but are not limited to: 
(i) clarity of bench rulings and other oral 
communications; 
(iii) sensitivety to impact of demeanor and 
other nonverbal communications. 
(D) Preparation, attentiveness, dignity and 
control over proceedings -- Factors considered shall 
include but are not limited to: 
(i) courtesy to all parties and participants; and 
(ii) willingness to permit every person legally 
interested in a proceeding to be heard, unless 
precluded by law or rules of courts....11 
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Integrity The trial court in this case should be free from 
personal bias; however, not only in this case is and was there 
indication of personal bias but the trial court [Judge, Leslie A. 
Lewis] has granted public television interviews wherein she has 
made it quite clear that "all defendants in her court in similar 
situations are going to jail". 
This reflected a personal bias that was reflected in an 
inability to discuss any other issues including the failure of the 
plaintiff to comply with orders of the Commissioner if in fact 
such are there but denied to be procedurally correct: and the 
judges personal belief about it as having been previously 
expressed in the news media and on television. 
Furthermore January 17, 1992 from approximately one-quarter 
into the hearing and testimony the courtroom was suddenly ringed 
by at least six (6) if not more deputies from the Salt Lake County 
Sheriffs Office and the judge had neither concluded the hearing 
nor completed same in the matter thereby creating an oppressive 
atmosphere in the courtroom given those aside from the Deputies 
the only other persons present were court personnel, respective 
counsel, and the parties. 
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Knowledge Understanding of the law was demonstrably 
missing herein in that the trial court clearly was wrong about the 
contempt matters, the procedural process, and factual and legal 
issues before the trial court with which the trial court indicated 
it was familiar and which as the transcripts demonstrate was not 
true. 
Comments & Demeanor The trial court clearly sought to 
silence counsel and at one point even set out that counsel could 
not know what was in the courts mind. [T5 Line 14-20] The trial 
court at that juncture was almost literally "yelling11 at counsel 
and clearly the court was not sensitive to the impact of demeanor 
and even non-verbal communications for at times the trial court 
was pointing at counsel and shaking its finger almost as a parent 
disciplining a child and yet counsel had done nothing contrary to 
the Rules of Professional Conduct to warrant such treatment from 
the court. 
Bias There was a distinct partiality and lack of courtesy 
to parties and participants in that the trial court clearly 
appeared to be biased in favor of attorney Nemelka's side of the 
case for there was a completely different tone and way of dealing 
with counsel and his client totally lacking in dealing with 
counsel for defendant who was cut off while speaking to the trial 
court was intent on not letting counsel make a record and be heard 
as is evidenced from the transcript of proceedings. 
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Neutrality There was a distinct lack of temperate 
neutrality created by the atmosphere in the courtroom and the 
presumption must be that the defendants assertions are correct 
since the state has made a decision or election not to employ 
better technology than the cold written page which does not convey 
the tones of voice, mannerisms, pointing, and other final 
questions. Clearly such technology is available and in use in the 
district; however, reserved for some courtrooms and participants 
and not for others. 
Lack of neutrality alone is deserving of the courts order 
being set aside, defendants Petition reinstated, and the contempt 
vacated. 
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(E) PROCEDURAL DEFECTS 
CJA Rule 4-501 "Motions" 
Gillmor v Cummings 806 P..2d 1205 (UT App. 1991) 
"...@pg 1208...We reverse because of procedural 
error, and not on either issue Gillmor argues on appeal. 
Therefore, we do not address the substantive issues 
Gillmor presents... 
Gillmorfs motion to reconsider also directed the 
trial courtf s attention to the prematurity of the 
summary judgment under Rule 4-501(1)(b). At that point, 
the trial court should have corrected the procedural 
problem with its summary judgment ruling by reconsidering 
that ruling in light of Gillmorfs January 25 affidavits... 
Because the trial court granted summary judgment 
prematurely under the applicable procedural rules, and 
because nothing in the record indicates that the court 
corrected its procedural error when that error was called 
to its attention, the summary judgment is set aside. 
See Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v Ironwood 
Exploration, Inc., 735 P.2d 62, 62-63 (Utah 1987); K.O. 
v Denison, 748 P.2d 588, 591 (Utah Ct.App.1988) " 
(Emphasis Added) 
Commentary 
Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 applies in its 
entirety. There had been in this case multiple hearings before 
the Commissioner, Sandra N. Peuler in this case. 
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Consistent with the rule objections from the Commissioners 
recommendations were in existance at the time and all such rulings 
were objected to and filed. Counsel for opposing side submitted a 
response and such was the last that was ever heard of any of those 
rulings. There never had been any notice of ruling on the 
objections or otherwise sent out to counsel for either party and 
no such indication of notice to counsel of the parties on such 
rulings can be found anywhere in the record. 
Furthermore on none of the hearings before the Commissioner, 
consistent with the policy at the time, was there at any time any 
testimony taken under oath and matters were solely done by proffer 
even though over the objection of the parties, neither of which 
were pleased with that situation. 
Notwithstanding this lack of procedural due process and 
confrontation of which the Commissioner repeatedly made it clear 
that the plaintiff did not come with clean hands and issued 
specific directives to the plaintiff which she in fact did not and 
has never complied with. 
Based upon these procedural errors alone there existed no 
basis for the trial court to find the defendant in contempt since 
objections that had never been properly ruled upon and 
procedurally no notice was ever given as to disposition of 
objections to Commissioners rulings. Defendant in fact 
specifically pointed out he waived no errors. 
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Court of Appeals had previously had occasion to rule on 
procedural issues under CJA Rule 4-501 "Motions". 
Gillmor v Cummings 806 P.2d 1205 (UT App. 1991) 
"...@pg 1208...We reverse because of procedural 
error, and not on either issue Gillmor argues on appeal. 
Therefore, we do not address the substantive issues 
Gillmor presents... 
It is significant that even after the contempt that the 
defendant had been in jail for some time before an order was 
prepared and even then under CJA Rule 4-501 "Motions" the order 
was not submitted to counsel for examination and objection prior 
to such time as it was submitted to the trial court. This clearly 
was a breach of the rule itself which gives counsel an opportunity 
to file an objection prior to the trial court signing same. 
Notwithstanding this breach of the rule the trial court proceeded 
to, as it appears from the record, file orders unbeknownst to the 
parties, said orders being not consistent with the rule thereby 
denying defendant due process. 
It is basic and implicit in the concept of due process that 
each branch of government must follow its own rules whether it be 
executive, judicial, or administrative. 
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Defendant had a right not only to the published rules being 
followed but also an expectation that they would be followed as 
published. 
Under the issue of contempt itself the defendant never had in 
fact received notice as set out, mandated, and required, pursuant 
to the statutory provisions; however, even thereafter he was never 
afforded an opportunity to review findings and other orders as 
required prior to such time as an order was entered. This in and 
of itself is a violation and procedural defect alone by which he 
was harmed. 
The trial court purported to dismiss f,with prejudice11 the 
defendants petition. This raises a question in terms of 
essentially ruling on the merits of a claim and thereby 
endangering the safety and welfare of the children and furthermore 
raised a question of impartiality given that the trial court 
itself acknowledged it was a severe remedy but one which 
conceiveably could cut off permanently defendants right to come 
forth and raise issues given the case law. 
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Even at best the trial court can only dismiss and the 
sanction would be that the defendant would have to refile and 
start over. Counsel is required to draft an order as a matter of 
professional responsibility consistent with the ruling of the 
trial court and there is nothing in the record which would support 
the trial court ever having said or indicated the matter should be 
dismissed "with prejudice11. 
This procedural error itself is egregious enough that it 
warrants the trial courts order being vacated, defendants petition 
reinstated and the contempt being said aside. 
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(F) CONCLUSION 
Defendant/appellant was clearly and affirmatively misled by 
?lfalse impressions11 conveyed to the defendant by the trial court 
as to its familiarity with the file which in fact turned out to be 
totally untrue. 
The trial court in fact was totally unprepared and displayed 
a lack of preparation for this trial and this hearing as 
demonstrated by the transcript and the courts own statements. 
Defendant furthermore was not given notice as the trial court 
itself had ordered and this is apparent and clear from its 
statements. Furthermore when the defendant attempted to argue his 
case there clearly was a lack of temperate neutrality which to the 
extent that technology is used in other courts was not available 
to the defendant as to the courts temper, tenor, tone, and taste. 
Furthermore its demeanor and attitude toward the defendant. 
Finally the procedural defects in the case rise to a 
constitutional level since the defendant never at anytime had an 
opportunity to present testimony under oath or hearing on anything 
that came from the Commissioner to the court and therefore any 
rulings of the court would be defective from a constitutional 
perspective for reason that the defendant never had a hearing at 
which testimony could be taken. 
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Sum total of the defects and procedure by which this case was 
handled requires that the dismissal with prejudice of the 
defendants Petition For Modification be reversed and the contempt 
of the defendant be vacated. 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; NOVEMBER 27, 1991; P.M. SESSION 
THE COURT: Let me note for the record that this 
is the time set for a hearing in connection with the matter 
of Houston versus Houston, 890901209. Both counsel for the 
plaintiff, Mr. Nemelka, and counsel for the defendant, Mr. 
Payton, are present. I notice the parties are not here. 
Is that correct? 
MR. PAYTON: For the defendant, that's correct, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And he did not anticipate being here 
today? 
MR. PAYTON: No, I think it's just on Mr. 
Nemelka's motion. 
THE COURT: Well it's most definitely on Mr. 
Nemelka's motion. I had assumed that at least the 
defendant would be here, because what occurs today is 
definitely going to impact, here. 
But if you're here representing him, we'll go 
forward. Certainly we're not going to reschedule the 
hearing when it's been scheduled so many times before. 
Let me indicate for the record that this is a 
matter in which there is a motion to compel, and for 
sanctions, that was originally filed by Mr. Nemelka on 
behalf of the plaintiff on May 16th of this year. There 
was also a plaintiff's renewal, or renewed motion for 
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nnorr? 
1 I sanctions that was filed on June 25th with the court. 
2 I This matter has been scheduled.on a number of 
3 I occasions. On one occasion it was continued by the court, 
4 J of necessity. On the last occasion that"this was set, 
5 I November 8th of 1991, we were set to go, Mr. Nemelka was 
6 I present, the hour for the hearing came and passed without 
7 J Mr. Payton being present, and finally we got a call 
8 I indicating that counsel was before the Industrial 
9 I commission, and could not be present, and asked to have the 
10 I matter set over. 
11 J So it is on today in connection with the motion 
12 I to compel and for sanctions. Mr. Nemelka. 
13 I MR. NEMELKA: Thank you. Your Honor. Very 
14 I briefly, I've kind of lost track of how many tiroes we've 
15 I noticed up Mr. Houston's deposition. I think maybe five or 
16 I six different times. 
17 J THE COURT: Let me just ask one preliminary 
18 J question. I know there's not only the deposition of Mr. 
19 I Houston at issue, but also the deposition of Marva, is it, 
20 I Marva Houston? 
21 I MR. NEMELKA: That's correct. 
22 I THE COURT: Has either one of those depositions 
23 I taken place? 
24 MR. NEMELKA: No, they have not. 
25 I THE COURT: And neither one is set? is that 
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correct? 
MR. NEMELKA: No, they have not. Because Mr. 
Payton has specifically stated to us that neither one of 
them is going to show up. 
THE COURT: I have reviewed all the 
correspondence that's been attached to the motions. I 
don't want to curtail your right to say anything that you 
feel to be meaningful in connection with this case, Mr. 
Nemelka. I want you and Mr. Payton to have full 
opportunity to state your position. 
But I will tell you that I'm inclined to grant 
the motion to compel, and for sanctions. So my suggestion 
would be that we let Mr. Payton address the issue, and then 
you can certainly respond. Mr, Payton. 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, I'll be brief. Let me 
just indicate a couple of things so the record is clear. 
If a party comes in and they want relief under equitable 
principles, they have to come with clean hands. And I 
suppose it's been somewhat of a joke, at least between 
counsel, but on one or another my client shows up and Mr. 
Nemelka's client doesn't, or vice versa. 
There have been a number of hearings before the 
commissioner, and I believe if the court would note that at 
one point in this matter I filed a certificate of readiness 
for trial to see if we could get the matter in and get it 
000079 
£ 
1 I h e a r d . 
2 I I think most significantly is that it is our 
3 I understanding as to Commissioner Peuler's recommendation 
4 I when this issue came up for sanctions before her, number 
5 I one, she indicated with regards to the deposition, and 
6 J we've never ever had any notice from Mr. Nemelka*s office 
7 J that there's ever been rescheduled subsequent thereto. I 
8 I did send him- -
9 I THE COURT: Well, let me just say that I wasn't 
10 I born yesterday, and there's correspondence in the file that 
11 . I clearly indicates from you to Mr. Nemelka—it's attached, I 
12 I believe, to his first, and maybe his second motion to 
13 I compel—that you would not be cooperating in allowing your 
14 I client to appear, nor his wife, at a deposition. So I'm 
15 I well aware of what the facts are in that regard. 
16 J MR. PAYTON: I suggest to the court, in the 
17 I interest of making a record, here—and I stand by 
18 I everything—that I suggest that I was the one who filed 
19 I correspondence with the court as a matter of protection. 
20 I THE COURT: Well anyway, the correspondence has 
21 I come to my attention, and what it reflects about your 
22 I position, I think, makes it clear that you did not feel 
23 I your client should have to appear at a deposition. Is that 
24 I a fair statement, Mr. Payton? 
25 MR. PAYTON: Probably a fair statement, but I 
00P0CO 
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think that the reasons are significant. Let me indicate, I 
the court mentioned his wife. I don't think his wife is in 
i 
issue here, because her deposition certainly has never been 
renoticed after the commissioner's hearing. I don't think 
that that's an issue here today. 
THE COURT: You realize, Mr. Payton, that 
Commissioner Peuler, as a result of a hearing, ordered that 
the defendant have his deposition taken. You remember that 
and recall that? 
MR. PAYTON: Thatfs correct. But the court was 
lumping them both together. I was trying to sort out 
what's not an issue. I don't think that the wife's in 
issue, because certainly she has never been noticed back up 
after we had a matter before the commissioner. 
THE COURT: We'll restrict ourselves to 
discussing the defendant. 
MR. PAYTON: We filed no objection to that, so 
| thatfs not in issue here today, I don't think. 
With regards to my client, let me indicate that, 
without telling Mr. Nemelka how to do it, that there were 
objections. One of the problems in this case is, that came 
up with- - The commissioner indicated that sanctions and 
I other matters, the last time we were before her, was that 
J we ought to get this matter on the calendar and get it 
I tried, and that all those matters should be dealt with 
ooocn 
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together. 
I have a distinct and clear recollection that the 
last time we were before the commissioner the matter of the 
deposition of Mr. Houston came up, and she wanted it 
rescheduled. Mr. Nemelka has then never rescheduled. 
Now, I will apologize and stand corrected if that 
is wrong, but he certainly has never given us a new date 
within which to appear. Subsequent to the commissioner 
indicating that my client appear. 
THE COURT: Well, let me just indicate to you, 
Mr. Payton, that in the court's file, attached to Mr. 
Nemelka's renewed motion for sanctions, there is a letter 
on your law office stationery dated June 20th, 1991. After 
the title, "Dear Mr. Nemelka," it says in caps, "Deposition 
non-appearance." It goes on to say, "This letter is to 
advise you that client of the undersigned will not be 
appearing for the deposition scheduled this date." 
MR. PAYTON: That's correct. But subsequent to 
that was when we were before the commissioner. That's what 
I'm saying, is that when you put it in a chronological 
order, that letter originally was written, and we went to 
the commissioner, and she ordered him to appear. And there 
has been nothing further from Mr. Nemelka since. 
Excuse me, I didn't interrupt you, counsel. I 
didn't persist in that position after the commissioner made 
onoor2 
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a recommendation he appear. And there's nothing 
subsequent. I originally took that position. I did not 
persist in this after Commissioner Peuler ordered that he 
appear. There has been nothing since thSh. 
MR. NEMELKA: You asked to point out if you're 
wrong, Mr. Payton, and you're totally wrong. You read in 
your letter, "We appeared at Commissioner Peuler's on the 
10th of June." That's when she ordered your client's 
deposition on the 20th of June, and he did not appear, and 
you said he would not appear. We haven't discussed the 
deposition with Commissioner Peuler since that time. 
That's totally wrong. 
MR. PAYTON: I won't interrupt, since the federal 
rule is that you don't address matters to counsel, by rule. 
But if I could see the letter. One of the problems in this 
case is Mr. Nemelka will send something- -
THE COURT: Mr. Payton, why don't you, then, in 
keeping with what you've just indicated is your practice, 
address your remarks to me. If you have something that you 
want to offer as an exhibit for me to consider, you're 
welcome to. I believe I have everything in front of me. 
I'll leave it to Mr. Nemelka to offer anything he wishes 
to, and I'm certainly going to give him a chance to 
respond. Is there anything you'd add? 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, if we had a date 
H000S3 
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1 I certain, we'd be happy to appear, as long as it's in 
2 I conformity with the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3 I THE COURT: Mr. Payton, let me just put a 
4 I question to you. You received, did you not, the motion for 
5 I sanctions that was sent out approximately May 16th of '91? 
6 I MR. PAYTON: That's correct. 
7 I THE COURT: Did you also receive the renewed 
8 I motion for sanctions? 
9 I MR. PAYTON: Correct. 
10 I THE COURT: Did you review them? 
11 I MR. PAYTON: We have. 
12 I THE COURT: And you understood that the motion to 
13 I compel and the motion for sanctions went to the fact that 
14 I Mr. Houston had not cooperated in a deposition. Did you 
15 I understand that? 
16 I MR. PAYTON: I'm sorry, I'm reviewing the docket 
17 I text of what's filed with the court. 
18 I THE COURT: Well, let me just note for the record 
19 I that that- - I'm speaking, Mr. Payton. That a clear 
20 I reading of the motion to compel and the renewed motion 
21 I makes it clear that the underlying problem is Mr. Houston, 
22 I the defendant's non-appearance at depositions. 
23 J My question to you is, did you attempt in any 
24 I way, seeing these motions to compel, in all the months that 
25 I have followed—I mean we're now at November 27th, and the 
0000C4 
motion to compel was filed May 16th with the court—have 
you ever attempted to set up a depositioa time with Mr. 
Nemelka? 
MR. PAYTON: Personally, no. It has been 
correspondence to him, however, and we- -
THE COURT: You mean the letters wherein you said 
that your client would not cooperate? 
MR. PAYTON: No, I don't. I mean we've been back 
and forth to the commissioner at least four times since 
then, and she indicated at our last appearance that all 
these matters should be consolidated and we should get this 
on for trial, period. 
I think we have a right to rely upon that 
representation. That issue has been discussed ad nauseam 
before the commissioner, and I think as an officer of the 
tribunal, that even Mr. Nemelka has a duty to acknowledge 
that that's correct. 
One of the things here, as I indicated, with 
regards—and discussed with Mr. Nemelka—we talk about 
non-appearances, we appeared before the commissioner with 
regards to- -
THE COURT: No, we're not discussing 
non-appearances, except with reference to the deposition 
and the fact that it has not occurred, in violation of 
Commissioner Peuler's order. 
orooes 
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MR. PAYTON: Then I stand upon what I just said. 
We've been back before the commissioner.* Her last 
indication was that all these matters should be referred on 
the trial calendar, and we should get this tried, our 
position is she thinks there has been enough fault to go 
around for both sides, and we should simply put this file 
housekeeping in order and get it done. 
And that was the last thing that was said at the 
last appearance before the commissioner, which, since the 
time of the letter you speak, we've been back four times 
before her. And I stand upon that. I think I have a right 
to expect some reliance upon what she said, that that be 
the case. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. PAYTON: No, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Mr. Nemelka? 
MR. NEMELKA: Very briefly, Your Honor. The 
motion for sanctions, you've correctly pointed out, was 
filed the 16th of May, because on three or four different 
occasions he never showed up for his deposition. We filed 
the transcript. 
On the 10th of June, on another matter, a 
pretrial, we appeared before Commissioner Peuler and she 
specifically says, "This is not going to happen any more. 
Your client shows up at the deposition on the 20th of June. 
nnonrs 
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Irregardless, no excuses, he'll be there." 
The 20th of June rolls around.* Mr. Payton says, 
sends me the letter, which I've attached it to our renewed 
motion, saying, "We're not coming." The"24th of June I 
filed my renewed motion, attached the letter, and said, 
"Hey, they're not coming." 
THE COURT: Mr. Nemelka, do you have a copy of 
the order or the minute entry from Commissioner Peuler 
concerning the deposition issue? 
MR. NEMELKA: After this period of time? 
THE COURT: The one that occurred at the June 
10th hearing. 
MR. NEMELKA: No, I do not. The June 10th, as I 
recall, Your Honor, was a pretrial, and I do not have- -
As I recall, it was a pretrial hearing. It was originally 
scheduled May 22nd, continued to the 10th of June, 
Commissioner Peuler's office. 
And we were in there and w« discussed all the 
issues of the pretrial, and I said, "I can't go forward 
until I take his deposition." And she said, "Okay, it'll 
be set on that." But I don't have a copy of her 
recommendat ion. 
THE COURT: And there doesn't appear to be any 
dispute about that. 
MR. NEMELKA: And subsequent to that time we've 
ooorr 
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been back in court a few times, that^s true. We'll again 
be in court, probably ten or twelve times over the last 
three years, because Mr. Houston won't do anything the 
court tells him to do. So we may have been in this court 
in this period of time, but none of it has to do with the 
deposition. 
MR. PAYTON: I don't think he means he and I, 
when he says "we." 
THE COURT: Mr. Payton 
MR. PAYTON: Excuse me. 
THE COURT: Mr. Nemelka. 
MR. NEMELKA: So we have not discussed, since I 
filed my renewed motion, with Commissioner Peuler or 
anybody, our motion for sanctions. We've been trying to 
resolve these other issues, and I finally noticed it up, 
and that's why we're here today, two months after I tried 
to get it set up. And that's the reason for the lengthy 
period of time. And I'll submit it on that. You have all 
the evidence before you. 
MR. PAYTON: May I correct one thing on the 
record? I only entered this case in October of '90, so 
when he says he's been in here three years, I don't want 
some appellate court or something to say I'm responsible 
for this. 
THE COURT: I've reviewed the file. I'm well 
or oars 
IS 
aware that the defendant has been represented by a number 
of different attorneys. 
All right, in connection with the plaintiff's 
motion to compel, and also renewed motiorr to compel and 
motion for sanctions, the motion is granted. I find that 
there is good cause for the granting of the motion. 
Specifically the defendant was directed or ordered by 
Commissioner Peuler to cooperate in appearing for a 
deposition on June 20th. 
Based on the motion, the sanctions I'm going to 
order at this time are that the defendant's petition to 
modify is dismissed. 
This is a very severe remedy, i^m well aware of 
that, but I'm making a finding that the defendant's refusal 
to comply with the order of the court to attend his 
deposition is intentional and blatant, and clearly in 
contravention of a direct ruling from Commissioner Peuler. 
Additionally, I'm going to find that the rules of 
discovery have a purpose, and that there is no way that a 
lawsuit, that litigation can be conducted, fairly held, if 
the parties do not follow court orders and facilitate 
discovery. 
For that reason, the defendant's petition to 
modify is dismissed at this time. I'm going to ask, Mr. 
Nemelka, that you prepare an order to that effect. 
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appreciate what the court says, it's a drastic remedy. But 
in temper, tone, and taste 
THE COURT: I'm sorry? 
MR. PAYTON: In temper, tone, and taste I 
restricted myself to the issue in the Nelson versus 
Jacobsen I reasonably thought would be here. And of course 
the court has discretion with regards to whatever remedy 
and fashion. 
But in terms of Mr. Nemelka*s conduct, at one 
such hearing, and there's another where his client didn't 
bother to show up, or at least showed up the last five 
minutes, and I believe I began this with the fact, with 
regards to equity, that one must come with clean hands. 
THE COURT: I've reviewed the entire file, Mr. 
Payton. 
MR. PAYTON: I simply suggest to the court that I 
don't think it'll be any surprise that we intend to appeal. 
THE COURT: Do so. 
MR. PAYTON: But I want to make 
THE COURT: As soon as there's a final order, you 
certainly may do so. And as I say, you certainly may 
address this issue of the further contempt proceedings when 
Mr. Nemelka files his motion in connection with that, 
clarifying what is to be heard, and we'll set it for a 
hearing. And also you can address the issue of attorneys 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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1 I fees at that time. 
2 1 MR. PAYTON: May I suggest, however, to the 
I * 
3 I court, so that the record's clear, if you dismiss the 
4 I petition, then he doesn't have any basis~to bring contempt, 
5 I because it's based upon and predicated upon matters 
6 I pertaining to the petition. 
7 I THE COURT: I believe, as I understand it, that 
8 I the contempt that he's alluding to—and I've asked him to 
9 J file a motion so it's clarified—has to do with the failure 
10 I to pay support on the original order; is that correct, Mr. 
11 Nemelka? 
12 I MR. NEMELKA: That's correct, Your Honor. In 
13 J regard to his refusal to pay the child support. 
14 I MR. PAYTON: And the petition goes to that issue 
15 I specifically, that he is without that ability. 
16 I THE COURT: I'm sorry, it's without what? 
17 j MR. PAYTON: He's without that ability. So I'll 
18 I leave it to Mr. Nemelka to file whatever he need be. 
19 J THE COURT: Fine. All right, that'll be the 
20 I order of the court. 
21 I MR. NEMELKA: Thank you, Your Honor. 
22 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; JANUARY 3f 1991; P.M. SESSION 
THE COURT: This is the time set for a hearing on 
the issue of contempt and attorneys fees in the matter of 
Houston versus Houston, 890901209. The record should 
reflect that Mr. Nemelka is here on behalf of the 
plaintiff, and Mr. Payton is here on behalf of the 
defendant. And neither of the parties are present; is that 
accurate? 
MR. NEMELKA: Yes, my client is just on her way 
in. But Mr. Payton explained to me that his client's not 
going to be here. 
THE COURT: Why is that, Mr. Payton? 
MR. NEMELKA: So it would create some problems on 
the contempt. 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, I think that the record 
will reflect, I asked Ms. Wilson at the last hearing if she 
could transcribe what took place, but I have a distinct 
recollection, and indicated to Mr. Nemelka if he wanted to, 
pursue it and file a motion and set out the issues he 
wanted to pursue. To my knowledge, no such motion or 
anything else has ever been filed. 
THE COURT: Mr. Nemelka? 
MR. NEMELKA: No, that's not even close. We 
indicated as the order states, that your minute entry 
states, that the court, on its own motion, continues the 
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hearing of contempt. Previously, at that time that hearing 
for contempt and attorneys fees was scheduled by the court 
when we were here at the last hearing. 
THE COURT: That's correct, andh that's my 
recollection. I recall very clearly, Mr. Payton, setting 
the time at that point, and it's my recollection that your 
client was present at that time. 
MR. NEMELKA: In fact, that's what your last 
order says in paragraph 3. "The issues for contempt and 
attorneys fees which previously were heard for further 
hearing can be heard before the Honorable Leslie Lewis on 
the llth day of December, 1991. 
THE COURT: That's my recollection, as well. So 
did you tell your client, Mr. Payton, that he did not need 
to appear today? 
MR. PAYTON: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Why did you do that? 
MR. PAYTON: If I could submit to the court, 
notwithstanding Mr. Nemelka's reference to the order, a 
proper objection was filed pursuant to 506, and despite the 
fact that he refers to the order, case law says that if the 
transcript is at odds with the order, then what was said in 
court prevails. 
THE COURT: Where is the transcript at odds with 
the order? Do you have a specific page reference? 
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MR. PAYTON: I do not. I requested that same day 
of Ms. Wilson- -
THE COURT: Have you paid for the transcript? 
MR. PAYTON: I have not. She didn't indicate she 
demanded prepayment, and it has not been the case in the 
past. 
THE COURT: All right, first of all, let me be 
clear on the record that whether or not a transcript has 
been prepared, or was requested, is irrelevant. It does 
not go to the.contempt issue or the attorneys fees issue, 
or the hearing on the same. 
I was very clear the last time we were in court, 
and the order reflects the same, that we were going to have 
the hearing on today's date on the issue of contempt and 
the attorneys fees, and that both of the parties needed to 
be present, as well as counsel. Something apparently got 
lost in the communication, Mr. Payton, although I fail to 
see how, since I recall saying it clearly, I know it's in 
the order, written order that you've obviously seen. 
It troubles me, it concerns me that you are 
telling your client not to appear, despite my order that he 
appear. 
MR. PAYTON: If I 
THE COURT: No, I will finish speaking, and then 
you're entitled to say what you wish to. 
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Therefore, since he is not here, there appears to 
be some question in your mind about that* and you've also 
requested a transcript. Again, I don't see the relevance 
of that. If you want it, you're certainly entitled to it. 
My court reporter indicates she needs ten days to prepare 
the same. 
We'll set this matter over to the next available 
date after ten days from today. Mr. Nemelka, I realize 
that you were prepared to proceed today, but given the 
non-appearance of the defendant, and the fact that counsel 
takes responsibility for the same, I see*that we have no 
recourse but to set it over. 
MR. NEMELKA: How about the 17th, in two weeks' 
time? 
THE COURT: Let me see if we have time. How 
about the 17th? 
MR. NEMELKA: Can the order reflect specifically 
that his client is ordered to be here? 
THE COURT: Oh, the record clearly will reflect 
it. 
Now, Mr. Payton, you and I are making eye 
contact. I'm going to see if I can express this as 
clearly, so clearly that no one can question it. You and 
your client, Mr. Nemelka, and his client, must be in this 
courtroom on the 17th of January at 3:30 in the afternoon 
00970 
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1 J for a hearing on the issue of contempt and attorneys fees. 
2 I Any questions about that? 
3 I MR. PAYTON: No, ma'am. Could I clarify one 
4 I thing for the record? 
5 J THE COURT: Yes, you may clarify. Just a moment, 
6 I Mr. Nemelka. 
7 I MR. PAYTON: If I mis-spoke myself May I 
8 I approach and show, the defendant was provided with a copy 
9 I of the order, I had him sign for it. If I indicated he 
10 I should not be here, it was not a specific discussion 
11 I whether he should or shouldn't. I indicated by directly 
12 I telling him to be here. 
13 I THE COURT: Did he know about the hearing today? 
14 I MR. PAYTON: He did. 
15 I THE COURT: And why didn't he come today? 
16 I MR. PAYTON: I can't speak for him. 
17 I THE COURT: So you didn't tell him not to come? 
18 I MR. PAYTON: I did not specifically indicate that 
19 I he was not required to come, no. 
20 I THE COURT: All right, let me be further, further 
21 I clarify my order. If the defendant does not appear on the 
22 I 17th promptly at 3:30, I will sign a bench warrant issued 
23 | for his arrest. It is imperative that he appears on that 
24 I date. 
25 I MR. PAYTON: And I will so 
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THE COURT: His continued lack of cooperation in 
connection with this matter is of tremendous concern to the 
court. It wastes your time, Mr. Payton, it wastes Mr. 
Nemelka's time, and it wastes my time and" my staff's time. 
And I refuse to put up with it any longer. 
Mr. Nemelka, you wanted to say something for the 
record? 
MR. NEMELKA: There's just one other item. We 
still have a counter-petition on the modification which 
deals toward- - We also, in the counter-petition, 
indicated he was in contempt of some previous orders, plus 
there was a minor issue, and I just wanted to make sure 
that we're going to have that heard at the same time. 
THE COURT: Well I was not aware that the 
counter-petition had been filed. Let me apologize for 
that, and indicate that there's so many pleadings in the 
file that it's hard to keep track of them. If there are 
some issues in connection with your counter-petition, I'll 
note for the record that the defendant's petition for 
modification was dismissed. If there remain issues beyond 
the contempt issue in the counter-petition, then you 
certainly will have the right to bring those up on the 
17th. 
MR. NEMELKA: Fine. 
THE COURT: But I am going to ask that you give 
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Mr. Payton and the court written notice of what those 
issues are. 
MR. NEMELKA: I can tell you right now. There's 
the medical bills. 
THE COURT: Payment of medical bills. 
MR. NEMELKA: Payment of medical bills, and the 
other issue goes towards the attorneys fees, as I recall. 
Those are the only two issues. 
THE COURT: And it's clearly been contemplated 
all along that the issue of contempt and attorneys fees 
will be taken up, and now there's an issue of medical 
bills, and you're on notice of that, Mr. Payton. 
MR. PAYTON: Could I simply ask that it seems 
like every time we come in, Mr. Nemelka expands the issues 
without regards to any indication in writing, or otherwise, 
THE COURT: If you believe that this is beyond 
what Mr. Nemelka has put in writing in his cross-petition 
to modify, then I guess you'll need to so advise me on the 
17th. I can't tell you what is in that cross-petition, 
because I haven't read it, and I'll certainly look at the 
file before the hearing, and I'd suggest you do the same. 
MR. PAYTON: Fine. 
MR. NEMELKA: There will be nothing that isn't on 
the counter-petition. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
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ME. NEMELKA: No, thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
* * * 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; JANUARY 17, 1991; P.M. SESSION 
THE COURT: This is the time set for a hearing in 
the matter of Houston versus Houston, 890901209, in 
connection with the counter-petition for^contempt and 
attorneys fees. 
The record should reflect that the plaintiff and 
defendant are both present with counsel, Mr. Nemelka, and 
Mr. Payton; is that correct, counsel? 
MR. NEMELKA: Yes, Your Honor. We're ready to 
proceed. 
THE COURT: All right, you may proceed. 
MR. NEMELKA: Thank you. We'd call Mr. Houston 
to the stand. 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, before he gets carried 
away, we do have an objection to the proceeding based upon 
the record of the transcript and some- - I'd like to be 
heard on that. 
THE COURT: You can be heard very briefly. 
What's your objection to going forward, Mr. Payton? 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, I have reduced- - In 
reading the transcript of November 27, 1991, the court last 
time we were here indicated that it had no recollection- -
MR. NEMELKA: Your Honor, I'm going to object. I 
don't have a copy. 
THE COURT: Let's just hear what Mr. Payton has 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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to say, and I'll certainly allow you to make an objection. 
Go ahead, Mr. Payton, if you would. 
MR. PAYTON: My understanding is the transcript 
is on file with the court. 
THE COURT: Just move forward, if you would, Mr. 
Payton. 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, on November 27th, the 
court indicated to Mr. Nemelka that, "You can file an 
affidavit and a motion, I'll give Mr. Payton, certainly, 
the opportunity to address that. Anything else?" 
The court also, in that same hearing, indicated 
that, "As soon as there's a final word you certainly may do 
so." That was to me. "And as I say, you certainly may 
address this issue of the further contempt proceedings when 
Mr, Nemelka files his motion in connection with that, 
clarifying what is to be heard. And we'll set it for 
hearing. And also you can- -" 
THE COURT: What's your point, Mr. Payton? 
Rather than reading from a transcript that, as Mr. Nemelka 
points out, I don't have in front of me, he doesn't have, 
let's cut to the chase. What is your point? 
MR. PAYTON: My point in this matter is that the 
court indicated that the directions and orders should be 
followed thereof, and in dismissing our petition, it so 
indicated that it had reviewed the entire record, and that 
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it believed that when the court directs a party to do 
something, they should do it. 
Mr. Nemelka, to this day, as I stand here, has 
never filed an affidavit and motion further clarifying th« 
issues, or otherwise setting out the issues, as you so 
directed him. 
THE COURT: I directed him to do that if he 
desired to do so. I did not order him to file anything. 
That's discretionary with Mr. Nemelka. 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, with all due respect, 
the transcript says, your words, "rve asked him to file a 
motion so it's clarified." I believe And that's the 
court's wording. 
THE COURT: Mr. Payton, I know better than you 
what was in my mind, and I recall very clearly the hearina 
in question. And again, let me state very clearly that I 
told Mr. Nemelka, I gave him a deadline for filing a motior 
if he wished to file it. And suggested that that might be 
helpful in clarifying the issues. I did not order him to 
file it. 
Now, we're here for the hearing today. Actually 
we were here before on this hearing, and that was on 
January 3rd, and your client was not here, despite a court 
order asking him to be here, so we set it over to today's 
date. We don't have a great deal of time on these 
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counter-petitions or motions. I'd like to move forward, if] 
there's nothing further. 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, with regards to that, 
I'd just simply, so the record is protected, in that same 
transcript, the Supreme Court has ruled that if the 
transcript differs with the order, the transcript controls, 
and there is no such order, and the November- -
THE COURT: What are you talking about? What 
order? How does the transcript differ with what order? 
MR. PAYTON: You indicated that you had ordered 
the defendant to be here on January 3rd. I'm simply 
pointing out the record does not bear that out. 
THE COURT: We moved to another, a new issue, 
then, Mr. Payton? 
MR. PAYTON: Correct. The transcript is at odds 
with that. 
THE COURT: All right, well, the defendant is 
present today. 
MR. PAYTON: Involuntarily, under the threat of 
the fact that you would have him arrested if he did not 
appear here. 
THE COURT: Well he's here, and we're going 
forward, Mr. Payton, unless there's something else. I 
believe I have the right to order his presence on a 
contempt hearing, which has been pending for some time. 
UH91G 
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MR. PAYTON: We have filed with the court our 
arguments in writing. I think that in t*rms of the right 
to be heard, that certainly if the court is now saying it 
was a directive, not an order to Mr. Nemelka, we certainly 
relied upon it. I certainly believed under the 
circumstances that we had a right to rely upon his filing 
something, and I raised that issue the last time we were 
here, and the court indicated that it had no recollection 
of even suggesting such a motion. So I simply make the 
record in this case. 
THE COURT: I don't get it, Mr. Payton. How are 
you prejudiced? You're telling me you were unaware that 
the counter-motion on contempt would be heard today? Is 
that what you're telling me? 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor 
THE COURT: Or are you saying that you're 
prejudiced by Mr. Nemelka not filing something additional 
in writing? What is it you're saying? 
MR. PAYTON: We are not going to presume whatever 
it is that Mr. Nemelka does or does not. The Utah Court of 
Appeals has recently, from a case from Judge Brian, dealt 
with this very issue, although I have not seen the advance 
sheets, in terms of due process and of hearings. And 
there's certain steps, if he wants to pursue the issues 
that he's done, that he has to do, and he has not done it. 
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court, the court specifically said, and I asked, "Will we 
need a hearing on our counter-petition?". You said, "Fine, 
let's schedule it. Let's schedule it, let's go." 
THE COURT: We're going forward, Mr. Payton. 
MR. PAYTON: May I simply put into the record 
that we waived no procedural issues with regards to the 
four orders procedurally. We have never been notified of 
any rulings or anything else, and every matter from the 
commissioner, we filed an appropriate objection to. So we 
don't waive any procedural errors. 
MR. NEMELKA: We'd call Mr. Houston to the stand, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Houston, will you come forward, 
please. 
DONALD HOUSTON 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff, 
having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. NEMELKA: 
Q Please state your full name. 
A Donald Houston. 
Q And what's your current address, Mr. Houston? 
A 389 Meadow Road, Murray, Utah. 
0«919 
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Q What was that, again? 
A 389 Meadow Road, Murray, Utah, 
Q And are you currently married? 
A I am. 
Q And your wife resides there with you? 
A She does. 
Q And what is her name? 
A Marva. 
Q Now, are you currently employed? 
A No. 
Q When is the last time you were employed? 
A When I worked for The Exam Center. 
Q When? 
A A year and a half ago. 
Q So you haven't been employed in a year and a 
half? 
A I have worked, but not on steady employment. 
Q You're a licensed medical doctor; is that 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And your license is still current? 
A That's correct. 
Q And it hasn't been suspended or revoked? 
A That's correct. 
Q And you're claiming that you haven't been 
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employed in a year and a half? 
A That's correct. 
Q But you've had odd jobs? 
A That's correct. 
Q Isn't it true- - Now, I want you to be sure of 
that. You're not employed today? 
A I am not employed today, counselor. 
Q Have you made any inquiries of buying any 
doctors' practices? 
A No. 
Q You have not. Are you familiar with the 
Highland Medical Clinic? 
A I am. 
Q Are you familiar with a Dr. Davis1 practice 
there? 
A I am. 
Q And have you not had negotiations with him to go 
to work there, or to buy out some of his practice? 
A No. 
Q You have had no negotiations whatsoever? 
A No. 
Q And you're not currently working at Highland 
Medical Clinic? 
A I work there sometimes, yes. 
Q You just told me you didn't work. 
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MR. PAYTON: Objection, that's argumentative. 
THE COURT: Overruled. Do you*work, sir, or do 
you not work? 
THE WITNESS: I work there occasionally, yes. 
Q (BY MR. NEMELKA) How occasionally? 
A Depends. 
Q How many times a month do you work there? 
A It all depends on what the work need is. There 
are three doctors employed there. 
Q For the year 1991, how many days did you work 
there? 
A I don't know. 
Q You don't know. How much money did you make in 
1991? 
A About ten to $12,000. 
Q About $12,000? 
A Between ten and twelve. 
Q Ten and twelve. How about in 1990? How much 
did you make? 
A I didn't know. 
Q About the same amount? More or less? 
A Perhaps. 
Q When you came to court here in September of 
1989, you represented to the court that you were making 
$2,800 month; is that correct? 
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I don't recall. 
Do you recall how much you were making at that 
I do not. 
Do you recall that, in fact, you'd asked this 
reduce the child support in this matter? 
I think that's correct. 
And in fact, the court did not reduce the child 
based upon the fact that you were making 
approximately $2,800 month; is that correct? 
A I don't recall. 
Q In fact, the court increased the child support 
to $681 a month at that time. You recall that, don't you? 
A I recall a figure in that neighborhood, yes. 
Q So you've been obligated to pay $681 from 
September of 1989 to the present time; is that correct? 
A I'll say if you say that, I'll not- -
Q You know of no order where that child support's 
been reduced, do you? 
A No. 
Q And you have not paid that amount, have you? 
A I have not. 
Q In fact, from the period of time from September 
of '89 through October of »90, you were in arrears of 
$4,500, and a judgment was entered against you for that; 
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correct? 
MR. PAYTON: I'll object, he's.asking him to make 
a legal judgment. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: I don't know. 
Q (BY MR. NEMELKA) You recall a judgment being 
entered for arrearages. 
A I recall a judgment. 
MR. NEMELKA: Your Honor, I'd just ask the court 
to take judicial notice that there's orders in the court 
that reflect that in September of '89 there was a judgment 
entered against Mr. Houston for $1,200 in child support 
arrearages, in December of 1990, for the period of 
September of '89 through November of '90, an additional 
amount of $4,433 in child support arrearage judgment was 
entered. In February of '91, which reflected the months of 
November through January, another judgment was entered for 
$1,14 3, and then in September of '91, another judgment was 
entered up through August of 1991 for $3,567. 
THE COURT: What is the total amount of 
arrearages reduced to judgment? 
MR. NEMELKA: At that time, Your Honor, as I 
recall, it was $11,343. That's just through August of 
1991. 
Q (BY MR. NEMELKA) Now, from August of 1991, the 
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first part of September, 1991 Mr. Houston, to the present 
day, you haven't paid one dime in child support, have you? 
MR. PAYTON: Objection, Your Honor, you asked him 
to file an affidavit as to the issues. I-f he now is going 
to come up to the current date, we don't have any 
notification of that. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer the 
question. 
THE WITNESS: I have made a monthly payment of 
$300. 
Q (BY MR. NEMELKA) To who? 
A I've given the check to my counsel. 
Q Well, your counsel hasn't sent it to anybody. 
Do you know of- - You're saying you've given $300 to your 
counsel from November, 1991 to the present? 
A I have answered that question already. 
THE COURT: You answer the question. I haven't 
heard an answer to the question. Have you given $300 to 
Mr. Payton to pay for child support? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q (BY MR. NEMELKA) From September of 1991 to the 
present? 
A Yes. 
Q Every month? 
A Every month. 
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Q Do you know whether Mr. Payton has sent that 
check on? 
A I do not. 
Q In fact, it's true he has notr He's just kept 
that money himself; isn't that true? 
A I have no way of knowing. 
MR. PAYTON: Objection, it's argumentative, and 
the implication I have stolen the money somehow, I'm 
entitled to an apology. 
THE COURT: I think Mr. Nemelka is entitled to 
ask the questions. Will you ask the question again, Mr. 
Nemelka? 
Q (BY MR. NEMELKA) Do you have any knowledge 
whether or not Mr. Payton has sent that money to my office 
or to Mrs. Kirkham? 
A I assume he has. 
Q Do you have any knowledge that he has? 
A I have no knowledge. 
Q Okay. But you knew all that time you were 
supposed to be paying $681 a month, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And you did not pay it. 
A That's correct. 
Q And do you recall having various conversations 
with Mrs. Kirkham in regards to why you did not pay it? 
0<»9°G 
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A I do not. 
Q You don't remember ever having a conversation 
with her as to why you didn't pay it? 
MR. PAYTON: Object to the form of the question. 
That can cover from the beginning of the time of this 
divorce. 
THE COURT: All right, will you rephrase it, Mr. 
Nemelka—just a moment, let me finish, if I might—and 
articulate a time frame, please. 
Q (BY MR. NEMELKA) Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. 
Houston, from September of '89 to the present, do you 
recall having any conversations with Mrs. Kirkham where you 
discussed why you were not paying the amount of support 
that the court ordered you to pay? 
A No. 
Q Okay. You just don't remember, or there were no 
conversations? 
A I don't remember any conversations. 
Q All right. Now, you recall in the previous 
orders of the court that you were ordered to sign various 
documents to transfer properties to Mrs. Kirkham. 
A Yes. 
Q And do you recall that you did not do that, and 
that we had to bring you into court to get an order to 
force you to sign those documents? Do you recall that? 
n09?7 
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A The documents have all been signed. 
Q That's correct. After you were brought into 
court, correct? 
A The documents have all been signed. 
THE COURT: Sir, listen to the question, if 
you- -
THE WITNESS: I don't know, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Just a moment, you don't interrupt 
me. Listen to the question and answer the question. Put 
the question to him again, if you would, Mr. Nemelka. 
Q (BY MR. NEMELKA) Mr. Houston, do you recall 
that, in fact, you did not sign any of those documents over 
which you were ordered to do until we came back into court 
with your previous counsel, and the court again ordered you 
to do it, and you finally did it? 
A I do not recall. 
Q And it's true that you recall not appearing for 
your depositions when you were ordered by the court to do 
so? 
A I don't recall. 
Q You don't recall not appearing at your 
depositions? 
A Any court order I've hadr I've obeyed to the 
best of my capacity. 
Q Did Mr. Payton tell you, you were supposed to be 
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here last, on the 3rd of January to a hearing? 
A I think that the one was- - I remember one 
being scheduled for that time. 
Q And did Mr. Pay ton tell you, you were supposed 
to be here? 
A I don't recall. 
Q You said you never have not appeared when the 
courts ordered you to be here. 
A I don't recall having a document stating to me 
that I had to appear at this court at this time. 
Q I didn't ask you about a document. I asked you 
if Mr. Pay ton told you, you were supposed to be here. 
A I don't recall. 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, objection. It's clearly 
argumentative at this point. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q (BY MR. NEMELKA) Now, you recall, do you not, 
that you were ordered to pay the medical expenses, one half 
of the medical expenses to Mrs. Kirkhara? 
A I don't recall. 
Q You don't recall what the decree of divorce 
says? 
A I don't recall. 
Q Is your wife currently employed? 
A Yes. 
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Q How much does she make? 
A I don't know. 
Q You have no idea how much she makes a month? 
A I don't know. 
Q Does had she pay the expenses where you're 
living? 
A Yes. 
Q The house expense, the utilities? 
A She does. 
Q She pays all that, doesn't she? 
A Yes. 
Q So you have no expense that you have to pay a 
month, correct? 
A I have certain expenses, yes. 
Q As far as the home and utilities are concerned? 
A I pay my share. 
Q Well, I thought you said she paid them. 
A Well, she writes the check. I contribute what I 
can. 
Q Okay. You don't have any children by your 
present wife? 
A No. 
Q The only children you're legally obligated to 
support is Mrs. Kirkham's, the ones that are with Mrs. 
Kirkham, correct? 
00930 
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Q And you filed bankruptcy, so you don't have any 
debts? 
A That's correct. 
MR. PAYTON: Well, excuse me, object to the form 
of the question, if that was a question. It sounded like a 
statement. 
THE COURT: The question's been asked and 
answered, the answer will stand. 
Q (BY MR. NEMELKA) Your wife works? 
A Yes. 
Q But you don't know how much she makes? 
A That's correct. 
Q What other jobs have you had besides working for 
this Highland Medical Clinic during the last year, 1991? 
Who else have you worked for? 
A I have done insurance exams from time to time, 
and I've done legal work for various counselors from time 
to time. 
Q So you have the capability of doing medical, as 
a doctor, for doing examinations for insurance companies? 
A Yes. 
Q Who did you work for? Which insurance 
companies? 
A Every insurance company in the city. 
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Q How do you get the jobs? 
A Various ways, from various agents. 
Q Agents that you work with? 
A That's correct. 
Q What are their names? 
A I can't tell you. 
Q You don't know who you contact to get jobs? 
A No, they call me and leave information for me to 
do, and I do the information, send it to the insurance 
company. 
Q You don't know who calls you? 
A I can't recall names at this time. 
Q Do you recall also in the decree of divorce that 
your wife was awarded certain hangars in St. George? 
A I recall something of that nature, yes. 
Q And she was entitled to all the rents. 
A I don't recall that, no. 
Q You don't recall taking some of the rents from 
the tenants after the decree of divorce, when they were 
supposed to go to Mrs. Kirkham? 
A I don't recall anything in the divorce decree 
that said anything about rents that concerned- -
Q She owned the hangars, though, did she not, 
after the decree of divorce? 
A Only after she paid off the bank balance that 
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was owing on them. 
Q And you had no rights to any of the rents from 
those hangars, did you? 
A There was no stipulation in tFfe divorce decree 
about rents, one way or the other. 
Q So you, in fact, did receive some of those 
rents, didn't you? 
A I did. 
Q And you spent them? 
A I did. 
Q And you didn't give them to Mrs. Kirkhara, did 
you? 
A I did not. 
Q And you've never paid her for one half of the 
medical expenses for the minor children since the decree of 
divorce, either, have you? 
A I have not. 
Q Nor any of the dental bills? 
A I have not. 
Q Do you recall ever making the statement to Mrs. 
Houston that you didn't care what the court said, that they 
couldn't make you pay child support if you didn't want to? 
MR. PAYTON: Objection, without some foundation 
in the question. Just simply throwing that out is 
inappropriate. 
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THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer the 
question. 
THE WITNESS: I don't recall. 
Q (BY MR. NEMELKA) You don't recall making that 
statement. 
MR. NEMELKA: I don't have anything further, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Payton. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PAYTON: 
Q Mr. Houston, even though you're licensed as a 
doctor, you cannot be insured; is that correct? 
A That was correct in the past, yes. 
Q In fact, you have had a number of- - Let me 
rephrase it this way. The reason you do not actively 
practice as a physician any more is because that your 
hospital privileges were suspended; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q They were suspended as a consequence of a 
medical malpractice suit? 
MR. NEMELKA: Your Honor, I have to object if 
he's going to keep leading. If he'd just ask him 
questions- -
THE COURT: All right, I'm going to overrule the 
objection. You may answer it. But I am going to ask, Mr. 
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Payton, that to the extent possible—we've obviously got a 
very bright witness—let's let him answer in a non-leading 
way where we can, please. 
Q (BY MR. PAYTON) Why were your hospital 
privileges suspended? 
A Because of a surgical review on gastric bypass 
surgeries. 
Q As a consequence of suspension of your hospital 
privileges, have you been able to get hospital privileges 
at any hospital? 
MR. NEMELKA: Your Honor, I'm going to object, 
because the whole issue is not relevant before the court. 
The hearing we had in September, this was brought before 
the court. His license was suspended prior to that time. 
On their motion, and to reduce the child support, the court 
heard the evidence, rejected and refused to reduce the 
child support at that time, based thereon. 
THE COURT: Okay, but I do believe, Mr. Nemelka, 
it goes to one of the issues that's before me in connection 
with contempt, and that is the ability of Mr. Houston to 
pay the support ordered. In order for me to find him in 
contempt, I have to find that he knew of the court order, 
that he failed to abide by the court order, and that he had 
the ability to pay, is my understanding. 
MR. NEMELKA: I understand that, Your Honor. But 
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that issue has already been resolved, and we would 
stipulate that his license has been suspended. 
THE COURT: All right, and I'm going to allow Mr. 
Payton to pursue this line of inquiry. ~ 
Q (BY MR. PAYTON) Your Honor, if Mr. Nemelka is 
willing to stipulate that his license is suspended, then 
we'll accept that stipulation. 
THE COURT: Apparently he's so stipulated. 
MR. NEMELKA: Excuse me, not his license has been 
suspended. The thing to practice before the hospital 
that- - The insurance, that's what we stipulate to. 
THE COURT: His hospital privileges have been 
revoked, is what you're stipulating to? 
MR. NEMELKA: That's my understanding of their 
testimony previously. 
MR. PAYTON: As I understand, you also stipulated 
that he can't be insured. 
THE COURT: Are you also stipulating to that, Mr. 
Nemelka? 
MR. NEMELKA: No, I have no knowledge of that, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: There's no stipulation to that 
effect. 
Q (BY MR. PAYTON) Mr. Houston, as a consequence 
of suspension of your hospital privileges, can you get 
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insurance? 
A A limited insurance now, yes.* 
Q But it will not allow you to practice in your 
specialty, surgery; is that correct? *~ 
A That's correct. 
Q How many years did you practice as a surgeon? 
A About twenty. 
Q In the past twenty years, had you practiced in 
any other area? 
A No. 
Q Other than giving routine physical exams, have 
you undertaken to attempt anything else of a medical 
nature? 
A Minor. 
Q With regards to your income in 1991, you 
indicated ten to $12,000. Is there a reason for your 
limited income? 
A It's the amount of work I am able to obtain. 
Q As a consequence of your inability to pay the 
amount ordered, did you file a petition in this case to 
modify the support obligation? 
A Yes. 
Q And has that petition ever been heard? 
A No. 
THE COURT: The petition, Mr. Payton, has been 
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dismissed. 
MR. PAYTON: It still goes to the issue of 
intent, Your Honor. As you articulated yourself. 
THE COURT: That isn't what I articulated. What 
is your next question? 
Q (BY MR. PAYTON) Did you attempt to pay your 
support to the best of your ability? 
A Yes. 
Q And when you could no longer do so, did you seek 
court protection? 
A Yes. 
Q As a physician, is there something called 
professional courtesy among physicians? 
A There is. 
Q If your ex-wife simply took the children to a 
physician and identified you as a physician, would the 
children have medical provided to them? 
A Quite possibly. 
Q And would it result in any cost to her 
whatsoever? 
A Ordinarily that would be true, yes. 
Q With regards to any insured, when you talk about 
half medical, does the decree provide that you were simply 
supposed to pay for half of any uninsured medical? 
A I don't recall. 
1)0938 
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Q With regard to working for insurance companies, 
the nature of that work is not actually hands-on, on 
patients, is it? 
A No. 
Q And what is the nature of what you do? 
A Mostly filling out forms, brief physical exams. 
Q The rents, with regards to the hangars that have 
been raised on the direct examination by Mr. Nemelka, was a 
condition of the decree that your ex-wife pay a note to the 
bank as a condition of that award? 
A Yes. 
Q And did she, in fact, ever make any payments on 
the hangars to the bank? 
A She did not. 
Q And the monies that you received from the 
hangars, did you use that to pay the note to the bank on 
them? 
A Yes. 
Q And was that note, in fact, in your name? 
A Yes. 
MR. PAYTON: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Nemelka? 
MR. NEMELKA: No, Your Honor. We'll call Jill 
Kirkhan to the stand. 
THE COURT: Wait, I have a couple of questions 
009^9 
COMPUTFRT7FD TRANSCRIPT 
-20. 
for Mr. Houston. 
EXAMINATION 
BY THE COURT: 
Q Sir, did you ever attend a deposition in 
connection with this case? 
A Yes. 
Q When was that, sir? 
A In St. George, when Mrs., ex-Mrs. Houston's 
deposition was being taken. 
Q When? 
A I don't recall the exact date. 
Q Did you ever attend a deposition where you had 
been called to give testimony? 
A Not that I recall. 
Q What do you earn when you work for the Highland 
Medical Clinic, per hour? 
A Nothing. I trade services. 
Q What do you mean, you trade services? 
A I utilize the facility to do insurance exams in 
exchange for the service I perform there. 
Q What do you charge when you do insurance exans, 
per hour? 
A It depends on the insurance company. They have 
their own set fees, and what they pay me. 
Q What do you pay? Give me the range. Or what do 
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you charge, and what do you earn? Give me the range. 
A From thirty-five to $50 for a» exam. 
Q Per hour? 
A Per exam, 
Q How long does an examination take? 
A It can take anywhere from forty minutes to an 
hour and a half. 
Q And when you do legal work for attorneys, or 
when you do medical work for attorneys in town, what you»ve 
referred to as legal work, what are you paid for that work? 
A Varies tremendously depending on the complexity. 
Q Give me the range. 
A From $25 to several hundreds. 
Q For what? Per hour? Per service? 
A Per review. 
Q And how much time do you expend per review? 
A Anywhere from an hour or two to several hours. 
Q So you may earn as much as $100 an hour? 
A That's correct. 
THE COURT: All right, 1 have nothing further. 
Anything further of this witness? 
MR. NEMELKA: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. NEMELKA: We call Jill Kirkham to th« stand, 
Your Honor. 
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present date? 
A No. 
Q Zero? 
A Zero. 
Q Has Mr. Payton ever sent you any checks? 
A Never. 
Q Now, do you recall having any conversations with 
Mr. Houston subsequent to September of 1989, where you've 
•discussed why he's not paying you the child support? 
A Yes. 
Q And were those discussions over the phone? 
A Yes. 
Q And do you recall what Mr. Houston said to you 
in regards to whether or not he had paid you the child 
support? 
A He said that he didn't have to, and that the 
court couldn't make him. 
Q In regards to the medical bills, you've asked 
the court in your modification, your counter-petition, to 
amend the decree of divorce to specifically state that Mr. 
Houston pay one-half of all non-covered medical and dental 
expenses, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And you also are asking for the court to award 
to you one half of the medical and dental expenses that 
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you've incurred subsequent to the decree of divorce. 
A Yes. 
Q And do you recall how much you've incurred in 
medical expenses for and in behalf of ther minor children 
for, just in the year 1991? 
A I've forgotten the number. 
Q Let me show you something that would refresh 
your recollection. Is that a document that you prepared? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q What was the amount that you spent? 
A The amount is $896.50. 
Q And did you also incur dental expenses for the 
minor children during 1991? 
A Yes, I did. 
MR. PAYTON: Excuse me, counsel, we'd like to 
insert an objection in the hearsay rule. And I recognize 
that normally a party would be able to introduce medical 
bills and other things in. But the rule says that counsel, 
upon demand, is supposed to supply that to opposing 
counsel. I think it goes back to the issue previously, 
about what would be in issue, and we object to it under 
803. 
THE COURT: Mr. Nemelka is not seeking to admit 
the documents. Mr. Nemelka is asking the witness what her 
understanding or recollection of the medical fees and 
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dental fees for 1991 was, and as I understand it, she's 
refreshing her recollection by looking at some document 
she's prepared. You're certainly entitled to look at that. 
Your objection is overruled. 
Q (BY MR. NEMELKA) Do you recall the dental 
expense, how much you paid for the minor children in 1991? 
A I don't remember the exact figure. 
Q Let me show you a document that you've prepared. 
Does that refresh your recollection? 
A Yes, it does. 
Q And how much did you spend in 1991? 
A I paid out of pocket $485.20. 
Q And you heard Mr. Houston's testimony that ha 
has not paid you any of those expenses? 
A Yes. 
Q Have you asked him to pay you? 
A Yes, in the past. I don't remember tha exact 
date. 
Q Do you recall what he told you? 
A I think he just didn't reply. 
MR. PAYTON: We'd object, then. If he said just 
simply in the past, and she doesn't recall the date- - He 
asked about a specific year. So we object to her answer as 
non-responsive. 
THE COURT: Well you can certainly follow up on 
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cross examination. Your objection is overruled. 
Q (BY MR. NEMELKA) Now, Mrs. Kirkham, since 
September of 1989, have you had to go out and borrow the 
money to help support these two, or to support the minor 
children? 
A Yes, I have. 
Q And is that based upon the fact that Mr. Houston 
failed to pay you the child support due and owing to you? 
A Yes, that's correct. 
Q And do you recall how much interest you had to 
pay during those two years on monies that you borrowed so 
you could support your two children? 
A The interest alone was over $7,000 for the two 
years, 1990 and 1991. 
Q And that was the various loans that you've made 
for those two years, and interest that you've paid back for 
money you've had to borrow? 
A Yes. 
Q And you're asking the court to consider awarding 
you that, as well? 
A I am. 
Q Have you had to adjust your schooling because 
Mr. Houston has not paid you the child support? 
A Yes, I did. I had to drop out of the, or take a 
leave of absence from the masters program at the University 
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of Utah in nursing. 
Q And you've been trying to get.your masters 
degree in nursing so you can increase your income? 
A Yes. 
Q You've had to drop out of that to do what, to 
work? 
A I had to increase the number of hours that I 
worked. 
Q To make up for the child support Mr. Houston 
wasn^t paying? 
A That's correct. 
THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Nemelka, I may have 
missed it. Did you indicate how many hours you're 
presently working, Mrs. Kirkham? 
THE WITNESS: I work seventy-two hours per week. 
THE COURT: Seventy-two hours a week? 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, in a two-week period. 
THE COURT: All right. And for whom are you 
employed? 
THE WITNESS: The University of Utah Hospital. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. You may 
proceed, counsel. I didn't hear that if you adduced it, 
and I wanted that. 
MR. NEMELKA: I did not, Your Honor. 
Q (BY MR. NEMELKA) And Mrs. Kirkham, you hatfe 
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also incurred attorneys fees in the last two and a half 
years trying to get Mr. Houston to pay the child support? 
A Yes, I have. 
MR. NEMELKA: I have nothing further, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. You may cross, Mr. 
Payton. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PAYTON: 
Q Miss Kirkham, did you attend the pretrial 
conference before the commissioner in this case? 
MR. NEMELKA: Objection, Your Honor, it's not 
even relevant whether she was at the pretrial conference or 
not. 
THE COURT: How is that relevant to the issue of 
contempt? And it's also beyond the scope of examination by 
counsel, isn't it? Mr. Payton? 
MR. PAYTON: I'm sorry. I'll ask the next 
question. 
Q (BY MR. PAYTON) Mrs. Kirkham, did you pay First 
Security Bank for those hangars? 
A Indirectly. 
Q Either you did or you didn't. Did you pay them? 
Did you pay the note every month directly to First Security 
Bank? 
A I never had personal control over the hangars. 
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Q You never, ever delivered any money to First 
Security Bank for the hangars; is that correct? 
MR. NEMELKA: Your Honor, I've got to object 
again. That's totally irrelevant. 
MR. PAYTON: He raised it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection. 
The question can be answered. Will you answer the 
question, Mrs. Kirkham? 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, I don't 
THE COURT: will you repeat the question, Mr. 
t-ayton? 
MR. PAYTON: I'll ask the next question, I'll 
accept her answer. 
I Q (BY MR. ^AYTON) You indicate that $7,000 in 
interest since when? 
A For the years 1991 and 1990. 
Where did you borrow this money from? 
a From City Bank on two separate accounts, and I 
i--e a «ther credit card account. 
Q You have never ever so testified before the 
^ommis oner, or any place else to this fact, have you? 
A That I had these accounts? 
Q That you borrowed money. 
A I don't remember. I don't remember being asked 
that question. 
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1 THE COURT: Next question, Mr. Payton. 
Q (BY MR. PAYTON) The defendant at all times 
I indicated to you he would pay you as he was able, did he 
not? 
5 i A No, he did not. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Q Did you ever receive money from Mr. Nemelka that 
I transmitted to him on behalf of the defendant? 
A In the past I have. 
Q The defendant has been paying $300 a month; is 
that correct? 
A No, he has not. 
v When the defendant filed the petition, my 
petition, you received it from Mr. Nemelka, did you not? 
14 A I'm sorry, I don't know what you're referring to 
15 
16 
specifically If you showed it to me I'd probably 
recognize it 
17 j Q Were you served with a petition in this case to 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
modify the decree? 
A I'm sorry, the different names of all the court 
things we've been to, I'm not sure which one you mean. 
I've gotten a lot of papers from you, yes. 
Q You've only been served by the constable with 
one document from my office? isn't that correct? 
MR. NEMELKA: Your Honor, we'll stipulate she was 
served the petition to modify. 
D0950 
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THE COURT: Fine, let's move along. 
Q (BY MR. PAYTON) Since the time of service of 
iihat, you were paid $300 per month, correct? 
A No. 
MR. PAYTON: No further questions. I have one 
other question. 
Q (BY MR. PAYTON) Have you complieJ with a.l the 
orders of the commissioner yourself? 
MR. NEMELKA: I'm going to object, that's not 
relevant. She's not here for contempt. There's no motion 
before the court. 
MR. PAYTON: I'm entitled, for the record, that 
if a party comes to court they must come with clean hands. 
THE COURT: You may ask the question. And Ms. 
^ir-Oiam, I'll ask you to answer it. I'll overrule the 
| ^i-**ction. 
I Q (BY MR. PAYTON) Ms. Kirkham, were you present 
I 
when the commissioner indicated that the defendant was, in 
fact, ts have phone contact with the children? 
A Yes, I remember that. 
C And you have never complied with that since 
then, "a e you? 
** That is not true. 
c Is your answer yes- -
The children talk to him all the time. 
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1 Q My question is-
2 THE COURT: The question's been asked and 
answered, counsel. If you have another question, ask it. 
I 
THE WITNESS: They're always ifr communication. 
1 
5 i THE COURT: Just a moment, if you would, Mrs. 
6 i Kirkham, Wait for a question. 
7 • MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, I don't think she 
8
 i answered my question. She said they're in communication. 
i 
9 ; She didn't say 
10 I MR. NEMELKA: She did too 
11 j THE WITNESS: Yes, over the telephone. 
12 1 THE COURT: Let's be clear, here. I will not 
13 I have both counsel speaking at the same time as a witness. 
14 I What you need to do, Mrs. Kirkham, is just wait for a 
15 I question. Wait for me to make a ruling, and then answer. 
16 I Please donft answer if there is not a pending question. 
17 I The question has been asked and answered. Let's move 
18 forward, Mr. Payton. 
19 I MR. PAYTON: No further questions. 
20 I THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Nemelka? 
21 I MR. NEMELKA: I have nothing further, Your Honor. 
22 I THE COURT: All right, you may step down, Mrs. 
2 3 I Kirkham. Do you have any additional witnesses, Mr. 
24 I Nemelka? 
25 MR. NEMELKA: Just myself. We'd proffer evidence 
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in regards to the attorneys fees. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. NEMELKA: I have compiled here the statements 
that I sent to Mrs. Kirkham from November the 1st of 1989 
through January 1st of 1992 of all the work that we've had 
to do in regards to all of the order to show causes and 
everything else as to Mr. Houston's contempt. The total 
amount of attorneys fees is $3,016. 
We would, my testimony would be that I'm licensed 
to practice law, I've been practicing for seventeen years. 
Half my practice is in the domestic area. That these fees 
have been incurred, they are reasonable, that I was 
charging $100 an hour—I presently charge $120 an hour—and 
that I've incurred, Mrs. Houston's incurred the attorneys 
fees of $3,016. 
THE COURT: Mr. Payton, do you accept the 
proffer, or do you want Mr. Nemelka put on the stand? 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, we have never seen these 
documents, nor were they supplied in advance. Again, the 
court asked him to submit an affidavit. 
THE COURT: I'll ask you, Mr. Nemelka, to submit 
this in affidavit form, rather than put you on the stand 
today. And Mr. Pay ton can review the affidavit and the 
attached bills, if you wish to attach them. And if you 
have an objection to the amount of the fees, Mr. Payton, 
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1 I you may indicate the same to the court within five days of 
I 
2 I receiving the affidavit. 
3 [ Anything further at this time? 
4 i MR. NEMELKA: No, Your Honor. 
i 
5 » THE COURT: Does counsel wish to make brief 
6 j closing arguments in connection with the contempt issue? 
7 MR. NEMELKA: Yes, Your Honor. If I may, Your 
8 I Honor. 
9 I As I stated before, asking the court to take 
10 I judicial notice of the four previous judgments that Mr. 
11 | Houston has had entered against him for child support 
12 i arrears, and the fact that since the last one in September 
13 I of 1991 he has not paid any money whatsoever to Mrs. 
1 Kirkham for child support. 
15 I He is not only in contempt of the orders in 
f- I regards to paying the child support, he was in contempt of 
1" I the order in regards to signing the documents to give to 
8 I Mrs. Kirkham, in regards to forwarding the rents on the 
9 I hangars in St. George to Mrs. Kirkham. He kept them, he 
20 I admitted he spent them. He didn't give them to her. 
21 I And he's also in contempt with the orders to 
22 I appear at depositions that he's been noticed up two or 
23 I three different times, and he's never appeared on those, as 
24 I well. And in fact, he wasn't quite sure whether he was 
25 I supposed to be here at the last hearing that he failed to 
009." 4 

12. 
appear. 
So I don't think there1s any question. Your 
Honor, in regards to his contempt. There's been no 
evidence to the court to rebut the fact that my client 
stated that he specifically said he didn't think he needed 
to pay, the court couldn't make him pay if he didn't want 
to. 
His ability to pay, Your Honor, I think the 
evidence before the court on the previous orders of the 
court is that the back, when they came into this court and 
asked the court to reduce the child support, based upon the 
fact that he was no longer able tc obtain insurance and had 
lost his hospital privileges, they filed their petition to 
modify, came in and asked the court to reduce the child 
support. 
The original decree, Your Honor, stated that he 
was not paying what he ought to be paying, because at that 
time he said he couldn't work. And so the judge down there 
said, "Hey, look, Mr. Houston, you pay this amount, go out 
and get a job." The original support was less than what he 
should have been paying. 
But then we came back into court on their 
petition and motion, and the court increased the support to 
$681 a month, based upon the finding that he was making 
25 I close to $2,800 month. And since that time he's been doing 
; , i9" i r i 
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the exact same thing that he was doing at that time. 
And it's our position that even though he says he 
only made ten or twelve grand, he has no recollection of 
even who he talks to as to- - And we've*~never been able to 
take his deposition to find out any other information. 
I don't think there's any question in regards to 
he's in contempt. He's had the ability to comply with the 
orders, and he just flat out refused. So we're asking the 
court to award us the judgment for the arrearages, for one 
half of the medical and dental expenses he hasn't paid, to 
modify the decree, and include that specific language that 
he has to pay that from here on out. 
And we also ask the court to incarcerate him in 
the Salt Lake County jail so that he learns he has to 
comply with these orders. We've been going on for years, 
now, and he flat out refuses. And we think this is one of 
the times when he ought to spend some time in jail, and 
that he ought to pay Mrs. Kirkham money that he owes her in 
the past to get, to purge the contempt and to get out of 
jail. And we also ask the attorneys fees, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Payton, do you wish 
to briefly be heard? 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, I still stand on the 
fact procedurally, and I again- -
THE COURT: I'm sorry, you still stand on what? 
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MR. PAYTON: On the fact procedurally that Mr. 
Nemelka catches me by surprise when he talks about matters 
that involve- - I don't know if he was involved or not, 
but they certainly predate any involvement that I have had 
as Mr. Houston's counsel. And my understanding was that 
the court asked him to file something to clarify what 
issues we would meet. 
And so we find ourself in the situation, punching 
in a dark room. He comes in and essentially kind of throws 
stuff out without regards to time periods or otherwise, and 
indicates proceedings that occurred in St. George that I 
certainly was not a participant to. 
THE COURT: Mr. Payton, there's so much 
correspondence in the file, much of it from you, concerning 
the St. George depositions. Are you now contending you 
don't know anything about that? 
MR. PAYTON: That's correct. And I suggest the 
court there's no- - I don't know anything about any 
depositions in St George, and I *^e never written such 
letter regarding any depositions in St. George. 
THE COURT: Are you aware that depositions were 
scheduled of your client, Mr. Payton, and that you advised 
him not to appear at the deposition? 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, I wasn't involved in any 
proceedings in St. George. And 1 have had no communication 
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with anybody about what occurred in St. George. 
THE COURT: All right, is there anything further, 
Mr. Payton? 
MR. PAYTON: I do hold in trust for Mr. Houston 
$300 per month from whenever the pretrial was that the 
court, that the commissioner ordered. 
THE COURT: Just a minute, let's see if I've got 
this. Are you saying that you have received on a monthly 
basis $300 a month from Mr. Houston to pay to his ex-wife 
10 J for child support, and you have not paid that to her? 
11 I MR. PAYTON: That's correct. 
12 I THE COURT: And have you advised him that you 
13 | hav« not paid this amount to her? 
14 MR. PAYTON: That's correct. 
15 ! THE COURT: May I ask why, Mr. Payton? 
i 
16 MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, I suggested to, and have 
periodically transferred the money to Mr. Nemelka. Mr. 
Nemelka indicated his client's position was either pay the 
$600 
MR. NEMELKA: That's a bunch of baloney. 
THE COURT: Mr. Nemelka, I'm going to ask that 
you regain your composure, and I won't tolerate from either 
side any outbursts. 
MR. NEMELKA: I apologize. 
THE COURT: Mr. Payton, you may continue. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, I an advised that Mrs. 
Kirkham's position is that she will take»no monies unless 
she has the entire $681. Mr. Houston is without that 
ability. 
THE COURT: Mr. Pay ton, how much money do you 
have in your trust account that*s been submitted to you for 
the payment of child support by your client, Mr. Houston? 
MR. PAYTON: I think approximately $1,200. I'd 
have to check specifically. 
THE COURT: Do you think that might have been 
useful to Mrs. Houston in meeting her children's day-to-day 
needs? 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, the court indirat»a with 
regards to this, that other issues were not- -
THE COURT: Listen to my question, Mr. Fa^ton. 
Do you think that money could have been used by Mrs. 
Houston to feed her children, to house and clothe her 
children? Hello? 
MR. PAYTON: The court's asking me to conjecture. 
1 don't know. 
THE COURT: All ^3*^, is there anything further, 
Hr. Payton? 
MR. PAYTON: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, you may be seated. 
All right, in connection with the contempt 
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proceedings in front of the court, it is the court's 
finding that the defendant is in contempt. There are many 
prior orders in front of the court in the file wherein the 
defendant has been ordered to pay child support. 
Testimony is clear and uncontroverted that he is 
in arrearages in the payment of child support in 
approximately the amount- - Well, in excess of $11,343, 
and that he has not paid his child support obligation, and 
that he knows he had an obligation, and he knows he has not 
paid that obligation, either in whole or in part. 
Further, I will note for the record that I have 
carefully observed the defendant, that he is able-bodied, 
I 
I and I see no reason that he cannot work. There is no 
testimony from the defendant that he is unable to work. In 
fact, there is testimony that he is a medical doctor, has a 
! great deal of education, and has, in fact, had many 
referrals made to him from insurance companies, and has had 
many referrals from lawyers to do what he refers to as 
legal work. 
Consequently it is the court's finding that he 
21 | has the ability to pay. This is further reinforced by the 
22 1 fact that he has discharged, apparently, all of his other 
23 J debts in a bankruptcy proceeding. 
24 1 In other words, it is the court's finding that 
25 I the defendant knew of the order concerning the payment of 
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child support, he knew of the order concerning his 
requirement to pay half of the uninsured •medical and dental 
costs. 
Further, it is the court's finding that he knew 
of the requirement that he attend his deposition, and that 
knowing of the same he failed to abide, intentionally, by 
all of those orders, and that he had the ability, the clear 
ability to comply with all of those orders. 
Having so found, it is the court's order that the 
plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for the entire amount 
of support due her under the various orders. Additionally, 
she is entitled to the payment of a reasonable attorneys 
fee. 
I will ask, again, that Mr. Nemelka submit an 
affidavit verifying the actual hours expended, dates that 
services were rendered, the specific services rendered, and 
nis hourly billing rate. And I will note that some 
testimony, or some proffer, rather, has been made on all of 
those points today. A reasonable fee will be awarded by 
the court. 
Additionally, it's the court's order tha^ the 
defendant is to serve sixty days in the Salt Lake county 
jail in connection with the contempt, and that is to 
commence forthwith. You are to submit yourself to the 
jurisdiction of the law enforcement officers in this court. 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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You're going to the Salt Lake County jail. 
We're going to visit a bit before you go. You 
are also entitled, Mr. Nemelka, or your client is, to a 
judgment for half of the uninsured medical and dental 
costs. 
I am not going to find that your client is 
entitled to the interest in connection with the loans that 
she has obtained in order to meet her children's needs, 
because Mr. Payton and his client were not on notice as to 
that. 
You may seek to purge yourself, Mr. Houston, of 
the contempt proceeding after you have served four days in 
the county jail. In order to purge yourself, you will have 
to come up with a significant part of the child support 
arrearages. 
Additionally, the order of the court, Mr. Payton, 
will be that by Monday at 5:00 o'clock, and no later, the 
money that you hold in your trust account that is child 
support for the benefit of the parties' minor children is 
to be turned over to Mr. Nemelka. And I have grave 
concerns, counsel, about your holding on to that money, 
knowing that it was child support, and knowing that it was 
not your money, but rather, money that your client paid to 
you, and so testified, for the express purpose of having 
you pass it on to the plaintiff for the benefit of the 
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minor children. 
I^ in going to ask, Mr. Nemelka, 'that you prepare 
an order reflecting my ruling today. Forthwith to the Salt 
Lake County jail. And Mr. Houston, you may believe that no 
one can force you to pay your child support, and maybe 
that's even true. But I have the right to sentence you to 
jail in connection with your contempt of court, which is 
clear. 
And I will say this to you/sir, and I want you 
to consider it carefully as you sit in the Salt Lake County 
jail. Your children that you participated in bringing into 
this world have the right to expect that you will 
contribute to their income. That you will help their 
mother put food on the table, help her provide them with 
clothes and the necessities of life. 
You apparently have chosen not to do that. I do 
not understand why, for the life of me, sir, a father would 
not contribute to the support of his children. But you 
will be contemplating the same In the Salt Lake County 
jail. And I can assure you that not only will you do this 
sixty days in connection with the contempt, unless you 
bring the arrearages current and purge yourself, but I will 
entertain future motions for contempt if you don't bring 
the arrearages current and keep up your monthly payments. 
Those children deserve more than they're getting, 
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and their mother is not entitled for making sure that all 
of their needs are met and contributing 100 percent to 
their well-being in terms of her ability. She's working 
seventy-two hours every two weeks. It dcTesn't appear that 
you're working at all. By choice. That's the order of the 
court. Forthwith to the Salt Lake County jail. 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor 
MR. NEMELKA: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Payton? 
MR. PAYTON: I am required by statute, before 
th«y take the defendant out, so he can hear- -
THE COURT: Just a moment, please. What is it, 
Mr. Payton? 
MR. PAYTON: We would request a stay of the 
court's order for purposes of perfecting an appeal. 
THE COURT: Denied. 
MR. PAYTON: Then may we submit it to the 
appellate- -
THE COURT: I'm denying your request for a stay. 
The defendant is going to jail. You can do whatever you 
feel you're entitled to do under the law. Any appellate 
remedies you feel you've got, feel free to exercise. You 
may now take him. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEE HOUSTON, 
vs. 
DON HOUSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 86-0905 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Howard H. Maetani, Commissioner for the Fifth Judicial 
District Court on November 20th, 1986. On said date, Plaintiff 
appeared, together with her attorney, Hans Q. Chamberlain. 
Defendant also appeared, together with his attorney, Kenneth A. 
Okazaki. The parties stipulated that this Court may sit as a 
district judge pro tem for purposes of hearing evidence for 
purposes of granting a divorce to Plaintiff and Defendant. 
Defendant's oral motion for leave to file a counterclaim to 
allege that he was entitled to a divorce from Plaintiff was 
granted by the Court. Plaintiff and Defendant were each called 
and sworn as witnesses concerning said matter, and the Court 
V/ 
having bifurcated said case in order to grant a Decree of Divorce 
concerning said matter, reserving all other issues until the tim< 
of trial, and the Court determined that jurisdiction was proper, 
and the Court having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the matter having been submitted to the 
Court, now therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from 
Defendant upon the grounds of mental cruelty. 
2. That Defendant is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from 
Plaintiff upon the grounds of mental cruelty. 
3. Said Decree of Divorce shall be final upon entry. 
4. That all other matters remaining for final disposition 
are reserved until the time of trial. 
DATED this / day of December, 1986. 
iOtf ARD H< MAETANI 
District"~^Tudge Pro Tem 
H*t. 
APPROV: 
^NS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
KENNETH A. OKAZAKI 
Attornfv for Defendant 
,^C*n 
. •» * J JDfCIAL 
P"*i.» w. COURT 
W..S„ ' ^ 7 " * COUNTY 
'87 APR 2H API 8 12 
HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN #0607 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
250 South Main St., 
P. O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEE HOUSTON, 
vs. 
DON HOUSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 86-0905 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Howard H. Maetani, Commissioner for the Fifth Judicial 
District Court on November 20th, 1986. On said date, Plaintiff 
appeared, together with her attorney, Hans Q. Chamberlain. 
Defendant also appeared, together with his attorney, Kenneth A. 
Okazaki. The parties stipulated that this Court may sit as a 
district judge pro tem for purposes of hearing evidence for 
purposes of granting a divorce to Plaintiff and Defendant. 
Defendant's oral motion for leave to file a counterclaim to 
allege that he was entitled to a divorce from Plaintiff was 
granted by the Court. Plaintiff and Defendant were each called 
and sworn as witnesses concerning said matter, and the Court 
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having bifurcated said case in order to grant a Decree of Divorc 
concerning said matter, reserving all other issues until the tirr 
of trial, and the Court determined that jurisdiction was proper 
and the matter having been submitted to the Court and the Court 
having been fully advised in the premises now makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. For three months prior to the time this matter was 
filed, Plaintiff and Defendant were each bona fide residents of 
Washington County, State of Utah. 
2. The Court finds that the Defendant has treated Plaintif 
cruelly in that Defendant has failed to support Plaintiff, that 
Plaintiff and Defendant have fought over business and financial 
matters, and by reason of said problems, Plaintiff is entitled t 
a Decree of Divorce from Defendant upon the grounds of mental 
cruelty. 
3. The Court finds that Plaintiff has likewise treated 
Defendant cruelly in that Plaintiff and Defendant have fought 
over business and financial matters, and Plaintiff has expressei 
to Defendant that she no longer loves him and does not want to t 
married to him, and by reason of the same, Defendant is entitle 
to a Decree of Divorce from Plaintiff upon the grounds of menta 
cruelty. 
4. The Court finds that all other remaining matters for 
final disposition are reserved until the time of trial. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That Plaintiff and Defendant are each entitled to a 
Decree of Divorce from the other upon the grounds of mental 
cruelty. 
2. All other remaining matters for final disposition are 
reserved until the time of trial. 
DATED this / day of December, 1986. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
&NS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
for Plaintiff 
KENNETH A. OKAZAKI 
Attorney for Defendant 
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WlttU^ HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN #0607 DEPUTE 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
250 South Main St., 
P. 0. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEE HOUSTON, 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
Plaintiff, ) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. 
DON HOUSTON, ) Civil No. 86-0905 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on for non-jury trial on 
September 23, 1987, before Howard H. Maetani, Domestic 
Commissioner, also sitting as District Judge, Pro Tem. Plaintiff 
appeared together with her attorney, Hans Q. Chamberlain, 
Defendant appeared with his attorney, V. Lowry Snow, and LaMar 
Windward of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake, appeared as guardian 
ad litem, for and on behalf of the minor children. Said guardian 
ad litem made a recommendation to the Court concerning child 
support to be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff on behalf of the 
minor children. Testimony was taken from witnesses called, but 
during the course of the trial, the parties entered into a 
Stipulation concerning custody, visitation and property division. 
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and read the same into the record. The parties could not agree 
as to child support, alimony and payment of the services rendered 
by the guardian ad litem. At the conclusion of the testimony, 
the Court took said issues under advisement. On the 29th day of 
October, 1987 the Court issued its Memorandum Decision. The 
Court previously granted to both Plaintiff and Defendant a Decree 
of Divorce on the 1st day of December, 1986, and the Court having 
heretofore made and entered its Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Decree 
of Divorce on file herein is supplemented as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to have the care, 
custody and control of David Cedric Houston, age 5 years, and 
Virginia Kay Houston, age 3 years, the minor children born as 
issue of said parties, subject to reasonable rights of visitation 
vested in the Defendant as follows: 
A. Every other weekend from Friday afternoon or 
evening until Sunday afternoon or evening. If the Defendant 
picks the children up in the afternoon on Friday, he shall 
return them Sunday afternoon, and likewise, if he picks the 
children up on Friday evening, he shall return the children 
on Sunday evening. 
B. On such other occasions when the Defendant shall be 
in the locale where Plaintiff resides, providing that 
Defendant give to Plaintiff 24 hours notice of his desire to 
exercise these additional visitation privileges. 
!*!4/ 
C. Every other holiday, commencing with Thanksgiving 
of 1987. The holidays contemplated by this Order are as 
follows: 
January 1st 
Presidents' Day 
Easter or Spring Break 
Memorial Day 
July 4th 
July 24th 
Labor Day 
Thanksgiving 
Christmas 
The Christmas vacation shall be divided equally between 
Plaintiff and Defendant. For the Christmas vacation of 
1987, Plaintiff shall have the children on Christmas Eve and 
until noon on Christmas Day, at which time Defendant shall 
be entitled to visitation with said minor children for 
one-half of the Christmas vacation, with the children to be 
in the care of the Plaintiff for the remaining Christmas 
vacation. Commencing with Christmas, 1988, the visitation 
shall rotate between Plaintiff and Defendant on the terms 
and conditions herein specified. 
D. For 6 weeks during the summer. As each child 
reaches their sixth birthday, the visitation for that child 
for the following summer shall increase to 8 weeks. 
3. The Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have 
held that the purpose of alimony is to maintain as much as 
possible the standard of living the parties enjoyed during the 
marriage and avoid the necessity of one spouse receiving public 
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assistance. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977); Boyle v. 
Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). with this purpos 
in mind, three factors must be considered by the trial court in 
fixing a reasonable alimony award: 
A. The financial conditions and needs of the wife? 
B. The ability of the wife to produce sufficient 
income for herself; and 
C. The ability of the husband to provide support. 
Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075. 
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on September 1, 1977, 
at San Jose, Santa Clara County, State of California. Further i 
is undisputed that Plaintiff and Defendant lived together for 
approximately three years from September 197 4 through September 
1977; therefore, although this is approximately a ten year 
marriage, the fact that the parties lived together for 
approximately three years prior to their marriage and pursuant t< 
Section 30-1-4.5 Validity of Marriage Not solemnized, Utah Code 
Annotated, the Court finds that the parties in essence were 
married for approximately 13 years. Plaintiff has a gross 
monthly income of approximately $2,100.00 and a net monthly 
income of approximately $1,534.00. Plaintiff's current monthly 
expenses for herself and the two minor children is approximately 
$2,558.00. Further, Plaintiff's approximate monthly expenses fo 
herself and her two minor children if she should purchase a hoine 
and live without her mother's assistance for child care is 
$3,318.00 per month. 
Defendant is presently unemployed and indicates to the Court 
that he is living on borrowed money from credit cards, family and 
friends. Defendant is a trained surgeon in the medical 
profession and has a historical earning m the past in excess of 
$100,000.00 per year albeit the last couple of years there has 
been a decrease in his income due to malpractice lawsuits against 
him. Currently, Defendant is unable to get malpractice insurance 
to continue as a surgeon. Although, Defendant is unable to 
practice his skills as a surgeon, he can continue his medical 
practice as a general practitioner. Defendant indicated to the 
Court that he has no interests in becoming a general practitioner 
and in pursuing his medical career because he personally feels he 
has accomplished all of his personal goals in the medical 
profession. Further, he sees no need to make money and would 
rather pursue his business interests. 
The Court finds that it is incredulous that the Defendant, 
who has obligations to his former spouse, his two minor children, 
his creditors and lives on borrowed money can testify that there 
does not exist a need to make irorey. The Court finds that the 
Defendant is able bodied and has the skills to at least erdeavor 
to earn a very respectable salary in the medical profession as a 
general practitioner. The Court advises the Defendant that until 
he can meet his obligations he should not pursue his business 
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interest at the expense of his children and former spouse. In 
essence he should make "contact with reality" and endeavor to 
utilize his medical skills; therefore, the Court will order 
Defendant to pay alimony to the Plaintiff in the sum of $200.00 
per month for a period of five (5) years as rehabilitative 
alimony or until she remarries or cohabitates, based upon the 
Defendant's past historical earnings and needs of the Plaintiff 
to adjust to her nex* circumstances. The Court invokes the use o 
Defendant's past historical earnings pursuant to Olson v. Olson, 
704 P 2d 564 (Utah, 1985) . 
4. Based on the foregoing paragraph, the Court will order 
Defendant to pay child support in the sum of $300.00 per month 
per child, for a total monthly child support obligation of 
$600.00. If the Defendant becomes delinquent in his child 
support obligations in an amount at least equal to child suppor 
payable for one month, then the Plaintiff is entitled a mandator 
withholding income relief pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-45d-l, et seq (1953) as amended. 
5. In order to avoid any "substantial change of 
circumstance" problems in the future as it relates to alimony am 
child support, the Court finds as follows 
A. The amount of alimony and child support awarded in 
the aforementioned paragraphs are temporary. The matter 
will be reviewed in one (1) year at the request of either 
party and/or the guardian ad "i item in behalf of the 
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children. However, the parties can request an earlier 
review by motion upon good cause that a substantial change 
of circumstance has occurred in the interim. 
B. During the next year, the Defendant is admonished 
and advised to document his endeavors in obtaining 
employment that will allow him to adequately support his 
children and former spouse. If the Court is persuaded that 
the Defendant has endeavored in "good faith", i.e., 
everything within his power to obtain adequate employment 
the Court may modify the amount awarded; however, the 
Defendant should be aware that the needs of his children and 
former spouse may also increase. 
6. It has been necessary for the parties to secure the 
services of an attorney to represent their children as a guardian 
ad litem. The guardian ad litem's fees and costs are $1,422,19 
as set out by his affidavit. In considering the reasonableness 
of attorney's fees, the Court follows the standard set out in 
Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984) : 
A. Necessity of the number of attorney hours 
dedicated. 
B. Reasonableness of the rate charged. 
C. Rates commonly charged for divorce action in the 
community. 
Based upon the above considerations set out in Beals v. 
Beals, the Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant are 
3ft 
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responsible for the guardian ad litem fees and costs in the sum 
of $1,000.00. The Plaintiff is responsible for $500.00 and the 
Defendant is responsible for $500.00. 
7. The real and personal property accumulated by the 
parties shall be awarded and divided as follows: 
A. TO PLAINTIFF: 
(1) A Promissory Note due from Ronald Thompson 
pursuant to terms and conditions contained therein, said 
Note having a net equity value of approximately $13,000. 
(2) Six (6) Port-A-Port airport hangars, being 
personal property, presently located at the St. George 
Airport in Washington County, Utah, together with the 
interest of the Defendant in the ground lease from St. 
George City upon which said hangars are presently located. 
Said property is awarded to Plaintiff subject to a debt 
thereon in the approximate sum of $21,878 in favor of First 
Security Bank, which Plaintiff shall pay and discharge, and 
indemnify and hold Defendant harmless from the payment of 
the same. 
(3) All of Lot 6, Mountain View Subdivision, or the 
proceeds arising from an existing sale for said lot, located 
in Pine Valley, V7ashington County, Utah. 
(4) All of Lot 66, Clear Creek Estates, Unit 2, a 
subdivision according to the official plat thereof in the 
office of the County Recorder of Garfield County, State of 
Utah, together with all improvements and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, including any and all water rights, 
both surface and underground, well rights, capital stock 
shares, etc., used in conjunction with or as appurtenances 
to said property. Said property is subject to an attorney's 
lien in favor of Ken Okazaki, Attorney at Law, as more 
specifically set forth in an Order entered by this Court on 
the 30th day of April, 1987. 
(5) All jewelry in Plaintiff's possession or which 
Plaintiff has pledged as security for payment of debt. 
(6) All household furniture and fixtures now in the 
possession of Plaintiff. 
(7) A 1987 Subaru Station Wagon, subject to a lien 
thereon in the sum of $11,600.00, which Plaintiff shall pay 
and discharge, and indemnify and hold Defendant harmless 
from the payment of the same. 
(8) A fifty percent (50%) interest of a l/7th 
partnership interest owned by Defendant in the partnership 
known as Moroni Feed, together with 1/2 of the proceeds due 
on Promissory Notes from Revecor, Turner, and Saclaroma 
which service the debt owed by Defendant for said l/7th 
partnership interest. Likewise, Plaintiff shall be 
responsible for one-half of the remaining partnership debt 
against said l/7th interest which is understood to be a net 
amount of approximately $4,000, assuming payment in full by 
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Revecor, Turner and Saclaroma, and payment to Dixie College 
Foundation as hereinafter set forth. 
(9) Defendant shall make, execute and deliver to 
Plaintiff a Promissory Note in the sum of $15,000 which 
shall be due and payable on September 23, 1992. For the 
first two years, said Promissory Note shall bear no 
interest. At the end of two years, interest shall accrue a 
the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum until said Trust 
Deed Note is paid in full. Said Trust Deed Note shall be 
secured by a Trust Deed to be executed by Defendant 
encumbering the remaining fifty percent (50%) interest of 
the l/7th interest in the Moroni Feed Partnership awarded tc 
Defendant. Said Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed shall be in 
conformity with Trust Deed Notes and Trust Deeds used by 
financial institutions in the State of Utah. 
B. TO DEFENDANT: 
(1) All other real and personal property and all debt 
associated therewith, and specifically the following: 
PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS 
(a) All right, title and interest in the 
following partnerships: 
(i) Houston Investors 
(ii) Maxwell Mini Farms 
(iii) Spanish Trails 
(iv) Glen Canyon Marine 
10 
(v) Settlers RV Park 
(vi) Moroni Feed, subject to Plaintiff's 
interest set forth in Paragraph 5-A(8) 
above, and subject to the Trust Deed and 
Trust Deed Note to be executed by 
Defendant as set forth Paragraph 5-A(9) 
above. 
REAL ESTATE 
(2) The following described real property located in 
Washington County, Utah: 
(1) All of Lot 1, Prestige Villa Subdivision 
according to the official plat thereof, on file 
in the office of the County Recorder of Washing-
ton County, State of Utah. 
Subject to the debt hereinafter specified, 
and 
Subject to a life estate in favor of 
Defendant's mother, Delia P. Gibson, also 
known as Delia P. Houston. 
(ii) The following described real property located 
in Garfield County, Utah: 
All of Lot 65, Clear Creek Estates, Unit 2, 
a subdivision according to the official plat 
thereof, on file in the office of the County 
Recorder of Garfield County, State of Utah. 
Subject to the debt hereinafter 
specified. 
Together with all improvements and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging, 
including any and all water rights, 
surface and well rights, capital stock 
shares, etc., used m conjunction with 
or as an appurtenance to said property. 
(in) The real property located in Page, Arizona. 
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE: 
U) 
4*00 
A Promissory Note due Defendant from Houston 
Investors of approximately $40,000.00. 
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(II) A Promissory Note due from Don Cecala of 
approximately $32,000.00. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY: 
(i) All personal property now m the possession 
of the Defendant. 
8. The Court finds that Defendant is indebted to Plaintiff 
for unpaid child and spousal support through September 26, 1987, 
in the sum of $5,550.00. The parties have advised the Court that 
Lot 6, Mountain View Estates, has been sold to Gary and Linda 
Wood pursuant to an Earnest Money Agreement dated August 23rd, 
1987. If said sale is consummated, the proceeds derived by 
Plaintiff from the sale of said lot shall be applied against all 
unpaid child support owed by Defendant, and the excess proceeds 
received by Plaintiff shall be deemed a credit in favor of 
Defendant against ongoing child support until the excess is 
exhausted, at which time, child support to be paid by Defendant 
to Plaintiff as herein set forth shall resume. If the sale of 
said lot is not consummated, child support shall become 
immediately due and payable. 
9. The Court finds that pursuant to the previous 
Stipulation between Plaintiff and Defendant, the following 
described real property shall be awarded to V. Lowry Snow and 
Rodney Savage, as tenants in common, free and clear of all liens 
and encumbrances and free of any claims of Plaintiff and 
Defendant. The following described real property is located in 
Washington County, Utah: 
ye/ 
All of Lot 5, Mourrtain View Subdivision, 
as per map on file in the office of the 
Washington County Recorder. 
10. The parties are hereby directed to execute all deeds or 
other documents to vests title to the within and foregoing real 
and personal property. 
11. The debts accumulated between Plaintiff and Defendant 
shall be paid and discharged as follows: 
A. BY PLAINTIFF; (In addition to those enumerated above) . 
1. CREDIT CARDS 
Goldwaters $ 46.78 
Citibank VISA 1,098.74 
Citibank Preferred VISA 2,497.00 
Mervyn's 254.87 
Citibank Mastercard 1,359.80 
Michigan VISA 1,061.00 
SUBTOTAL: $6,317.32 
2. Balance Due on Auto Loan $11,600.00 
3. Debt to Virginia Singer, 
Plaintiff's Mother 6,500.00 
4. Canyonlands Human Services, 
Gerald Thamert, Counseling 
for David Cedric Houston 460.00 
5. One-half debt owed to Dixie 
College Foundation for 
Moroni Feed 9,000.00 
6. One-half debt owed on t'oroni 
Feed $18,500.00 
TOTAL: $52,377.32 
In addition, Plaintiff shall be responsible for the 
following expenses which she originally claimed should be 
reimbursed to her by Defendant: 
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Amount paid toward deductible 
on health insurance, prescrip-
tions, dental, 1986 & 1987 600.00 
August health insurance -
Blue Cross 200.00 
Cleaning deposit on hone 
rental 150.00 
Fixing house to sell 35.12 
Expenses incurred in locating 
new employment, hotel 140.00 
Moving expenses, U-Haul & gas 700.00 
Warren Brooks, moving furniture 
& driving truck 150.00 
Lodging during move 70.00 
Community education programs 
for children 30.00 
SUBTOTAL: 
TOTAL: 
$ 2,075.12 
$54,452 44 
B. BY DEFENDANT: (In addition to those onumerated above). 
(Estimated liabilities include interest as of October 31, 
1987 as per Rodney Savage, the accountant for the parties). 
1. A Judgment m favor of First Interstate Bank 
against Plaintiff and Defendant in the sun 
of $82,192.00. Defendant shall indemnify 
and hold Plaintiff harmless from the payment 
of the same. 
Financial Institutions: 
2. Valley National - Virginia Kay House Boat 
3. Sun Capital - Dale Peterson property 
4. Sun Capital - Auto 
5. Sun Capital - Other 
$82,192.00 
25,859.00 
62,757.00 
16,085.00 
18,519.00 
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6. Sun Capital - Other 10,621.00 
7. First Security - Dale Peterson 29,593.00 
8. First Security - Boyd Brown 15,148.00 
9. First Security - Auto 17,366.00 
10. First Security - Other 30,142.00 
11. St. George Federal Credit Onion -
S/C Property 4,000.00 
12. Zions 14,238.00 
13. Stockmans 16,000.00 
14. Heritage Savings - Delia's House 46,315.00 
15. Zions Bank (cabin) 7,000.00 
TOTAL: $395,835.00 
Individuals and Others: 
16. Credit cards and open accounts $ 20,000.00 
17. Dale Peterson 22,750.00 
18. Savage & Esplin 34,000.00 
19. V. Lowry Snow 15,000.00 
20. Ken Okazaki 7,000.00 
21. Dixie College Foundation for Moroni 
Feed (1/2) 9,000.00 
22. Carolyn Houston (Defendant's first wife) 100,000.00 
23. Scott Houston 110,000.00 
24. Moroni Feed (1/2) 18,500.00 
TOTAL: $732,085.00 
?*? 15 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
101 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22\ 
23 
24 
25 
Defendant shall pay, assume and discharge all of the above 
debts as well as all other debts incurred by Plaintiff and 
Defendant, including, but not limited to those owed by reason oi 
partnership interests, real estate, ownership of personal 
property, etc., and shall indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless 
from the payment of the same. 
12. Plaintiff shall be required to pay health and accident 
insurance in favor of the minor children so long as the same is 
available to her through her employment. In the event the same 
becomes unavailable to Plaintiff through her employment, the 
Court shall review this matter to determine which party shall pa 
health and accident insurance on behalf of the minor children. 
13. No attorney's fees or costs are awarded to either party 
DATED this J£L day of tfLsrvvn*^^ t> 1987. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF 
DIVORCE to Mr. V. Lowry Snow, SNOW & JENSEN, 75 South 100 East, 
Suite 2C, St. George, Utah 84770, first-class postage prepaid on 
this 30th day of Novpmhpr / 1987. 
Sebretary 2^ 
CHAMBERLAIN 
& HIGBEE 
ATTORNBYS AT LAW 
2SO BOOTH MAIN 
F O BOX 7 2 6 
CEDAR C TV 
W* 17 
HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN [0607] 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
250 South Main 
P. O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
FIF*. ~VC7 COURT 
*'"- -. COUNTY 
'87 DEC 2 fin 10 13 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEE HOUSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DON HOUSTON, ET AL., 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 86-0905 
The above-entitled matter came on for non-jury trial on 
September 23, 1987, before Howard H. Maetani, Domestic 
Commissioner, also sitting as District Judge, Pro Tem. Plaintiff 
appeared together with her attorney, Hans Q. Chamberlain, 
Defendant appeared with his attorney, V. Lowry Snow, and LaMar 
Windward of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake, appeared as guardian 
ad litem, for and on behalf of the minor children. Said guardian 
ad litem made a recommendation to the Court concerning child 
support to be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff on behalf of the 
miror children. Testimony v/as taken from witnesses called, but 
during the course of the trial, the parties entered into a 
Stipulation concerning custody, visitation and property division, 
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and read the same into the record. The parties could not agree 
as to child support, alimony and payment of the services rendere< 
by the guardian ad litem. At the conclusion of the testimony, 
the Court took said issues under advisement. On the 29th day of 
October, 1987 the Court issued its Memorandum Decision. The 
Court previously granted to both Plaintiff and Defendant a Deere* 
of Divorce on the 1st day of December, 1986. The Court having 
been fully advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. There have been two children born as issue of said 
marriage, namely, David Cedric Houston, age 5 years and Virginia 
Kay Houston, age 3 years. 
2. Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to have the care, 
custody and control of said minor children, subject to reasonable 
rights of visitation vested in the Defendant as follows: 
A. Every other weekend from Friday afternoon or 
evening until Sunday afternoon or evening. If the Defendant 
picks the children up in the afternoon on Friday, he shall 
return them Sunday afternoon, and likewise, if he picks the 
children up on Friday evening, he shall return the children 
on Sunday evening. 
B. On such other occasions when the Defendant shall be 
in the locale where Plaintiff resides, providing that 
Defendant give to Plaintiff 24 hours notice of his desire to 
exercise these additional visitation privileges. 
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C. Every other holiday, commencing with Thanksgiving 
of 1987. The holidays contemplated by this Order are as 
follows: 
January 1st 
Presidents' Day 
Easter or Spring Break 
Memorial Day 
July 4th 
July 24th 
Labor Day 
Thanksgiving 
Christmas 
The Christmas vacation shall be divided equally between 
Plaintiff and Defendant. For the Christmas vacation of 
1987, Plaintiff shall have the children on Christmas Eve and 
until noon on Christmas Day, at which time Defendant shall 
be entitled to visitation with said minor children for 
one-half of the Christmas vacation, with the children to be 
in the care of the Plaintiff for the remaining Christmas 
vacation. Commencing with Christmas, 1988, the visitation 
shall rotate between Plaintiff and Defendant on the terms 
and conditions herein specified. 
D. For 6 weeks during the summer. As each child 
reaches their sixth birthday, the visitation for that child 
for the following summer shall increase to 8 weeks. 
3. The Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have 
held that the purpose of alimony is to maintain as much as 
possible the standard of living the parties enjoyed during the 
marriage and avoid the necessity of one spouse receiving public 
37^ 
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assistance. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977); Boyle v. 
Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). with this purpose 
in mind, three factors must be considered by the trial court in 
fixing a reasonable alimony award: 
A. The financial conditions and needs of the wife; 
B. The ability of the wife to produce sufficient 
income for herself; and 
C. The ability of the husband to provide support. 
Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075. 
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on September 1, 1977, 
at San Jose, Santa Clara County, State of California. Further it 
is undisputed that Plaintiff and Defendant lived together for 
approximately three years from September 1974 through September 
1977; therefore, although this is approximately a ten year 
marriage, the fact that the parties lived together for 
approximately three years prior to their marriage and pursuant tc 
Section 30-1-4.5 Validity of Marriage Not solemnized, Utah Code 
Annotated, the Court finds that the parties in essence were 
married for approximately 13 years. Plaintiff has a gross 
monthly income of approximately $2,100.00 and a net monthly 
income of approximately $1,534.00. Plaintiff's current monthly 
expenses for herself and the two minor children is approximately 
$2,558.00. Further, Plaintiff's approximate monthly experses foi 
herself and her two minor children if she should purchase a heme 
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and live without her mother's assistance for child care is 
$3,318.00 per month. 
Defendant is presently unemployed and indicates to the Court 
that he is living on borrowed money from credit cards, family and 
friends. Defendant is a trained surgeon in the medical 
profession and has a historical earning in the past in excess of 
$100,000.00 per year albeit the last couple of years there has 
been a decrease in his income due to malpractice lawsuits against 
him. Currently, Defendant is unable to get malpractice insurance 
to continue as a surgeon. Although, Defendant is unable to 
practice his skills as a surgeon, he can continue his medical 
practice as a general practitioner. Defendant indicated to the 
Court that he has no interests in becoming a general practitioner 
and in pursuing his medical career because he personally feels he 
has accomplished all of his personal goals in the medical 
profession. Further, he sees no need to make money and would 
rather pursue his business interests. 
The Court finds that it is incredulous that the Defendant, 
who has obligations to his former spouse, his two minor children, 
his creditors and lives on borrowed money can testify that there 
does not exist a need to make money. The Court finds that the 
Defendant is able bodied and has the skills to at least endeavor 
to earn a very respectable salary in the medical profession as a 
general practitioner. The Court advises the Defendant that until 
he can meet his obligations he should not pursue his business 
74r 
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interest at the expense of his children and former spouse. In 
essence he should make "contact with reality" and endeavor to 
utilize his medical skills; therefore, the Court will order 
Defendant to pay alimony to the Plaintiff in the sum of $200.00 
per month for a period of five (5) years as rehabilitative 
alimony or until she remarries or cohabitates, based upon the 
Defendant's past historical earnings and needs of the Plaintiff 
to adjust to her new circumstances. The Court invokes the use of 
Defendant's past historical earnings pursuant to Olson v. Olson, 
704 P.2d 564 (Utah, 1985) . 
4. Based on the foregoing paragraph, the Court will order 
Defendant to pay child support in the sum of $300.00 per month 
per child, for a total monthly child support obligation of 
$600.00. If the Defendant becomes delinquent in his child 
support obligations in an amount at least equal to child support 
payable for one month, then the Plaintiff is entitled a mandatory 
withholding income relief pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-45d-l, et seq. (1953) as amended. 
5. In order to avoid any "substantial change of 
circumstance" problems in the future as it relates to alimony and 
child support, the Court finds as follows: 
A. The amount of alimony and child support awarded in 
the aforementioned paragraphs are temporary. The matter 
will be reviewed in one (1) year at the request of either 
party and/or the guardian ad litem in behalf of the 
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children. However, the parties can request an earlier 
review by motion upon good cause that a substantial change 
of circumstance has occurred in the interim. 
B. During the next year, the Defendant is admonished 
and advised to document his endeavors in obtaining 
employment that will allow him to adequately support his 
children and former spouse. If the Court is persuaded that 
the Defendant has endeavored in "good faith", i.e., 
everything within his power to obtain adequate employment 
the Court may modify the amount awarded; however, the 
Defendant should be aware that the needs of his children and 
former spouse may also increase. 
6. It has been necessary for the parties to secure the 
services of an attorney to represent their children as a guardian 
ad litem. The guardian ad litem's fees and costs are $1,422,19 
as set out by his affidavit. In considering the reasonableness 
of attorney's fees, the Court follows the standard set out in 
Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984): 
A. Necessity of the number of attorney hours 
dedicated. 
B. Reasonableness of the rate charged. 
C. Rates commonly charged for divorce action in the 
community. 
Based upon the above considerations set out in Beals v. 
Beals, the Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant are 
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responsible for the guardian ad litem fees and costs in the sum 
of $1,000.00. The Plaintiff is responsible for $500.00 and the 
Defendant is responsible for $500.00. 
7. The real and personal property accumulated by the 
parties shall be awarded and divided as follows: 
A. TO PLAINTIFF: 
(1) A Promissory Note due from Ronald Thompson 
pursuant to terms and conditions contained therein, said 
Note having a net equity value of approximately $13,000. 
(2) Six (6) Port-A~Port airport hangars, being 
personal property, presently located at the St. George 
Airport in VJashington County, Utah, together with the 
interest of the Defendant in the ground lease from St. 
George City upon which said hangars are presently located. 
Said property is awarded to Plaintiff subject to a debt 
thereon in the approximate sum of $21,878 in favor of First 
Security Bank, which Plaintiff shall pay and discharge, and 
indemnify and hold Defendant harmless from the payment of 
the same. 
(3) All of Lot 6, Mountain View Subdivision, or the 
proceeds arising from an existing sale for said lot, locatec 
in Pine Valley, Washington County, Utah. 
(4) All of Lot 66, Clear Creek Estates, Unit 2, a 
subdivision according to the official plat thereof in the 
office of the County Recorder of Garfield County, State of 
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Utah, together with all improvements and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, including any and all water rights, 
both surface and underground, well rights, capital stock 
shares, etc., used in conjunction with or as appurtenances 
to said property. Said property is subject to an attorney's 
lien in favor of Ken Okazaki, Attorney at Law, as more 
specifically set forth in an Order entered by this Court on 
the 30th day of April, 1987. 
(5) All jewelry in Plaintiff's possession or which 
Plaintiff has pledged as security for payment of debt. 
(6) All household furniture and fixtures now in the 
possession of Plaintiff. 
(7) A 1987 Subaru Station Wagon, subject to a lien 
thereon in the sum of $11,600.00, which Plaintiff shall pay 
and discharge, and indemnify and hold Defendant harmless 
from the payment of the same. 
(8) A fifty percent (50%) interest of a l/7th 
partnership interest owned by Defendant in the partnership 
known as Moroni Feed, together with 1/2 of the proceeds due 
on Promissory Notes from Revecor, Turner, and Saclaroma 
which service the debt owed by Defendant for said l/7th 
partnership interest. Likewise, Plaintiff shall be 
responsible for one-half of the remaining partnership debt 
against said l/7th interest which is understood to be a net 
amount of approximately $4,000, assuming payment in full by 
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Revecor, Turner and Saclaroma, and payment to Dixie College 
Foundation as hereinafter set forth. 
(9) Defendant shall make, execute and deliver to 
Plaintiff a Promissory Note in the sum of $15,000 which 
shall be due and payable on September 23, 1992. For the 
first two years, said Promissory Note shall bear no 
interest. At the end of two years, interest shall accrue at 
the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum until said Trust 
Deed Note is paid in full. Said Trust Deed Note shall be 
secured by a Trust Deed to be executed by Defendant 
encumbering the remaining fifty percent (50%) interest of 
the l/7th interest in the Moroni Feed Partnership awarded to 
Defendant. Said Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed shall be in 
conformity with Trust Deed Notes and Trust Deeds used by 
financial institutions in the State of Utah. 
B. TO DEFENDANT; 
(1) All other real and personal property and all debt 
associated therewith, and specifically the following: 
PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS 
(a) All right, title and interest in the 
following partnerships: 
(i) Houston Investors 
(ii) Maxwell Mini Farms 
(iii) Spanish Trails 
(iv) Glen Canyon Marine 
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(v) Settlers RV Park 
(vi) Moroni Feed, subject to Plaintiff's 
interest set forth in Paragraph 5-A(8) 
above, and subject to the Trust Deed and 
Trust Deed Note to be executed by-
Defendant as set forth Paragraph 5-A(9) 
above. 
REAL ESTATE 
(2) The following described real property located in 
Washington County, Utah: 
(1) All of Lot 1, Prestige Villa Subdivision 
according to the official plat thereof, on file 
m the office of the County Recorder of Washing-
ton County, State of Utah. 
Subject to the debt hereinafter specified, 
and 
Subject to a life estate in favor of 
Defendant's mother, Delia P. Gibson, also 
known as Delia P. Houston. 
(11) The following described real property located 
in Garfield County, Utah: 
All of Lot 65, Clear Creek Estates, Unit 2, 
a subdivision according to the official plat 
thereof, on file in the office of the County 
Recorder of Garfield County, State of Utah. 
Subject to the debt hereinafter 
specified. 
Together with all improvements and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging, 
including any and all water rights, 
surface and well rights, capital stock 
shares, etc., used in conjunction with 
or as an appurtenance to said property. 
(iii) The real property located in Page, Arizona. 
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ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE: 
(i) A Promissory Note due Defendant from Houston 
Investors of approximately $40,000.00. 
(n) A Promissory Note due from Don Cecala of 
approximately $32,000.00. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY: 
(l) All personal property now in the possession 
of the Defendant. 
8. The Court finds that Defendant is indebted to Plaintiff 
for unpaid child and spousal support through September 26, 1987, 
in the sum of $5,550.00. The parties have advised the Court that 
Lot 6, Mountain View Estates, has been sold to Gary and Linda 
Wood pursuant to an Earnest Money Agreement dated August 2 3rd, 
1987. If said sale is consummated, the proceeds derived by 
Plaintiff from the sale of said lot shall be applied against all 
unpaid child support owed by Defendant, and the excess proceeds 
received by Plaintiff shall be deemed a credit in favor of 
Defendant against ongoing child support until the excess is 
exhausted, at which time, child support to be paid b> Defendant 
to Plaintiff as herein set forth shall resume. If the sale of 
said lot is not consummated, child support shall become 
immediately due and payable. 
9. The Court finds that pursuant to the previous 
Stipulation between Plaintiff and Defendant, the following 
described real property shall be awarded to V Lowry Snow and 
Rodney Savage, as tenants in common, free and clear of all liens 
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and encumbrances and free of any claims of Plaintiff and 
Defendant. The following described real property is located in 
Washington County, Utah: 
All of Lot 5, Mountain View Subdivision, 
as per map on file in the office of the 
Washington County Recorder. 
10. The parties are hereby directed to execute all deeds or 
other documents to vests title to the within and foregoing real 
and personal property. 
11. The debts accumulated between Plaintiff and Defendant 
shall be paid and discharged as follows: 
A. BY PLAINTIFF: (In addition to those enumerated above). 
1. CREDIT CARDS 
Goldwaters $ 4 6.78 
Citibank VISA 1,098.74 
Citibank Preferred VISA 2,497.00 
Mervyn's 254.87 
Citibank Mastercard 1,359.80 
Michigan VISA 1,061.00 
SUBTOTAL: $6,317.32 
2. Balance Due on Auto Loan $11,600.00 
3. Debt to Virginia Singer, 
Plaintiff's Mother 6,500.00 
4. Canyonlands Human Services, 
Gerald Thamert, Counseling 
for David Cedric Houston 460.00 
5. One-half debt owed to Dixie 
College Foundation for 
Moroni Feed 9,000.00 
6. One-half debt owed on Moroni 
Feed $18,500.00 
i 
TOTAL: $52,377.32 
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In addition, Plaintiff shall be responsible for the 
following expenses which she originally claimed should be 
reimbursed to her by Defendant: 
Amount paid toward deductible 
on health insurance, prescrip-
tions, dental, 1986 & 1987 600.00 
August health insurance -
Blue Cross 200.00 
Cleaning deposit on home 
rental 150.00 
Fixing house to sell 35.12 
Expenses incurred in locating 
new employment, hotel 14 0.00 
Moving expenses, U-Haul & gas 700.00 
Warren Brooks, moving furniture 
& driving truck 150.00 
Lodging during move 70.00 
Community education programs 
for children 30.00 
SUBTOTAL: 
TOTAL: 
$ 2,075.12 
$54,452.44 
B. BY DEFENDANT: (In addition to those enumerated abco) . 
(Estimated liabilities include interest as of October 31, 
1987 as per Rodney Savage, the accountant for the parties). 
1. A Judgment in favor of First Interstate Bank 
against Plaintiff and Defendant in the sum 
of $82,192.00. Defendant shall indemnify 
and hold Plaintiff harmless from the payment 
of the same. $82,192.00 
Financial Institutions: 
2. Valley National - Virginia Kay House Boat 25,859.00 
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3. Sun Capital - Dale Peterson property 62,757.00 
4. Sun Capital - Auto 16,085.00 
5. Sun Capital - Other 18,519.00 
6. Sun Capital - Other 10,6 21.00 
7. First Security - Dale Peterson 29,593.00 
8. First Security - Boyd Brown 15,148.00 
9. First Security - Auto 17,366.00 
10. First Security - Other 30,142.00 
11. St. George Federal Credit Union -
S/C Property 4,000.00 
12. Zions 14,238.00 
13. Stockmans 16,000.00 
14. Heritage Savings - Delia's House 46,315.00 
15. Zions Bank (cabin) 7,000.00 
TOTAL: $395,835.00 
Individuals and Others: 
16. Credit cards and open accounts $ 20,000.00 
17. Dale Peterson 22,750.00 
18. Savage & Esplin 34,000.00 
19. V. Lowry Snow 15,000.00 
20. Ken Okazaki 7,000.00 
21. Dixie College Foundation for Moroni 
Feed (1/2) 9,000.00 
22. Carolyn Houston (Defendant's first wife) 100,000.00 
23. Scott Houston 110,000.00 
24. Moroni Feed (1/2) 18,500.00 
TOTAL: $732,085.00 
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Defendant shall pay, assume and discharge all of the above 
debts as well as all other debts incurred by Plaintiff and 
Defendant, including, but not limited to those owed by reason of 
partnership interests, real estate, ownership of personal 
property, etc., and shall indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless 
from the payment of the same. 
12. Plaintiff shall be required to pay health and accident 
insurance in favor of the minor children so long as the same is 
available to her through her employment. In the event the same 
becomes unavailable to Plaintiff through her employment, the 
Court shall review this matter to determine which party shall pay 
health and accident insurance on behalf of the minor children. 
13. No attorney's fees or costs are awarded to either party. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That Judgment be entered in accordance with the within 
and foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED this (J^^ day of , / l ^ Z ^ ^ ^ O 1987. 
D H. MA 
ict-<fud< ge Pro Ten 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Mr. V. Lowry Snow, SNOW & JENSEN, 75 South 
100 East, Suite 2C, St. George, Utah 84770, first-class postage 
prepaid on this 30th day of November , 1987. 
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HAROLD R. STEPHENS ( 3 0 9 7 ) 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
136 E a s t S o u t h T e m p l e , S u i t e 1060 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U tah 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 328 -0645 
TIF,. JSWL DIST C0»)RT 
WASH'^G m COoSTY 
NOV 2 3 1933 
zzg0zi:. GLfc°-< JEHJTY 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
WASHINGTON 
DEE HOUSTON, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
DON HOUSTON, 
Defendant 
D 
COUN 
[STRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
rY, STATE OF UTAH 
) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
) AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
) AND MOTION FOR CHANGE 
) OF VENUE 
i Civil No. 86-0905 
1
 Judge: 
DEE HOUSTON, b e i n g f i r s t p l a c e d u p o n he r o a t h and d u l y 
s w o r n and i n s u p p o r t o f m o t i o n f o r an Order t o Show Cause and 
M o t i o n f o r Change o f Venue s t a t e s as f o l l o w s * 
1 . T h a t she i s t h e p l a i n t i f f i n t h e a b o v e - i d e n t i f l e d 
a c t i o n h a v i n g been d i v o r c e d f rom Don H o u s t o n , t h e d e f e n d a n t , 
on December 1 , 1 9 8 6 , w i t h a S u p p l e m e n t a l D e c r e e o f D i v o r c e 
h a v i n g been e n t e r e d p u r s u a n t t o memorandum d e c i s i o n o f t h e 
H o n o r a b l e Howard H. M a e t a m i s s u e d Oc tobe r 2 9 , 1 9 8 7 . 
2 . T h a t s i n c e t h e e n t r y o f t h e D e c r e e o f D i v o r c e 
p l a i n t i f f and d e f e n d a n t h a v e moved f r o m W a s h i n g t o n C o u n t y , 
S t a t e o f U t a h , and now r e s i d e i n S a l t Lake C o u n t y . 
3 . That t o t h e b e s t o f p l a i n t i f f ' s k n o w l e d g e , d e f e n d a n t 
i s f u l l y employed and has r e m a r r i e d , and p l a i n t i f f has a l s o 
r e c e n t l y r e n a m e d . 
yap 
4 . T h a t i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h i s m a t t e r t o be 
t r a n s f e r r e d and t h e v e n u e c h a n g e d f r o m t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l 
D i s t r i c t t o t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t as a n a t t e r o f 
c o n v e n i e n c e t o t h e p a r t i e s and i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f j u d i c i a l 
economy. 
5 . T h a t she has r e c e i v e d no c h i l d s u p p o r t or a l i m o n y as 
p r o v i d e d u n d e r t h e t e r n s o f t h e D e c r e e o f D i v o r c e s i n c e 
J a n u a r y , 1 9 8 8 , and i s i n need o f an O r d e r t o Show Cause 
r e q u i r i n g d e f e n d a n t t o appear and show cause why he s h o u l d no t 
be h e l d i n c o n t e m p t o f C o u r t f o r h i s f a i l u r e and r e f u s a l t o 
mee t t h e o b l i g a t i o n i m p o s e d , and f u r t h e r , p l a i n t i f f w o u l d 
r e q u e s t an o r d e r o f t h e C o u r t as p r o v i d e d e n t e r i n g a s u p p o r t 
award based on d e f e n d a n t ' s c u r r e n t i n c o m e , p l a i n t i f f ' s i n c o m e 
and t h e newly adop ted U n i f o r m R u l e s o f C h i l d S u p p o r t and w o u l d 
ask t h e C o u r t t o i s s u e i t s o r d e r t o w i t h h o l d and d e l i v e r t o 
d e f e n d a n t ' s emp loye r t o g u a r a n t e e p l a i n t i f f ' s s u p p o r t payment 
as c a l l e d f o r i n t h e Decree o f D i v o r c e . 
6 . Tha t d e f e n d a n t has f a i l e d o r r e f u s e s t o i s s u e h i s n o t e 
and t r a n s f e r c o n t r a c t s o r agreements as c a l l e d f o r u n d e r t h e 
t e r m s o f t h e D e c r e e , and p l a i n t i f f w o u l d r e q u e s t an o r d e r o f 
t h e C o u r t r e q u i r i n g d e f e n d a n t t o comp ly w i t h t h e t e r m s o f t h e 
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Decree , or i n the a l t e r n a t i v e , Judgment against defendant for 
the value represented as p l a i n t i f f ' s h e r e i n . 
Fur the r , a f f i a n t sayeth not . 
1988. DATED t h i s J2- day of lAiJLC^ujs/T , 
tffefniifV DEF NuWTON 
k SUBSCI 
My Commiss ion E x p i r e s : 
u RIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s 2J^J day o f 
, 1 9 8 8 . 
DTARY P U B L I C v NO 
Residing i n S a l t Lake County, UT 
yj 
:yjrj 
HAROLD ft. STEPHENS (3097) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1060 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-0645 
'89 FEB 7 PD 1 24 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN 
AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEE HOUSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON HOUSTON, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION FOR CHANGE 
OF VENUE AND CONTINUANCE 
ON AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. 86-0905 
Oudge : 
COMES NOW the parties in the above identified matter and 
by and through their counsel Harold R. Stephens representing 
Plaintiff and Rinehart Peshell representing Defendant and 
stipulate as follows: 
1. That the parties were divorced in October 1987 in 
the Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington County. 
2. That since the entry of the Decree in this matter 
both parties have moved, and now reside in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, both have remarried, and are employed in Salt 
Lake County. 
3. That the parties agree in their best economic 
interest the matter should be transferred to the Third 
Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, for any further 
hearings supplemental, or modification proceedinas. 
4. That the Order to Show Cause in thi3 matter issued 
from the Fifth District is continued until such time as the 
parties can reset the matter before the Third District bench 
on further stipulation of the parties. 
DATED this \"^f- day of January, 1989. 
Y3S 
L\ y -%A-
HAROLD R. STEPHENS V 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
RINEHART PESHELL 
Attorney for Defendant 
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HAROLD R. STEPHENS (3097) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1060 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: ^801) 328-0645 
C3 FEB 37 R!'l 8 07 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN 
AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEE HOUSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON HOUSTON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER FOR CHANGE OF 
VENUE AND CONTINUANCE 
OF AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. 86-0905 
Judge: £& 3&tf 
Based on the S t i p u l a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s , t h r o u g h t h e i r 
c o u n s e l and good cause a p p e a r i n g t h e C o u r t e n t e r t h e 
f o l l o w i n g : 
ORDER 
1 . That t h i s m a t t e r be t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e T h i r d 
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court o f S a l t Lake County f o r any f u r t h e r 
h e a r i n g s on m o d i f i c a t i o n as the p a r t i e s deem a p p r o p r i a t e . 
2 . That t h e Order to Show Cause i s s u e d i n t h i s m a t t e r 
be c o n t i n u e d to be r e s e t or r e - i s s u e d from the T h i r d D i s t r i c t 
C o u r t . 
DATED t h i s /(JP " day of 3anuar7 , ( / 9 8 9 . 
BY THE COURT : 
Y*1 
-n 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of January, 1989, I 
mailed, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order for 
Chanae of Venue and Continuance of an Order to Show Cause 
postage prepaid, to: 
Rmehart Peshell 
Attorney for Defendant 
7321 South State Street, #E 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
¥tft> 
1** ' " (S* .MIi'lT 
I •-' • V «, 'Jv. 1\ ' 
kill A 25 TH f9Q 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT ,LCA* 
STEVEN LEE PAYTON (#2554) 
Attorney for Defendant 
431 South 300 East, Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3298 
Telephone: (801) 363-7070 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEE HOUSTON, 
aka DEE HOUSTON KIRKHAM, 
3656 Aurora Circle 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
DOB: 06/13/56 
Plaintiff, 
DON HOUSTON, 
389 Meadow Road 
Murray, UT 84107 
DOB: 03/05/32 
Defendant• 
VERIFIED PETITION 
FOR MODIFICATION OF 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
[Decree of Divorce 12/1/86] 
5th D/C Washington Co. 
State of Utah 
Civil No. 86-0905 
Judge Pro Tempore 
Commissioner, Howard H. Maetani 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce 
11/24/87 
5th D/C Washington Co. 
State of Utah 
Judge Pro Tempore 
Comissioner, Howard H. Maetani 
Civil Mo. 86-0905 
Transferred To 3rd D/C Court 
SLCo. 2/16/89 
Judge, Raymond S. Uno 
Civil No. 
00554 
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JURISDICTION 
1. Jurisdiction of the court is pursuant to Utah State Law 
as follows: 
CJA Rule 6-404 "Modification of Divorce Decrees" 
U.C.A. 30-3-5(3) [Modification of Decree-Continuing jur^S(^^ct^onj 
U.C.A. 30-3-10 "Custody of Children" 
VENUE 
2. Venue is properly laid in Salt Lake County, state of 
Utah pursuant to Utah State statutes as follows: 
U.C.A. 30-3-1 "Procedure-Residence-Grounds" 
U.C.A. 78-13-7 "All Other Actions" 
PARTIES 
3. DEE HOUSTON, PLAINTIFF, is an individual and resident oi 
Salt Lake County, state of Utah residing as follows: 
3656 Aurora Circle 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
*• DON HOUSTON, DEFENDANT, is an individual and resident oi 
Salt Lake County, state of Utah, residing as follows: 
389 Meadow Road 
Murray, UT 84107 
00555 
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5. MINOR CHILDREN^ of the parties relevant herein are as 
follows: 
DAVID CEDRIC HOUSTON DOB: 06/01/82 
VIRGINIA KAY HOUSTON DOB: 09/04/84 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Custody Modification) 
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
6. December 1, 1986 the parties were divorced pursuant to 
Decree of Divorce signed by Howard H. Maetani, Commissioner and 
District Judge Pro Tempore in the Fifth Judicial District Court in 
and for Washington County, state of Utah, all parties being 
residents within said district at that time. 
7. November 24, 1987 a "Supplmental Decree of Divorce" was 
entered and signed by Howard H. Maetani, Commissioner and District 
Judge Pro Tempore in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for 
Washington County, state of Utah, all parties being residents 
within said district at that time. • 
8. February 16, 1989 pursuant to stipulation of the parties 
the case was transferred to the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County for any further proceedings, modifications, or 
other proceedings as the parties deem necessary said order signed 
by Judge, J. Phillip Eves. 
o o r ^ 
Verified Petition 
Houston v Houston 
Civil No. 89-090-1209 
3rd D/C SLCo. 
Page l 
9. This Petition For Modification is filed based upon a 
change In circumstances which has occurred subsequent to any and 
all other proceedings in the within entitled case without 
limitation, none of which circumstances were previously considere< 
in any hearings and all of which have occurred subsequent to any 
proceedings in Washington County and/or Salt Lake County. 
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES 
10. Subsequent to any and all prior proceedings of every 
kind and description whatsoever there have been material changes 
in circumstances with regards to custody of the children, said 
change being in the custodial parent, the plaintiff herein, and 
which material change would warrant the court making a change in 
custody of the minor children to the defendant, said material 
changes not heretofore having been explored or considered in any 
other proceedings and include but are not limited to the 
following: 
(a) Communication Plaintiff herein absolutely refuses unde 
any circumstance to communicate with the defendant except in 
writing even about routine matters of visitation which she insist 
must be handled In writing. 
(b) Refuses To Directly Communicate The plaintiff has 
installed a telephone answering device subsequent to all prior 
proceedings and keeps it on constantly so that the defendant is 
only able to leave messages with regards to the children. Such 
phone calls are never returned by the plaintiff but often times b 
the children as much as three or four days after the fact. 
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(c) Plaintiff has delegated her husband as person to deal 
with the defendant on issues of the children even though he is a 
third party to this proceeding, has no relationship to the 
children, and legally cannot dictate or interpret the terms and 
conditions of the parties decree. 
(d) Said lack of communication is a factor which the court 
may consider with regards to a change in custody and has 
heretofore not been considered and furthermore the lack of 
communication has intensified and become worse since the plaintiff 
has what she perceives to be complete and total control. 
1 1
 • Visitation Visitation schedule of the defendant is 
substantially interf erred with by the plaintiff in that she limits 
access to the children for purposes of visitation and refuses to 
discuss same. Furthermore summer visitation plaintiff has not 
complied with the terms of the decree and insists that the 
defendant cannot have any blocks of time such that he may take 
trips with the children or otherwise. Plaintiff furthermore 
interprets the provisions of the visitation that he give her the 
right to pick the children up every evening or otherwise regulate 
visitation during the summer. 
12. Plaintiff refuses to discuss the matter and simply does 
this through a series of notes again consistent with a change in 
circumstances regarding communication. 
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13. Plaintiff planned extensive trips with the children 
during the summer and used that as a justification to deny the 
defendant visitation or right to have same, he having limited 
access with the children during the year and summertime being the 
only time he would have substantial visitation. Such interferenc 
with the visitation schedule is sufficient change in circumstance 
to justify a change in custody pursuant to case law of the Supren 
Court of the state of Utah. 
14. Religious Training During the course of the marriage 
and at all times since then the plaintiff professed to believe in 
religion, the children however were of sufficiently tender years 
that they did not appreciate the consequences thereof. 
15. Plaintiff now has openly proclaimed that she is an 
"atheist" has no belief whatsoever in religion, church, or any 
interest in seeing that the children have "religious training" of 
any kind and consciously seeks to avoid the children engage in 
church attendance or religious training. 
16. Plaintiff has indicated that she "discourages religious 
training", does not go to church at all, does not have a belief i 
religion, is adamantly opposed to same, and announced that she ha 
always held that position but simply during the marriage and 
subsequent thereto sought to appease the defendant by not stating 
heretore these beliefs. 
005 
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BEST INTEREST 
17. Such changes in circumstances have never been brought 
before or considered by the court and it would be a substantial 
change justifying change in custody pursuant to the best interest 
of children. 
18. Best interest of the minor children justify change in 
custody, that being justified by case law and appellate decisions 
of the Utah Courts and best interest being preliminarily 
demonstrated as follows: 
Tuckey v Tuckey 649 P.2d 88 (UT 1982) 
Martinez v Martinez 652 p.2d 934 (UT 1982) 
Williams v Williams 655 P.2d 652 (UT 1982) 
Mitchell v Mitchell 668 P.2d 561 (UT 1983) 
Beclcer v Becker 694 P.2d 608 (UT 1984) 
Mineer v Mineer 706 P.2d 1060 <UT 1985) 
Pennington v Pennington 711 P.2d 254 (UT 1985) 
Moody y Moody 715 P.2d 507 (UT 1985) 
shioji v Shioji 712 P.2d 197 (UT 1985) 
Fontenot v Fontenot 714 P.2d 1131 (UT 1986) 
Kramer v Kramer 738 p.2d 624 (UT 1987) 
19. Interference with visitation denies the children access 
and ability to bond with the defendant herein who is their natural 
father. His repeated limited visitation is frustrating to the 
children because no acrimony exists between they and their father 
(defendant) and it is an attempt by plaintiff to limit their 
ability to bond which is not in their best Interest given that 
both parents shall be lifelong parents to them despite the divorce 
and remarriage of each parent to other parties. 
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20. Such interference by plaintiff is sufficient grounds ar 
basis for change in custody pursuant to case law. 
21. The acrimony in communication and failure and refusal t 
openly discuss with defendant and limited access is a breakdown i 
communication which is not in the best interest of the children. 
Even phone calls are regulated by the plaintiff such that the 
defendant does not have free access to the children even though \ 
harbors no hostility or animosity toward the plaintiff. 
22. This lack of communication and lack of encouragement b} 
the plaintiff is sufficient grounds pursuant to case law of the 
appellate courts to justify a change in custody, it being in the 
best interests of the children. 
23. Religion The statements of the plaintiff and complete 
hostility towards religion is not in the best interests of the 
children. Religious training is not something which the courts 
would normally become involved in; however, it is a circumstance 
and situation where even on an "academic basis" that a knowledge 
and understanding of biblical texts is basic to functioning in tl 
United States and in a society where many of the references are 
based upon scriptural doctrines of a secular nature, both old an< 
new testament references and the children would be severely 
crippled educationally as well as culturally given the complete 
hostility toward religious training by the plaintiff. 
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24. Failure of religious training is a basis for change in 
custody and such failure* to train is not in the best interest of 
the children since they are always free to reject same as they 
grow older but having never been taught young they would not have 
a basis for making informed decisions. 
25 . Case Authority Defendant sets out herein that his 
Petition is based and predicated upon cases of the Utah Supreme 
Court and appellate courts including but not limited to cases, all 
of which have dealt with "change in custody" and "best interest" 
subsequent to the time of divorce and defendant relies upon 
general case law and more specifically trial memorandum to be 
filed at time of trial so that there is a record that same has 
been brought to the courts attention. 
26. Defendant as a matter of case law is factually entitled 
to a change in custody, it simply being rationale of the appellate 
courts that "sometimes the court must choose between good and 
better" and normally will "place with the parent who has shown the 
greatest ability and desire to subvert their own needs and 
hostility between the parties in greater the interest of the needs 
of the children". Current relationship does not work with the 
plaintiff because of friction in her own marriage and because of 
the matters which are previously set out herein. 
00562 
Verified Petition Civil No. 89-090-1209 Page 1( 
Houston v Houston 3rd D/C SLCo. 
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS 
27. Defendant herein should be granted a judicial 
satisfaction for any and all sums, obligations, and/or judgments 
without limitation through and including October 1, 1990 on 
grounds and for said reasons that all such sums have been 
satisfied through discharge in bankruptcy in 1990. 
28. Defendant furthermore is entitled to judicial 
satisfaction for any and all sums of every kind and description 
through October 1, 1990 which may not have been covered in 
bankruptcy by virtue of payments to the plaintiff and the fact 
that neither she nor her counsel have filed appropriate 
satisfactions of judgments, or release of lien in property 
defendant no longer has an interest in as a consequence of 
bankruptcy. 
29. Defendant is entitled to discharge as a matter of law OJ 
any and all sums through October 1, 1990 on grounds and for 
reasons that he filed bankruptcy in 1990. Plaintiff was given 
notice or in the alternative had actual knowledge of said 
bankruptcy and did not intervene in said proceedings nor file any 
objection or adversary proceeding and therefore claims of every 
kind and description she may have as a matter of Utah State case 
law and Federal Bankruptcy law are discharged thru October 1, 199( 
without limitation. 
U056 
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"KNUPSEN CONTRIBUTION" 
30. Judgment For Sums Expended Divorce Decree of the 
parties provided with regards to property of the parties relevant 
to this modication as follows: 
Six (6) Port-A-Port airport hangers, being personal 
property, presently located at the St. George Airport 
in Washington County, Utah, together with the interest 
of the defendant in the ground lease from St. George 
City upon which said hangars are presently located. 
Said property is awarded to plaintiff subject to a 
debt thereon in the approximate sum of $21,878 in 
favor of First Security Bank, which plaintiff shall 
pay and discharge, and indemnify and hold defendant 
narmless from the payment of the same. 
31. Defendant prior to any discharge in bankruptcy expended 
a total judgment of $27,000 including the principle and interest 
paid to retire said sum for reason that the plaintiff did NOT 
follow the Decree and it was necessary for the defendant in an 
attempt to salvage any creditworthiness to pay said sums and is a 
matter of case law he is entitled to a judgment for said sums. 
32. Any said sums with regards to judgment herein in the 
event that custody is not granted defendant should be entitled to 
retire monthly as child support from said sums, same being 
appropriate under case law in the state of Utah and they being in 
kind contributions that the "plaintiff otherwise would have had to 
pay" therefore they constitute as a matter of law contribution 
toward support to which defendant is entitled to credit. 
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REDUCTION IN SUPPORT 
33. Defendants date of birth is 3/5/32, he is 58 years of 
age, and until divorce he practiced as a surgeon at a substantial 
income. 
34. Defendant can no longer work as a surgeon and has not 
done so for at least the past five (5) years. Grounds and reason! 
therefore being that he has been sued, said suits are not recited 
herein but are a matter of public record and are still pending. 
35. Defendant during his entire medical career since 1960 
has practiced as a surgeon and it is impractible for him to 
continue medical practice because of age and pending litigation 
and he is not knowledgeable about general medical practice and to 
attempt same would be tantamount to a new physician starting out 
since he practiced solely in the area of surgery prior to ceasing 
practice of medicine. 
36. Defendant herein is incapable of carrying on the 
practice of medicine of any kind on grounds and for reasons that 
he cannot secure medical malpractice insurance and thus as a 
consequence of same is unable and has been unable to secure 
practice independently or to secure a medical position due to his 
"uninsurability" and pending litigation arising out of previous 
alleged medical malpractice. 
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37. On said grounds and for said reasons defendant has 
worked in "non-medical capacities" including but not limited to 
business consultant, reviewing and assessing medical records for 
parties that have a need for such services j however, is currently 
not regularly employed and therefore the sum of $300 per month for 
a total support obligation is reasonable under the circumstances. 
38. Defendant requests that the court enter an order that 
the support payment be established at said sum if the cour rules 
that custody with him is not an alternative given the changes in 
circumstances and best interest of the children as previously set 
out. 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
39. Defendant herein In the event that the court should 
determine alternatively that he should not have custody avers he 
should have other sundry relief alternatively, not otherwise 
covered herein as follows: 
(a) Visitation The court establish a specific visitation 
schedule which defendant will submit with memorandum of authority 
of law as a reasonable proposal herein in the event the parties 
cannot otherwise agree what should be followed. 
(b) Clarification from the court for the title company as to 
the status of the "Ronald Thompson note" which is with the 
Southern Utah Title Company and about which there exists a dispute 
over residual sums as well as water stock. 
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(c) The court enter a satisfaction of judgment for any and 
all matters upon which the defendants name may appear in a 
partnership or otherwise for reason that this problem has arisen 
and defendant having been discharged in bankruptcy such liens ha-v 
impaired the ability of other persons who have sought financial 
liability from the defendant to clear title. 
(d) Tax Exemption The court settle the question of tax 
exemption between the respective parties, depending upon the 
outcome of the Petition For Change In Custody. 
40. In Its equitable power the court furthermore should 
satisfy and clarify current status of a garnishment against the 
defendant and his former employer plaintiffs counsel having sougl 
to garnish under a statute that had been repealed and having 
sought a daily garnishment of the defendant; he having been 
discharged as a consequence of same however, counsel having 
committed "legal malpractice per se" for reason of having 
overlooked said statute pursuant to- case law in the state of Utat 
41. Such other and further relief as the court deems fair, 
just and equitable under the provisions of U.R.C.P. Rule 54(c)(i; 
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42. Right To Amend Defendant herein reserves at this time 
the right to amend this pleading to add further causes of action 
as may be appropriate after examining the answer of the defendant 
t 
and her defenses and averments herein. 
43. Furthermore defendant reserves the right herein and 
gives notice of same, as is his right, after such time as 
plaintiff files an answer herein to file a Memorandum of law in 
support of the contentions and provisions herein. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays for relief as heretofore set out 
and avered in his allegations contained herein. 
1. Attorneys fees herein at the rate of $100 per hour with 
a minimum fee of $2000 plus all costs and expenses as well as 
attorneys fees and costs subsequent to judgment and enforcement 
thereof and on appeal should same be necessary. 
[Cabrera v Cottrell 694 P.2d 622 (UT 1985)] 
[Cady v Johnson 671 P.2d 149 (UT 1983)] 
(Kerr v Kerr 620 P.2d 1380 (UT 1980)] 
2. Such other and additional relief as the court may deem 
just, proper and appropriate in according with the provisions of 
U.R.C.P. Rule 54(c)(1). 
DATED this 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the Z^*day of ^ o f t i . m b u , 19 ^ n . 
personally appeared before me DON HOUSTON, DEFENDANT, in the 
foregoing action, who after being duly sworn upon oath stated that 
he has read the foregoing Verified Petition For Modification of 
Divorce Decree and that the matters contained therein are true to 
the best of his knowledge, information and belief and that he 
executed same.
 A 
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RICHARD S. NEMELKA NO. e3oe 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2046 EAST 4800 SOUTH 
SUITE 103 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84117 
(801) 272-4244 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
DEE HOUSTON aka DEE 
HOUSTON KIRKHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
DON HOUSTON, 
Defendant. 
ANSWER TO VERIFIED 
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION 
AND VERIFIED COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 89 090 1209 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Plaintiff, by and through her attorney, Richard S. 
Neraelka, in answer to defendant's Petition for Modification, 
hereby admits, denies and alleges as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. Defendant's Petition fails to state a cause of action 
upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
2. Plaintiff admits the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 8 of said Petition. 
3. Plaintiff denies the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 9 through 43 of said Petition. 
0057J 
4. Plaintiff denies each and every other allegation not 
heretofore specifically admitted. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
5. Plaintiff affirmatively alleges that the defendant ha* 
unclean hands and is in contempt of various orders of the Court 
and still fails to comply with the same and is in arrearages in 
child support and has failed to comply with other terms of the 
previous orders of the Court and, therefore, should be denied an] 
relief whatsoever. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
6. Plaintiff further affirmatively alleges that any 
change of circumstance in defendant's employment is due to 
defendant's intentional acts to not acquire sufficient employmenl 
and, further, that defendant is capable of earning income far in 
excess of the approximately $2,800.00 that the Court found he 
made approximately one year ago. 
7. Plaintiff further affirmatively alleges that she has 
complied with all the terms of the Decree of Divorce and 
subsequent Orders thereto. 
8. Plaintiff further alleges that she did not have 
sufficient notice in regards to any bankruptcy proceedings of th« 
defendant. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that defendant's Petition be 
dismissed and defendant take nothing thereby. 
2 
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VERIFIED 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Plaintiff counterclaims against defendant and alleges as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff and defendant are residents of Salt Lake 
County and the above-entitled Court had proper venue in regards 
to the Decree of Divorce and subsequent Orders that have been 
entered in the above-entitled action. 
2. That pursuant to the Decree of Divorce and Orders 
entered in the above-entitled action the defendant was ordered to 
pay to the plaintiff child support in the sura of $681.00 per 
month beginning in July 1989. Further, the Order signed by the 
Court in approximately September 1989 ordered the defendant to 
prepare any and all documents necessary to transfer the interest 
in the Moroni Peed Partnership and Trust Deed Note applicable 
thereto to the plaintiff. 
3. Further, the issue of contempt was held in reserve 
pursuant to said Order. 
4. That defendant is still in contempt of the Orders of 
the Court and has failed to pay the child support due and owing 
and has failed to comply with the signing of documents 
transferring various interests to the plaintiff. 
5. That defendant is indebted to the plaintiff for child 
support arrearages in an amount to be determined at the time of 
trial in this matter. 
3 
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6. That plaintiff is entitled to child support being 
ordered pursuant to the statutory guidelines and the gross income 
of the plaintiff and the imputed gross income of the defendant 
based upon his capabilities. 
7. That defendant has also failed to comply with the 
Orders of the Court in regards to payment of medical bills for 
the minor children of the parties and plaintiff is entitled to 
reimbursement for an amount to be determined at the time of 
trial. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays under her Counterclaim as 
follows: 
1. That the defendant be held in contempt of Court and b* 
incarcerated in jail for his willful contempt. 
2. For judgments for child support arrearages, medical 
expenses, attorney's fees and other amounts to be determined at 
the time of trial. 
3. For an Order of this Court ordering the defendant to 
forthwith comply with all the terras of the previous Orders of th< 
Court before he is allowed to purge himself of his contempt of 
said Orders, 
4. For reasonable attorney's fees, costs of court and 
such other relief as the court deems just and proper. 
DATED this 25th day of October, 1990. 
"rhf^U 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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V E R I F I C A T I O N 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DEE HOUSTON KIRKHAM, being first duly swon upon oath, 
deposes and says that she is the plaintiff in the foregoing, 
that she has read the foregoing and knows and understands 
the contents thereof and that the same are true to the best 
of her knowledge, information and belief. 
DATED this U* day of October, 1990. 
nRR HOUSTON! KTRKHAM v DEE HOUSTON KIRKHAM 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2- 4> day of 
October, 1990. 
NOTARY"PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Answer and Verified Counterclaim to Steven Lee ^ayton, Attorney 
for Defendant, 431 South 300 East, Suite 40, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111-3298, this 25th day of October, 1990, postage 
prepaid. 
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IN THE T^IRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOUSTON, DEE 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
HOUSTON, DON 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 890901209 CV 
DATE 12/06/90 
HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER 
COURT REPORTER NO TAPE 
COURT CLERK SPO 
TYPE OF HEARING: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. NEMELKA, RICHARD S. 
D. ATTY. PAYTON, S 
ON MOTION OF 
PLAINTIFF 
COMM. RECOMMENDS: 
1. PLTF AWARDED JUDGMENT FOR CHILD SUPPORT IN SUM OF $4,433 
FROM SEPT. 89 - OCT. 90. 
2. DEFT TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT THRU CLERK OF THE COURT. 
3. DEFT SIGN DOCUMENT RELEASING FUNDS WITHIN 5 DAYS OF TODAY; 
PLTF MAKE CHANGES AS NECESSARY TO PROPERLY IDENTIFY FUNDS. 
qy^ct^fcD^t^ 
STEVEN LEE PAYTON (#2554) 
Attorney for Defendant 
431 South 300 East, Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3298 
Telephone: (801) 363-7070 
DEC 17 1390 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEE HOUSTON aka 
DEE HOUSTON KIRKHAM, 
3656 Aurora Circle, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
DOB: 06/13/56 
Plaintiff, 
DON HOUSTON, 
389 Meadow Road 
Hurray, UT 84107 
DOB: 03/05/32 
Defendant. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
OBJECTION 
TO 
COMMISSIONERS RECOMMENDATION 
Civil No. 89-090-1209 
(Judge, Raymond S. Uno) 
Authority 
U.C.A. 78-27-19 "Law Defined" 
U.C.A. 30-3-15.3 "Commissioners Powers" 
CJA Rule 6-401 "Domestic Relations Commissioners" 
00592 
Objection 
Houston v Houston 
Civil No. 89-090-1209 
3rd D/C SLCo. Page 
TO: RICHARD S. NEMELKA, ESQ. 
2046 East 480T) South, Suite 103 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
[272-4244] ' 
Certified Mail JP459-447-515 
COMMISSIONER, SANDRA N. PEULER 
Third Circuit Court Building 
451 South 200 East, Room 340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
HAND DELIVERED 
NOTICE OF OBJECTION 
You and each of you are hereby advised that objection is 
taken to Commissioners recommendation on "Plaintiffs Order To Sh 
Cause". 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. 12/6/90 (Thurs.) @2:00 p.m. plaintiff appeared with 
counsel Richard S. Nemelka; defendant appeared with counsel Stev 
Lee Payton before Commissioner, Sandra N. Peuler. 
2. Commissioner advised that there was only fifteen (15) 
minutes allowed to the parties and no testimony would be heard o 
witnesses to which objection was traken. 
3. Defendant had pending at the time and still pending 
Petition For Modification which deals with the same issues in 
plaintiffs Order To Show Cause and which was filed subsequent to 
the defendants Petition For Modification. 
I 
00593 
Objection Civil No. 89-090-1209 Page i 
Houston v Houston 3rd D/C SLCo. 
SPECIFIC POINTS OF OBJECTION 
Rule 4-501 ''Motions" 
Defendant herein Has insufficient time within which to 
prepare memorandum pursuant to CJA Rule 4-501 "Motions" for 
purposes of this objection and herewith moves the court pursuant 
to U.R.C.P. Rule 6(b) "Extension of Time" to allow additional time 
for filing of Memorandum with the court, objection rule beinR 
unclear as to when the time period begins to run. Time is 
necessary so that there is an adequate record for appellate 
review. Furthermore it is contemplated that oral argument will bi 
requested at such time as all memorandums pursuant to CJA Rule 
4-501 "Motions" are filed however due to the shortness of time for 
filing objection, points of objection are set out to place the 
parties on notice. 
1• Statutory Provisions Unconstitutional Pursuant to 
requirements of CJA all statutory provisions in the state of Utah 
and CJA Rules in all domestic matters filed in the District Court 
are required to be heard before the Commissioner and given that a 
defendant may not bypass the Commissioner the matter is 
unconstitutional in that the Commissioner only allows fifteen (15l 
minutes, no evidence is taken, no witnesses are heard and the 
ij matter is done on proffer of counsel. Specific objection having 
I been made thereto it violates the fundamental right of a party to 
confront and cross-examine evidence against them as well as 
' witnesses thereof in support of contentions of a party. 
l  00594 
Objection 
Houston v Houston 
Civil Ho. 89-090-1209 
3rd D/C SLCo. 
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Furthermore that the provision of the rule with regards to 
objections requires that any matter going to the District Court b 
heard in accordance with the provisions of CJA Rule 4-501 
"Motions" and likewise does not allow for discovery of other 
matters in terms of confronting issues raised, in this case 
specifically plaintiffs Order To Show Cause. To that extent the 
entire procedure is unconstitutional "as applied", if not "on its 
face" although it is conceded the court may in practice allow in 
any given case or specifically make provision to suspend the rule 
thereby circumventing any unconstitutional objection. 
2. Defendant having not been allowed to present witnesses 
or other matters herein contrary to those in the Order To Show 
Cause this procedure is unconstitutional and it is particularly 
egregious since the Commissioner admonished the defendant that h( 
Order stands until such time as there may be a hearing before th< 
court and under such a procedure the unconstitutionality of the 
procedure becomes apparent. 
3. Hearsay Evidence taken*-before the Commissioner is 
hearsay particularly when it has not been ratified by clients or 
the procedure agreed to and as such it ia in violation of basic 
due process under the guarantees of the Utah State Constitution 
and Federal Constitution. Article I Section 12 Utah State 
Constitution, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment United States 
Constitution. 
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Houston v Houston 3rd D/C SLCo. 
Furthermore such proceedings before the Commissioner are: 
(a) Solely by proffer; 
(b) Not well suitved to conflicting proffers of evidence or 
allegations of counsel; 
(c) Do not allow for or make provision for discovery 
proceedings therein; 
(d) Result in irreparable harm in not preserving status quo 
when substantial question exists or objection is raised; 
(e) Deny due process in that a party is required to comply 
with an order under these circumstances when they have had no 
opportunity to present evidence. 
Accordingly and therefore not only is it hearsay but is 
unconstitutional and there is case law to suggest same in the 
state of Utah as follows: 
Wlscomb v Wiscomb 744 P.2d 1021 (Utah App. 1987) 
D.B. v Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
of the Department of Business Regulation State of Utah 
779 E.Sd 1UJ> <dtah APP. 1989> 
4. Richard S. Nemelka, Esq. Richard S. Nemelka has a 
conflict of interest in the case as appears herein by virtue of 
the documents in the file in that he attempted to execute on 
matters to the harm of the defendant herein under outdated law ancf 
as such his actions on its face preliminarily constitute 
malpractice per se [See State v Moritzky 771 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 
1989)1. 
00596 
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Houston v Houston 3rd D/C SLCo. 
5 • Discovery Discovery is not allowed prior to these 
hearings given the relatively short time before they are heard an 
thus the defendant is denied due process of law, he having a rigb 
to fully explore and make record of evidence and preserve same tc 
the best that he can [See: Strand v Associated Students of 
University of Utah 561 P.2d 191 (UT 1977)1 
6. Due Process As set out, the Commissioner has 
authority to enter recommendations of binding effect CJA Rule 
4-601(a) "Temporary Orders and Recommedations" in the absence of 
legally admissible evidence and over the objection of a defendant 
therefore the entire Commissioner system is flawed 
constitutionally in that it denies due process as guaranteed by 
the United States Constitution and Utah State Constitution and 
such an order entered without admissible evidence admissible in « 
court of law denies due process to a defendant. 
7. Miscellaneous Witness Defendant is not allowed to 
call witnesses before the Commissioner, something to which he 
objects and which violates due process under both federal and 
state constitution. 
8. Department of Social Services The plaintiff herein i 
pursueing a duel matter both through the Department of Social 
Services as well as through the court and that is not legally 
allowed in the state of Utah since Department of Social Services 
regulations provide that one shall not pursue a separate action 
when she has assigned it to said Department. 
Objection Civil No. 89-090-1209 Page 7 
Houaton v Houston 3rd D/C SLCo. | 
9. Bankruptcy Defendant herein filed a bankruptcy in 
the United States District Court and gave notice to all parties I 
and something the plaintiff did not deny before the Commissioner. 
Plaintiff however at no time ever'moved to intervene, file an I 
adversary proceeding, or otherwise sought to in any way to have 
her rights adjudicated under the bankruptcy proceeding and as sucA 
back support having been listed in said proceeding and no 
objection having otherwise been made thereto is analagous to a 
default judgment and said discharge went through thus all matters 
prior to the discharge date in bankruptcy would be discharged 
notwithstanding any other provision of law. 
10. Defendant is denied due process in that he is not I 
allowed to present law before the Commissioner or otherwise be 
heard on it and there exists law in the state of Utah which 1 
specifically gives him right to a trial, be heard, present 
evidence, and law on the issue [Beckman, supra.] 
11. Additional Receipts Defendant has insufficient time 
under the order to marshal additional receipts of evidence 
particularly when he has been denied right to discovery in this 
matter by virtue of the procedure as heretofore outlined in this 
objection. 
12. Payment Clerk of the Court Commissioner specifically 
ordered payment to the Clerk of the Court without allowing 
defendant to be heard with regards to that matter. 
00597 
Objection 
Houston v Houston 
Civil No. 89-090-1209 
3rd D/C SLCo. 
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13. Escrow Documents Commissioner herein did not allow 
evidence to be taken, witnesses to be heard, or otherwise hear t 
defendant with regards to payment'of a note as specifically set 
out in a proposed order herein and this is a denial of due proce 
particularly when the plaintiff did not participate in the 
bankruptcy proceedings or otherwise intervene with regards to th 
issue. 
14. Petition For Modification Plaintiff herein filed a 
Petition For Modification which pursuant to provisions of Utah 
State Law, particularly when it involves financial matters and a 
allegation of inability to pay, freezes the issues as of the dat 
of filing of the petition. Furthermore that the plaintiff and 
Commissioners order herein would bypass an adjudication on 
defendants Petition./ 
DATED this rt^day of VtSag^Ujggjfg
 1 9J& 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Objection To "Commissioners Recommendation was mailed 
via United States Mail, first clajjs^postage prepaid on 
to the following: 
! 
 r. j A r 0-
the 19 "'day of 
Richard S. Nemelka, Esq. 
2046 East 4800 South. Suite 103 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Certified Mail #P459-447-515 
Don Houston 
(U.S. Certificate of Mailing) 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
FILED 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attn: Sandra N. Peuler 
Commissioner 
HAND DELIVERED 
3H?~^' <k 
Authority 
Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration 
CJA Rule 4-504 "Written Orders, Judgments & Decrees" 
U.R.Cr.P. Rule 3 "Service & Filing of Papers" 
U.R.C.P. Rule 5 "Service and Filing of Pleadings and Other 
papers» 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 21 "Filing and Service" 
00599 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOUSTON, DEE 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
HOUSTON, DON 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 890901209 CV 
DATE 01/29/91 
HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER 
COURT REPORTER TAPE 3(1650-2618) 
COURT CLERK SPO 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
P. ATTY. NEMELKA, RICHARD S. 
D. ATTY. PAYTON, STEVEN LEE 
ON MOTION OF 
PLAINTIFF 
COMM. RECOMMENDS: 
1. ISSUE OF PROPER SERVICE FOR OSC - PROPERLY SERVED BY 
MAILING TO DEFT'S ATTY. 
2. CHILD SUPPORT ISSUE - NO RECOMMENDATION ON JUDGMENT. 
3. ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS - DEFT APPEAR WITHIN 10 DAYS TO ANSWER 
WHY HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH COURT ORDER (HASN'T SIGNED 
ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS). 
4. ATTYS FEES RESERVED. 
^^M^^e^fOLk^te*-/ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOUSTON, DEE 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
HOUSTON, DON 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 890901209 CV 
DATE 02/05/91 
HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER 
COURT REPORTER TAPE 3(184-1720) 
COURT CLERK SPO 
TYPE OF HEARING: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF 
P. ATTY. NEMELKA, RICHARD S. 
D. ATTY. PAYTON, STEVEN LEE 
ON MOTION OF 
PLAINTIFF 
COMM. RECOMMENDS: 
1. DEFT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE PLTF'S OSC DENIED. 
2. PLTF AWARDED JUDGMENT FOR CHILD SUPPORT OWED (NOV. 90 - JAN. 
91) FOR $1,143. 
3. WAGE WITHHOLDING PREVIOUS^/ IMPLEMENTED AMENDED TO REFLECT 
SERVICE ON DEFT'S CURRENT "EMPLOYER. 
4. TITLE COMPANY BE AUTHORIZED & ORDERED TO RELEASE FUNDS 
OWED UNDER ESCROW ACCOUNT FROM RON THOMPSON'S NOTE WITHOUT 
DEFT'S SIGNATURE. 
5. PLTF AWARDED $600 ATTYS FEES. 
^LJt^^oCiA^r<£jsA^6c^cj/ 
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STEVE!? LEE PAYTON (#2554) 
Attorney for Defendant 
431 South 300 East, Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3298 
Telephone: (B01) 363-7070 
f<ILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
f£8 8 2 WPH'91 
TMI-;: •it. OrSTfllCT 
;.\xt COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THI 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
i DEE HOUSTON, 
I aka DEE HOUSTON KIRKHAM, 
it 3656 Aurora Circle 
| Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
j DOB: 06/13/56 
I Plaintiff, 
DON HOUSTON, 
389 Meadow Road 
Murray, UT 84107 
DOB: 03/05/32 
Defendant. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
OBJECTION 
TO 
COMMISSIONERS RECOMMENDATION 
[January 29, 1991 (Tues.)l 
[Decree of Divorce 12/1/86] 
5th D/C Washington Co. 
State of Utah 
Judge, Howard H. Maetani 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce 
12/24/87 
5th D/C Washington Co. 
State of Utah 
Judge, Howard H. Maetani 
Civil No. 86-0905 
Transferred to 3rd D/C Court 
2/16/89 
Judge, Raymond S. Uno 
Civil No. 89-090-1209-CV 
Authority 
U.C.A. 78-27-19 "Law Defined" 
U.C.A. 30-3-15.3 "Commissioners Powers" 
CJA Rule 6-401 "Domestic Relations Commissioners" 
00637 
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Houston v Houston 3rd D/C SLCo. 
TO: RICHARD S. NEMELKA, ESQ. 
2046 East 4800 South, Suite 103 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
[272-4244] 
Certified Mail #P459-447-653 
COMMISSIONER, SANDRA N. PEULER 
Third Circuit Court Building 
451 South 200 East, Room 340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
HAND DELIVERED — FILED 
NOTICE OF OBJECTION 
You and each of you are hereby advised that objection is 
taken to Commissioners recommendation on "Plaintiffs Order To Show 
Cause" hearing thereon having been held January 29, 1991 (Tues.). 
SPECIFIC POINTS OF OBJECTION 
1. Statutory Provisions Unconstitutional Pursuant to 
requirements of CJA and statutory provisions in the state of Utah, 
all domestic matters filed in the District Court are required to 
be heard before the Commissioner and given that the defendant may 
not bypass the Commissioner the procedure is unconstitutional in 
that as a matter of practice and normally no evidence is taken 
except by proffer, no witnesses are heard, and matters done on 
proffer of counsel. Such procedure violates fundamental right of 
a party to confront and cross-examine evidence against them as 
well as witnesses in support of contentions of a party. 
[See: Amendment 5, 14 U.S. Constitution [Due Process] 
Article I, Section 27 Utah Constitution [Fundamental 
Rights] 
Article I, Section 7 Utah Constitution [Due Process] 
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2. Furthermore provisions of the rules with regards to 
objections require that any matter going to the District Court be 
heard in accordance with the provisions of CJA Rule A-501 
"Motions" and likewise does not allow for discovery in terms of 
confronting issues raised before the Commissioner of contentions 
done by proffer and no provision for hearing is allowed therefore 
procedure is unconstitutional. [See: Wlscomb v Wiscorob 744 P.2d 
1021 (Utah App. 1987)1 
3. Furthermore with regards to the same point of 
unconstitutionality the District Court is in fact required by case 
law in the state of Utah to follow the recommendation of the 
Commissioner if supported by facts. [See: Davis v Davis 777 P.2d 
518 (Utah App. 1989)1. 
4. Modification of the rules since David, supra, however 
does not cure the problem since the rules themselves require that 
the recommedation of the Commissioner even now is binding unless 
and until such time as modification by the court and therefore it 
allows a taking of property in this specific case without due 
process of law and without hearing, discovery, or testimony under 
oath. 
00639 
Objection 
Houston v Houston 
Civil No. 89-090-1209 
3rd D/C SLCo. 
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5. Interum Order Unconstitutionality of the matter is 
readily illustrated by the fact that given the proffers of fact 
and evidence without, testimony under oath and the fact that the 
Order is binding until such time as the court rules differently 
unconstitutionality becomes apparent in that there is no provision 
for stay of the Commissioners recommendation pending further 
modification by the court. 
Furthermore in this case it is particularly egregious since 
the defendant requested stay of the Commissioners recommendation 
pending court action to avoid irreparable harm and same was 
denied. 
6
« Hearsay Evidence taken before the Commissioner is 
hearsay particularly when it has not been ratified by clients or 
the procedure agreed to and as such it is in violation of basic 
due process under the guarantees of the Utah State Constitution 
and Federal Constitution, Article I Section 12 Utah State 
Constitution. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment United States 
Constitution separate and independent of each other. 
00640 
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Furthermore such proceedings before the Commissioner are*. 
(a) Solely by proffer; 
(b) Not well suited to conflicting proffers of evidence or 
allegations of counseli 
(c) Do not allow for or make provision for discovery 
proceedings therein; 
(d) Result in irreparable harm in not preserving status quo 
when substantial question exists or objection is raised; 
(e) Deny due process in that a party is required to comply 
with an order under these circumstances when they have had no 
opportunity to present evidence. 
Accordingly and therefore not only is it hearsay but is 
unconstitutional and there is case law to suggest same in the 
state of Utah as follows: 
Wiscomb v Wiscomb 744 P.2d 1021 (Utah App. 1987) 
D.B. v Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
of the bepartment of Business Regulation State of Utah 
779 P.2d 1145 (Utah App. 1989) 
7. Richard S. Nemelka, Esq. Richard S. Nemelka continues 
to have conflict of interest which exists in the case as appears 
herein by virtue of the documents in the file in that he attempted 
to execute on matters to the harm of the defendant herein under 
outdated law and as such his actions on its face preliminarily 
constitute malpractice per se [See State v Moritzky 771 P.2d 688 
(Utah App. 1989)1 . 
006U 
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8
* Discovery Discovery is not allowed prior to these 
hearings given the relatively short time before they are heard and 
thus the defendant is denied due process of law, he having a right 
to fully explore and make record of evidence and testimony and 
preserve same. {See: Strand v Associated Students of University of 
Utah 561 P.2d 191 (UT 1977)3 
9. Due Process As set out, the Commissioner has 
authority to enter recommendations of binding effect CJA Rule 
4-601(a) "Temporary Orders and Recommedations" in the absence of 
legally admissible evidence and over the objection of a defendant 
therefore the entire Commissioner system is flawed 
constitutionally in that it denies due process as guaranteed by 
the United States Constitution and Utah State Constitution and 
such an order entered without admissible evidence admissible in a 
court of law denies due process to a defendant. 
10. Miscellaneous Witness Defendant is not allowed to 
call witnesses before the Commissioner, something to which he 
objects and which violates due process under both federal and 
state constitution. 
11. Department of Social Services The plaintiff herein is 
pursueing a duel matter both through the Department of Social 
Services as well as through the court and that is not legally 
allowed in the state of Utah since Department of Social Services 
Regulations provide that one shall not pursue a separate action 
when she has assigned it to said Department. 
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12. Bankruptcy Defendant herein filed a bankruptcy In 
the United States District Court and gave notice to all parties 
and something the plaintiff did not deny before the Commissioner-, 
Plaintiff however at no time ever moved to intervene, file an 
adversary proceeding, or otherwise sought to in any way to have 
her rights adjudicated under the bankruptcy proceeding and as such 
back support having been listed in said proceeding and no 
objection having otherwise been made thereto is analagous to a 
default judgment and said discharge went through thus all matters 
prior to the discharge date in bankruptcy would be discharged 
notwithstanding any other provision of law. 
13. Defendant is denied due process in that he is not 
allowed to present law before the Commissioner or otherwise be 
heard on it and there exists law in the state of Utah which 
specifically gives him right to a trial, be heard, present 
evidence, and law on the issue. 
[See: Beckmann v Beckmann 685 P.2d 1045 (UT-1984)1 
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14 . Order To Show Cause Order To Show Cause herein was 
never served personally upon the defendant but rather was mailed 
to his counsel and it therefore is asserted without citation by 
plaintiffs counsel that the Commissioner has jurisdiction despite 
the fact that it has never been the practice in the state of Utah 
nor is it personal service for contempt or otherwise were simply 
mailed to the attorney. There has been no allegation by 
plaintiffs counsel that defendant has secreted himself or 
otherwise made himself unavailable and in fact to the contrary the 
assertion is that the plaintiff regularly has contact with him. 
Counsel objected to jurisdiction based upon such service in 
that the address of the defendant readily appeared on all 
pleadings that are filed by him including this objection in 
accordance with the provisions of U.R.C.P. Rule 10 [Address of 
Party Necessary On Pleading] and thus there is no basis consistent 
with previous decisions where Order To Show Cause was served upon 
counsel personally to serve same in this case as was done, 
[Seej D'Aston yD'Aston 790 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1990) 
U.C.A. 78-32-4 "Warrant of Attachment or Commitment 
Order To Show Cause"] ~~ 
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15. Commissioner ordering a defendant to appear within ten 
days to answer to the court is an abuse of discretion given the 
challenge to the jurisdiction. Furthermore at said hearing the 
plaintiff herself did not appear nor was explanation made for the 
fact that she did not appear and was not present thus it compounds 
the problems herein of the constitutionality of proffers being 
made solely by her counsel vithowr she plaintiff even being 
present. 
16. Incorporation Defendant herein alleges that the 
petition is in violation of Utah State Law regarding repeated 
application for orders as well as intent to simply serve as a 
matter of harassment or burden to the defendant given that there 
is a Petition For Modification pending and all issues are 
contained within said petition and therefore plaintiff to file an 
Order To Show Cause in an attempt to circumvent same and otherwise 
attempt to get a binding order would deny again due process and 
appears to be a violation of affirmative law in the state of Utah 
by plaintiff or her counsel. 
rseet U.C.A. 78-7-19 "Repeated Application For Orders 
Forbidden^ 
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 "Meritorious 
Claims and Contentions"^ 
00645 
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Houston v Houston 
Civil No. 89-090-1209 
3rd D/C SLCo. 
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17. Escrow Documents Commissioner herein did not allow 
evidence to be taken, witnesses to be heard, or otherwise hear the 
defendant with regards to payment of a note as specifically set 
out in a proposed order herein and this is a denial of due process 
particularly when the plaintiff did not participate in the 
bankruptcy proceedings or otherwise intervene with regards to that 
issue. 
18. Petition For Modification Plaintiff herein filed a 
Petition For Modification which pursuant to provisions of Utah 
State Law. particularly when it involves financial matters and an 
allegation of inability to pay, freezes the issues as of the date 
of filing of the petition. Furthermore that the plaintiff and 
Commissioners order herein would bypass an adjudication on 
defendants Petition. 
[Seet Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 '"Meritorious 
Claims and Contentions ] 
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19. Previous Objection Defendant raised the fact tha- **-
terms of orderly procedure that a previous objection had been 
filed from an earlier recommendation and that ac a matter -f di,e 
process and fundamental £aimes« independent under both federal 
and state constitutions that the plaintiff should sreak tc the 
issues and challenge appropriately en appeal n~t sy applicat^c-
fcr core Orders To Shew «aase o^ the same is**»es vbich are 
currently the subject matter cf a previous Order To Shew Cau e _nd 
processed before the court. 
[See Article I Section 27 Utati State Constitution 
Fifth and Fourteenth _Anepdment United States 
Constitution — — — 
C.A. 78-7-19 'Pep- t~- A-rlJ-atie- Fcr Ort'e--
Forbidden" 
rales of Professional C **jy-t *\* e _ ^enc-rious 
Claims and Contenticrs 
This Is particularly so where the n'aintiff ana rer counsel 
in response - previous objection cn-eded and nsda argjpent as 
followsi 
"Plaintiff agrees with defendant that the present 
procedure followed by the Courts in regards to domestic 
matters pursuant to CJA Rules 6-401 and 4-501 is 
unconstitutional and a denial of due process. Fbwever, 
the parties are bound by the current state of the law 
and said rules and, therefore, must proceed accordingly...." 
(Emphasis Added) 
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20. Omnibus Objection Defendant herein incorporates all 
previous objections as was pointed out to the Commissioner and 
raised previously in proceedings and as set out in response to -h< 
previous Order To Show Cause to which objection was filed Decenbei 
17, 1990 and t-be proceedings heretofore. 
DATED this #*>*day of 
Attorney for Defen<£a/it 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Objection To Commissioners Recommendation %&& mailed 
via Unitfd States Mail, first clas- postage crepaid -
the flr^day of 
Richard S. Hemelka, Esq. 
2046 East 4800 South, Suite lJ^ 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Certified Mail #P459-447-653 
Don Houston 
U.S. Certific r wa^i-= 
T"he following 
Third District Ccur* 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT RaUl 
FILED WITH CLERK 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attn: Sandra N. Peuler 
Commissioner 
HAND DELIVERED 
Authority 
Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration 
CJA Rule 4-504 "Written Orders, Judgments & Decrees" 
U.R.Cr.P. Rule 3 "Service & Filing of Papers" 
U.R.C.P. Rule 5 "Service and Filing of Pleading ^d Ot^e^ 
P a p e r 3 i . — 
Utah R. App, P Rule 2*. "Filing and Service' 
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FILED 
Oilier coum 
STEVEN LEE PAYTON (#2554) 
Attorney for Defendant 
431 South 300 East, Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3298 
Telephone: (801) 363-7070 
fcB 15 4 31 FK 'Si 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICtkV:6fSTftlCI 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEE HOUSTON, 
aka DEE HOUSTON KIRKHAM, 
3656 Aurora Circle 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
DOB: 06/13/56 
Plaintiff. 
DON HOUSTON, 
389 Meadow Read 
Murray, UT 84107 
DOB: 03/05 32 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION 
TO 
COMMISSIONERS RECOMMENDATION 
[February 5, 1991 (Tues.)] 
[Decree of Divorce 12/1/86] 
5th D/C Washington Co. 
State of Utah 
Judge, Howard H. Maetani 
Supplemental Decree t "i-'-'/ce 
12/24/87 
5th D/C Washington ' 
State of Utah 
Judge, Howard H. Mar 
Civil No. 86-0905 
Transferred to 3rd 
2/16/89 
Judge, Leslie A - ?v: 
Civil No. 89-090-1209-CV 
Authority 
U,C.A. 78-27-19 "Law Defined" 
U.C.A. 30-3-15.3 "Commissidnera Powers" 
CJA Rule 6-401 "Domestic Relations Commissi:: 
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TO: RICHARD S. NEMELKA, ESQ. 
2046 East 4800 South, Suite 103 
Salt Lake City, OT 84117 
[272-4244] 
Certified Mail #P459-447-667 
COMMISSIONER, SANDRA N. PEULER 
Third Circuit Court Building 
451 South 200 East, Room 340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
HAND DELIVERED — FILED 
NOTICE OF OBJECTION 
You and each of you are hereby advised that objection is 
taken to Commissioners recommendation on "Plaintiffs Order To Sho 
Cause" hearing thereon having been held February 5, 1991 (Hon.). 
SPECIFIC POINTS OF OBJECTION 
1. Statutory Provisions Unconstitutional Pursuant to 
requirements of CJA and statutory provisions in the state of Utah 
all domestic matters filed in the District Court are required to 
be heard before the Commissioner and given that the defendant may 
not bypass the Commissioner the procedure is unconstitutional in 
that as a matter of practice and normally no evidence is taken 
except by proffer, no witnesses are heard, and matters done on 
proffer of counsel. Such procedure violates fundamental right oi 
a party to confront and cross-examine evidence against them as 
well ai witnesses in support of contentions of a party. 
[Sees Amendment 5, 14 U.S. Constitution [Due Process] 
Article 1, Section 27 Utah Constitution [Fundamental 
Rights] 
Article If Section 7 Utah Constitution [Due Process] 
U0653 
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2. Furthermore provisions of the rules with regards to 
objections require that any matter going to the District Court be 
heard in accordance with the provisions of CJA Rule 4-501 
"Motions" and likewise does not allow for discovery in reras of 
snfronting issaes raised before tne Commissioner of contentions 
done by proffer cr.c no provision far ^earing "s allowed therefore 
-rocedurs is unconstitutional. icee Wiscomb . Wiscoi^b 744 P 2d 
1021 (Utah App. 1987)1 
3. Furthermore with regards z tve same point of 
^nenstitutionality the District ^ur- s ir fact reqi^red by case 
law in the state of Utah to follow tve recommendation of the 
Commissioner if supportea *^ v facts .See Davis % Davis "^ 77 P.2d 
518 (Utah App. 1989)1. 
4. Modification of the rules since Davis, supra. however 
does not cure the problem since the rules themselves require tha^ 
the recommedation of the Commissioner even now is binding unless 
and until such time as modification by the court and therefore -
allows - taking cf property ir tr_« specific a-e without dae 
process af law and without hearing discovery, or testimony arde-
oath LEee Article 4 Domestic Relations Section 6-401(2)(e) Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration]. 
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5. Interum Order Unconstitutionality ^f the matter Is 
readily illustrated by the fa^t tret given the proffer^ f cz -
and evidence without -estfmcrv under oatr« and the fact =«iat the 
Order is binding unt* = such time as the zaxt r„l«»~ differently 
unconstitutionality becomes ^rparent ir that - u r - -s no prov_«i 
for stay of the Commissioner- recommendaticr ps- ^r% further 
modification by the court. 
Furthermore in this casc it is particularly egregious since 
the defendant requested stay cf ~*~e C o ^ i s 0 ! ^ ^ ^ -ecommendattjr 
pending court actior to avoid irreparable hcrm and sare wa« 
deniec 
Hearsay Evidence taken before the Commiss4-«er ^s 
hearsay particularly when it has not been -<stified by -*i~ :« oi 
the procedure agreed to and as such it is in violation of basic 
due process under the guarantees of the Utah State Constitution 
and Federal Constitution, Article I Section 12 Utah State 
Constitution, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment United States 
Constitution separate and independent of each other. 
U0655 
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lermore such proceedings lafirE - = "oimiss!.--rer rs 
Solely by proffer* 
Not well suited to conflicting proffers of evidence or 
alle • - ,£ counsel; 
not allow for or make provision for discovery 
proceedings therein; 
(d) Result in irreparable harm in not preserving status quo 
when substantial question exists or objection is raised; 
(e) Deny due process in that a party is required to comply 
with an order under these circumstances when they have had no 
opportunity to present evidence. 
Accordingly and therefore not only is it hearsay but is 
unconstitutional and there is case law to suggest same in the 
state of Utah as follows: 
Wlscomb v Wiscomb 744 P.2d 1021 (Utah App. 1937) 
D.B. v Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
~" of the Department of Business Regulation State of iftah 
779 V.'ld 1145 (Utah App". 1989) * " 
7. Richard S. Nemelka, Esq. Richard S. Nemelka continues 
to have conflict of interest which exists in the case as appears 
herein by virtue of the documents in the file in that he attempted 
to execute on matters to the harm of the defendant herein under 
outdated law and as such his actions on its face preliminarily 
constitute malpractice per se [See State v Moritzky 771 P.2d 688 
(Utah App. 1989)1. 
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®* Discovery Discovery is not allowed prior to these 
hearings given the relatively short time before they are heard ar 
thus the defendant is denied due process of law, he having a rigl 
to fully explore and make record of evidence and testimony and 
preserve same. [See: Strand v Associated Students of University c 
Utah 561 P.2d 191 (UT 1977)3 
9. Due Process As set out, the Commissioner has 
authority to enter recommendations of binding effect CJA Rule 
4-601(a) "Temporary Orders and Recormnedations" in the absence of 
legally admissible evidence and over the objection of a defendan 
therefore the entire Commissioner system is flawed 
constitutionally in that it denies due process as guaranteed by 
the United States Constitution and Utah State Constitution and 
such an order entered without admissible evidence admissible in 
court of law denies due process to a defendant, 
10. Miscellaneous Witness Defendant is not allowed to 
call witnesses before the Commissioner, something to which he 
objects and which violates due process under both federal and 
state constitution. 
11. Department of Social Services The plaintiff herein i 
pursueing a duel matter both through the Department of Social 
Services as well as through the court and that is not legally 
allowed in the state of Utah since Department of Social Service* 
Regulations provide that one shall not pursue a separate action 
when she has assigned it to said Department. 
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12. Bankruptcy Defendant herein filed a bankruptcy in 
the United States District Court and gave notice to all parties 
and something the plaintiff did not deny before the Commissioner.. 
Plaintiff however at no time ever moved to intervene, file an 
adversary proceeding, or otherwise sought to in any way to have 
her rights adjudicated under the bankruptcy proceeding and as such 
back support having been listed in said proceeding and no 
objection having otherwise been made thereto is analagous to a 
default judgment and said discharge went through thus all matters 
prior to the discharge date in bankruptcy would be discharged 
notwithstanding any other provision of law. 
13. Defendant is denied due process in that he is not 
allowed to present law before the Commissioner or otherwise be 
heard on it and there exists law in the state of Utah which 
specifically gives him right to a trial, be heard, present 
evidence, and lav on the issue. 
[See: Beckmann v Beckmann 685 P.2d 1045 (UT 1984)) 
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14. Order To Show Cause Order To Show Cause herein was 
never served personally upon the defendant but rather was mailed 
to his counsel and it therefore is asserted without citation by 
plaintiffs counsel that the Commissioner has jurisdiction despiti 
the fact that it has never been the practice in the state of Utal 
nor is it personal service for contempt or otherwise were simply 
mailed to the attorney. There has been no allegation by 
plaintiffs counsel that defendant has secreted himself or 
otherwise made himself unavailable and in fact to the contrary t 
assertion is that the plaintiff regularly has contact with him. 
Counsel objected to jurisdiction based upon such service in 
that the address of the defendant readily appeared on all 
pleadings that are filed by him including this objection in 
accordance with the provisions of U.R.C.P. Rule 10 [Address of 
Party Necessary On Pleading] and thus there is no basis consiste 
with previous decisions where Order To Show Cause was served upc 
counsel personally to serve same in this case as was done. 
[See: D' As ton v D'Astern 790 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1990) 
U.C.A. >8-32-4 "Warrant of Attachment or Commitment 
Order To Snow Cause'H 
0065.9 
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15. It was abuse of discretion by the Commissioner to fail 
to continue the Order To Show Cause herein given the circumstances 
and the previous hearing January 29, 1991 and counsels affidavit 
[See: Nelson v Jacobsen 669 P.2d 120 (UT 1983) 
Griffiths v Hammond 560 P.2d 1375 (UT 1977)1 
16. Incorporation Defendant herein alleges that the 
petition is in violation of Utah State Law regarding repeated 
application for orders as well as intent to simply serve as a 
matter of harassment or burden to the defendant given that there 
is a Petition For Modification pending and all issues are 
contained within said petition and therefore plaintiff to file an 
Order To Show Cause in an attempt to circumvent same and otherwise 
attempt to get a binding order would deny again due process and 
appears to be a violation of affirmative law in the state of Utah 
by plaintiff or her counsel. 
CSee: U.C.A. 78-7-19 "Repeated Application For Orders y o r b i d d eyr -
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 "Meritorious 
Claims and Contentions"^ — 
U0660 
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17. Irreparable Harm It is abuse not to grant a stay or 
other provision herein given that irreparable harm will result tc 
the defendant and the fact that a Petition For Modification is 
pending which in a light most favorable to contentions of the 
plaintiff she would then be liable to pay the funds back to the 
defendant which she is not in a position to do [See: Knudson v 
State Department of Social Services 660 P.2d 259 (UT 1983)1. 
18. Furthermore an appropriate and timely objection filed 
herein pursuant to case law would operate as a stay in and of 
itself of any such order of the Commissioner unless or until sucl 
time as the court may rule upon it and that is pursuant to case 
law in Domestic Relations cases. [See: Glad v Glad 567 P.2d 160 
(UT 1977)1 
19. Petition For Modification Plaintiff herein filed a 
Petition For Modification which pursuant to provisions of Utah 
State Law, particularly when it involves financial matters and a 
allegation of inability to pay, freezes the issues as of the dat 
of filing of the petition. Furthermore that the plaintiff and 
Commissioners order herein would bypass an adjudication on 
defendants Petition. 
[Sees Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 "Meritorious 
Claims and Contentions,rJ 
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20. Previous Objection Defendant raised the fact that in 
terms of orderly procedure that a previous objection had been 
filed from an earlier recommendation and that as a matter of due 
process and fundamental fairness independent under both federal-
and state constitutions that the plaintiff should speak to the 
issues and challenge appropriately on appeal not by application 
for more Orders To Show Cause on the same issues which are 
currently the subject matter of a previous Order To Show Cause and 
processed before the court. 
[See: Article I Section 27 Utah State Constitution 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment United States 
Constitution 
U.C.A. 78-7-19 "Repeated Application For Orders 
Forbidd^rr 
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 "Meritorious 
Claims and Contentions"! 
This is particularly so where the plaintiff and her counsel 
in response to previous objection conceded and made argument as 
follows: 
"Plaintiff agrees with defendant that the present 
procedure followed by the Courts in regards to domestic 
matters pursuant to CJA Rules ft"^1 an" 4-501 is 
unconstitutional and a denial of due process"! However, 
the parties are bound by the current state of the law 
and said rules and, therefore, must proceed accordingly.-.." 
(Emphasis Added) 
00662 
Objection Civil No. 89-090-1209 Page iz 
Houston v Houston 3*d D/C SLCo. 
21. Child Support There is no showing that the defendant 
had ability and capability to pay the child support as ordered 
herein nor was there ..ever testimony taken from the plaintiff that 
it was due and finally the defendant had pending a modification 
wherein he is under oath which is a verified pleading which he 
recited he was without the ability to do same. 
22. Attorneys Fees Award The court did not make a prope: 
showing as to the reasonableness or ability of the client or any 
other matters as set out and required by case law in this matter 
and thus the award of attorneys fees is improper nor was award 
made as to necessity of same. [See: Kerr v Kerr 620 P.2d 1380 (U 
1980)1 
23. Omnibus Objection Defendant herein incorporates all 
previous objections as was pointed out to the Commissioner and 
raised previously in proceedings and as set out in response to th 
previous Order To Show Cause to which objections were filed as 
follows: 
December 17, 1990 
February 8, 199J 
DATED th i s 
Seven LeeSJ^Lyton 
Attorney for Defendan 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Objection To Commissioners Recommendation was mailed 
via United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid on 
_, to the following: 
Richard S. Nemelka, Esq. 
2046 East 4800 South, Suite 103 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Certified Mail #P459-447-667 
Don Houston 
(U.S. Certificate of Mailing) 
Authority 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
FILED WITH CLERK 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attn: Sandra N. Peuler 
Commissioner 
HAND DELIVERED 
Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration 
CJA ftule 4-504 "Written Orders, Judgments & Decrees" 
U.R.Cr.P. Rule 3 "Service & Filing of Papers" 
U.R.C.P. Rule 5 "Service and Filing of Pleadings and Other 
P a p e r 8 . . • 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 21 "Filing and Service" 
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In the District Court of the Third JudkaO^^tncl^ctt^ 
In and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
PEE HOUSTON aka DEE HOUSTON KIRKHAM \ 
puintifr J Certification of 
v$. > Readiness for Trial 
DON HOUSTON I Case No. 89-09(7-1 ?f)9 
D c f e o d a m
 JUDGE LESLIE LEWIS 
TO THE DISTRICT COURT: 
PJCharfl fi» NenftlKfl attorney for , . PI - f l lnHff 
Kirkham (PlaintifT or Defendant) 
Dfifl.Hfmatrm flftfl X)Pft Hnnntnn . by his signature below hereby certifies that in his judgment this 
(Name of Client) 
case is ready for trial and in support of such certification counsel represents to the Court as follows: 
1. That all required pleadings have been Hied and the case is at issue as to all parties. 
2. That counsel has completed atl discovery; that opposing counsel have had reasonable time to pursue discovery; 
and that all discovery of record has been completed. 
3. That if medical testimony is contemplated or required, eopies of all existing medical reports have been made 
available to all counsel or parties of record. 
4. That there are no motions thai have been filed which remain pending and upon which no disposition has been 
made. 
5. That reasonable discussions to effect settlement have been purused by counsel and their clients but no settlement 
has been effected. (Such discussions are to be realistic in nature and not limited to an unresponded to offer. The duty to 
effectively negotiate lies with all parties.) 
6. Jury trial b . w a i v e d lf d c m a n d e d # 350.00 fee to be enclosed. 
(Demanded or Waived) 
(OVER) 00698 
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this certificate on the . JL2Lth_ . day of _ A p r i l , 
, 19 *»"* . whose last Known 
addresses and telephone numbers are as follows: 
Name Address 
Steven Lee Pay ton 431 smith inn ^ a f , ft J I O -
Tclcphone 
3 6 3 - 7 0 7 0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3298 
Dated this . . day of . . . 1 9 . 
Signature of Attorney 
Richard S. Nemelka 
2046 E 4800 So #103 272 -4244 
Address Sal t Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone 
NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES 
Any objections to the above certification or any disagreement to any of the matters certified are to be filed in writing 
with the court within ten days of the date hereof, served upon all parties, and noticed up for hearing upon the law and 
motion calendar. 
The foregoing Certificate is to be used in the Third Judicial District Court as the Request for Trial Setting provided 
for in Rule 4.1 of the Rules of Practice of the District and Circuit Courts, effective March 1. 1982. 
BY THE COURT 
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RICHARD S. NEMELKA NO. •»•• 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2046 EAST 4800 SOUTH 
SUITE 103 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH84117 
(801) 272*4244 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
DEE HOUSTON aka ) 
DEE HOUSTON KIRKHAM, ) MOTION TO COMPEL AND 
) FOR SANCTIONS 
Plaintiff, ) 
) Civil No. 89-090-1209 
vs ) 
) JUDGE LESLIE LEWIS 
DON HOUSTON, ) 
Defendant. ) 
Plaintiff, by and through her attorney, Richard S. 
Nemelka, pursuant to Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
hereby moves the above-entitled court for a motion compelling the 
defendant to appear at his deposition or have his petition 
dismissed and further moves for sanctions including reasonable 
attorney's fees. Said motion is based upon the failure of the 
defendant on two (2) occasions to appear at his deposition, more 
specifically stated in the transcript attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A" and incorporated herein by reference. 
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Plaintiff is entitled to an order compelling the defendant 
to appear on the date certain at his deposition and for sanctions 
of reasonable attorney's fees for having to bring this matter 
before the court and for court reporter fees for the aforesaid 
deposition as well as costs incurred. 
DATED this-3ird day of May, 1991. 
Richard S. Nemelka 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Motion to Compel and Sanctions this -3rd day of May, 1991, by 
United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Steven Lee Payton 
431 South 300 East 
Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3298 
,Ajf^A^^^ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOUSTON, DEE 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
HOUSTON, DON 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 890901209 CV 
DATE 06/10/91 
HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER 
COURT REPORTER NO TAPE 
COURT CLERK SPO 
TYPE OF HEARING: PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. NEMELKA, RICHARD S. 
D. ATTY. PAYTON, STEVEN LEE 
COMM. RECOMMENDS: 
1. PTC CONTINUED. 
2. CUSTODY EVALUATION TO BE PERFORMED AT DEFT'S EXPENSE, 
COUNSEL TO AGREE*ON EVALUATOR. 
DEFT APPEAR FOR HIS DEPOSITION JUNE 20TH AT 4:00 P.M. 
EACH FILE FINANCIAL DECLARATION WITHIN 10 DAYS. 
3. 
4. 
^Zy*^c*^/GQs*t,£c^s 
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RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
J 2046 EAST 4800 SOUTH 
SUITE 103 
SALT LAKE CTTY, UTAH 64 i 17 
(801)272-4244 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
II DEB HOUSTON aka 
DEE HOUSTON KIRKHAM, 
) RENEWED MOTION FOR 
Plaintiff, ) SANCTIONS 
I v# * 
jlDON HOUSTON, ) Civil No. 89-090-1209 
) Judge Leslie Lewis 
I Defendant. ) 
Plaintiff, by and through her attorney, Richard S. 
Neroelka, pursuant to Rule 77 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
hereby moves the above-entitled Court for a Motion for Sanctions 
and for an Order dismissing defendant's Petition for Modification 
and an award of attorney's fees. Said Motion is based upon the 
previous Motion to Compel and for Sanctions filed with the Court 
and, further, upon defendant's blatant and intentional refusal to 
comply with the Order of the Court. At the Pre-Trial Hearing 
held in the above-entitled matter, Commissioner Sandra Peuler 
specifically ordered that defendant's deposition be held on the 
00724 
NO. 8 3 0 6 
JraS 9 35W9I 
£»4 / 
20th o£ June, 1991 at the hour of 4*00 o'clock p.m. and said 
time and date was agreed upon between the parties. This was the 
third Notice of the Deposition of the defendant. Attached hereto 
is a letter received on said date from the counsel of defendant 
indicating that he was not going to appear at his deposition. 
Plaintiff is entitled to an Order dismissing defendant's 
Petition for Modification for his intentional refusal to appear 
at his deposition and for an award of reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs incurred. 
DATED this 24th day of June, 1991. 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Renewed Motion for Sanctions to Steven Lee Payton, Attorney for 
Defendant, 431 South 300 East, Suite 40, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111-3298, this 24th day of June, 1991, postage prepaid. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOUSTON, DEE 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
HOUSTON, DON 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 890901209 CV 
DATE 09/09/91 
HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER 
COURT REPORTER TAPE 2(1800-2659) 
COURT CLERK SPO 
TYPE OF HEARING: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. NEMELKA, RICHARD S. 
D. ATTY. PAYTON, STEVEN LEE 
ON MOTION OF 
PLAINTIFF 
COMM. RECOMMENDS: 
1. PRIOR ORDER (FEB. 20, 1991) REMAIN IN EFFECT. 
2. PLTF AWARDED JUDGMENT $3,567.00 - DEFT HAVE 10 DAYS TO 
PROVIDE PROOF OF ANY ADDITIONAL PAYMENTS HAS NOT RECEIVED 
CREDIT ON. 
3. ISSUE OF DEFT'S CONTEMPT FOR NOT PAYING CHILD SUPPORT -
RESERVED TILL TRIAL. 
4. MUTUAL RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST HARASSING EACH OTHER, 
CONTACTING EACH OTHER EXCEPT FOR VISITATION, & ALLOWING 
THIRD PARTIES TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN VISITATION. 
5. NO RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MODIFYING DIVORCE DECREE. 
6. ATTYS FEES RESERVED. 
Q!^^c*<^/QQfr<i'£*TLS 
aa i J 4 3* 
OUR1 
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STEVEN LEE PAYTON ($2554) 
Attorney for Defendant 
431 South 300 East, Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3298
 T • . ISTPICT . 
Telephone: (801) 363-7070 ^ *. - "' MTY fiA-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICl!ALEfftsTRICr^ 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEE HOUSTON, 
aka DEE HOUSTON KIRKHAM, 
3656 Aurora Circle 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
DOB: 06/13/56 
Plaintiff, 
DON HOUSTON, 
389 Meadow Road 
Murray, UT 84107 
DOB: 03/05/32 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION 
TO 
COMMISSIONERS RECOMMENDATION 
tr:[SeptemSer\ 9^1991. (Mon.) 3 \ 
[Decree of Divorce 12/1/86] 
5th D/C Washington Co. 
State of Utah 
Judge, Howard H. Maetani 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce 
12/24/87 
5th D/C Washington Co. 
State of Utah 
Judge, Howard H. Maetani 
Civil No. 86-0905 
Transferred to 3rd D/C Court 
2/16/89 
Judge, Leslie A. Lewis 
Civil No. 89-090-1209-CV 
Authority 
U.C.A. 78-27-19 "Law Defined" 
U.C.A. 30-3-15.3 "Commissioners Powers" 
CJA Rule 6-401 "Domestic Relations Commiasloners" 
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TO: RICHARD S. NEMELKA, ESQ. 
2046 East 4800 South, Suite 103 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
[272-4244] 
Certified Mail #P805-472-177 
COMMISSIONER, SANDRA N. PEULER 
Third Circuit Court Building 
451 South 200 East, Room 340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
HAND DELIVERED — FILED 
NOTICE OF OBJECTION 
You and each of you are hereby advised that objection is 
taken to Commissioners recommendation on "Plaintiffs Order To Sh< 
Cause" hearing thereon having been held September 9, 1991 (Mon.) 
SPECIFIC POINTS OF OBJECTION 
1. Statutory Provisions Unconstitutional Pursuant to 
requirements of CJA and statutory provisions in the state of Utal 
all domestic matters filed in the District Court are required to 
be heard before the Commissioner and given that the defendant ma 
not bypass the Commissioner the procedure is unconstitutional in 
that as a matter of practice and normally no evidence is taken 
except by proffer, no witnesses are*heard, and matters done on 
proffer of counsel. Such procedure violates fundamental right o 
a party to confront and cross-examine evidence against them as 
well as witnesses in support of contentions of a party. 
[See: Amendment 5, 14 U.S. Constitution [Due Process] 
Article I, Section 27 Utah Constitution [Fundamental 
Rights] 
Article I, Section 7 Utah Constitution [Due Process] 
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2. Furthermore provisions of the rules with regards to 
objections require that any matter going to the District Court be 
heard in accordance with the provisions of CJA Rule A-501 
"Motions" and likewise does not allow for discovery in terms.of 
confronting issues raised before the Commissioner of contentions 
done by proffer and no provision for hearing is allowed therefore 
procedure is unconstitutional. [See: Wiscomb v Wlscomb 744 P.2d 
1021 (Utah App. 1987)3 
3. Furthermore with regards to the same point of 
unconstitutionality the District Court is in fact required by case 
law in the state of Utah to follow the recommendation of the 
Commissioner if supported by facts. [See: Davis v Davis 777 P.2d 
518 (Utah App. 1989)1. 
4. Modification of the rules since Davis, supra, however 
does not cure the problem since the rules themselves require that 
the recommedation of the Commissioner even now is binding unless 
and until such time as modification by the court and therefore it 
allows a taking of property in this specific case without due 
process of law and without hearing, discovery, or testimony under 
oath [See: Article 4 Domestic Relations Section 6-401(2)(e) Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration]. 
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5. Interum Order Unconstitutionality of the matter is 
readily illustrated by the fact that given the proffers of fact 
and evidence without testimony under oath and the fact that the 
Order is binding until such time as the court rules differently 
unconstitutionality becomes apparent in that there is no provisJ 
for stay of the Commissioners recommendation pending further 
modification by the court. 
6. Hearsay Evidence taken before the Commissioner is 
hearsay particularly when it has not been ratified by clients o: 
the procedure agreed to and as such it is in violation of basic 
due process under the guarantees of the Utah State Constitution 
and Federal Constitution, Article I Section 12 Utah State 
Constitution, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment United States 
Constitution separate and independent of each other. 
00771 
Objection Civil No. 89-090-1209 Page 5 
Houston v Houston 3rd D/C SLCo. 
Furthermore such proceedings before the Commissioner are: 
(a) Solely by profferj 
(b) Not well suited to conflicting proffers of evidence or 
allegations of counsel; 
(c) Do not allow for or make provision for discovery 
proceedings therein; 
(d) Result in irreparable harm in not preserving status quo 
when substantial question exists or objection is raisedi 
(e) Deny due process in that a party is required to comply 
with an order under these circumstances when they have had no 
opportunity to present evidence. 
Accordingly and therefore not only is it hearsay but is 
unconstitutional and there is case law to suggest same in the 
state of Utah as follows: 
Wiscomb v Wiscomb 744 P.2d 1021 (Utah App. 1987) 
D.B. v Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
of the Department of Business Regulation State of lltah 
779 P.2d 1145 (Utah App. 1989) 
7. Richard S. Nemelka, Esq. ' Richard S. Nemelka continues 
to have conflict of interest which exists in the case as appears 
herein by virtue of the documents in the file in that he attempted 
to execute on matters to the harm of the defendant herein under 
outdated law and as such his actions on its face preliminarily 
constitute malpractice per se [See State v Moritzky 771 P.2d 688 
(Utah App. 1989)1. 
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8* Discovery Discovery is not allowed prior to these 
hearings given the relatively short time before they are heard a 
thus the defendant is denied due process of law, he having a rig 
to fully explore and make record of evidence and testimony and 
preserve same. [See: Strand v Associated Students of University 
Utah 561 P.2d 191 (UT 1977)1 
9. Due Process As set out, the Commissioner has 
authority to enter recommendations of binding effect CJA Rule 
4-601(a) "Temporary Orders and Recommedatlons" in the absence oj 
legally admissible evidence and over the objection of a defendai 
therefore the entire Commissioner system is flawed 
constitutionally in that it denies due process as guaranteed by 
the United States Constitution and Utah State Constitution and 
such an order entered without admissible evidence admissible in 
court of law denies due process to a defendant. 
10. Miscellaneous Witness Defendant is not allowed to 
call witnesses before the Commissioner, something to which he 
objects and which violates due process under both federal and 
state constitution. 
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11. Incorporation Defendant herein alleges that the 
petition is in violation of Utah State Law regarding repeated 
application for orders as well as intent to simply serve as a 
matter of harassment or burden to the defendant given that there 
is a Petition For Modification pending and all issues are 
contained within said petition and therefore plaintiff to file an 
Order To Show Cause in an attempt to circumvent same and otherwise 
attempt to get a binding order would deny again due process and 
appears to be a violation of affirmative law in the state of Utah 
by plaintiff or her counsel. 
[See: U.C.A. 78-7-19 "Repeated Application For Orders 
Forbidden™ 
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 "Meritorious 
Claims and Contentions^ 
12. Petition For Modification Plaintiff herein filed a 
Petition For Modification which pursuant to provisions of Utah 
State Law, particularly when it involves financial matters and an 
allegation of inability to pay, freezes the issues as of the date 
of filing of the petition. Furthermore that the plaintiff and 
Commissioners order herein would bypass an adjudication on 
defendants Petition. 
[See: Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 "Meritorious 
Claims and Contentions"! _ _ - _ _ — — — - -
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13. Child Support There is no showing that the defendant 
had ability and capability to pay the child support as ordered 
herein nor was there ever testimony taken from the plaintiff ths 
it was due and finally the defendant had pending a modification 
wherein he is under oath which is a verified pleading which he 
recited he was without the ability to do same. 
14. Visitation Commissioner would not allow defendant 
argue issues of denial of visitation for the entire summer by tt 
plaintiff ruling that it was not relevant however same is contra 
to case law that it is a consideration that may be considered ii 
terms of the equity of ordering support payments when visitatioi 
is being denied the non-custodial parent contrary to prior ordei 
of the court. 
15. Omnibus Objection Defendant herein incorporates all 
previous objections as was pointed out to the Commissioner and 
raised previously in proceedings and as set out in response to \ 
previous Order To Show Cause to which objections were filed as 
follows: 
December 17, 1990 
February 8, 1991 
DATED thisJ^ZLday of ^ffi&*&&Z ^ W ^ . W ? 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Objection To Commissioners Recommendation was mailed 
via United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid on 
the ft1* day o f < 5 & ^ f g g < l f t r i 9 ^ l , to the following: 
Richard S. Nemelka, Esq. 
2046 East 4800 South, Suite 103 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Certified Mail IP805-472-177 
Don Houston 
(U.S. Certificate of Mailing) 
Authority 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
FILED WITH CLERK 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attn: Sandra N. Peuler 
Commissioner 
HAND DELIVERED 
Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration 
CJA Rule 4-504 "Written flrders. Judgments & Decrees" 
U.R.Cr.P. Rule 3 "Service & Filing of Papers" 
U.R.C.P. Rule 5 "Service and Filing of Pleadings and Other 
Papers" 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 21 "Filing and Service" 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOUSTON, DEE 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
HOUSTON, DON 
DEFENDANT 
TYPE OF HEARING: MOTION HEARING 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. NEMELKA, RICHARD S. 
D. ATTY. PAYTON, STEVEN LEE 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 890901209 CV 
DATE ll/g^/91 
HONORABLE LESLIE A LEWIS 
COURT REPORTER CECILEE WILSON 
COURT CLERK EHM 
THIS MATTER CAME BEFORE THE COURT FOR A HEARING ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO, COMPEL AND FOR SANCTIONS, APPEARANCES AS 
SHOWN ABOVE. 
THE MOTIONS WERE ARGUED TO THE COURT AND SUBMITTED, THE 
COURT RULED AS FOLLOWS: 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL AND FOR SANCTIONS IS GRANTED 
DEFENDANT'S PETITION TO MODIFY IS DISMISSED, 
MR. NEMELKA IS TO PREPARE THE ORDER. 
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STEVEN LEE PAYTON (#2554) 
Attorney for Defendant 
431 South 300 East, Suite 40 
I! Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3298 
Telephone: (801) 363-7070 
IN THE DISTRICT COUFT OF THE THITO JUDICIAL DISTRICT* 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OBJECTION TO ORDER 
AS DRAFTED 
DEE HOUSTON aka 
DEE HOUSTON KIRKRAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON HOUSTON, 
Defendant. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Civil No. 89-090-1209 
(Judge, Leslie Lewis) 
COMES NOW, the above-named defendant represented by counsel 
Steven Lee Payton and hereby files notice and advises the court 
that the order drafted by counsel Nemelka [copy attached] as 
|j directed by the court does NOT comport with what was said in open 
court, that specifically being as follows: 
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DISMISSAL 
I 1. With Prejudice [?3 Petition For Modification was not 
dismissed "with prejudice". Furthermore for the court to disxnia 
a Petition For Modification with prejudice would allow counsel i 
| plaintiff INemelka] to attempt to assert from now on 
[prospectively] until the childrens age of majority that any 
issues could never be raised with regards to matters of custody 
child support, or any other modification and clearly that is noi 
what the court intended and if the court did so intend it would 
a clear abuse of discretion as well as contrary to case law. 
2. Duration of Minority The young age of the minor 
children is such that such an order would preclude for the 
duration of minority [ten (10) years and eleven years] defendan 
from ever bringing a modification petition again. The court did 
not intend such a drastic consequence and if It did in fact int 
such a drastic consequence it would clearly be an abuse of 
discretion. 
3. Final Order For said reasons the order is not 
adequately drafted and in a light most favorable to the plainti 
the petition would simply be dismissed pursuant to U.R.C.P. Ru1 
41 "Without Prejudice". This is so for the reason that custod: 
jj and other matters raised in the Petition For Modification are 
never final orders pursuant to domestic relations case law and 
|l counsel for plaintiff is attempting to draft an order not in 
conformity therewith. 
I 
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4. Transcript — Record Furthermore if there is a 
difference between what the actual transcript and record shows and 
the written order then, again pursuant to case law, the transcript 
controls, not the written order and it is necessary that this ' 
objection be inserted early so that there is notice as to the 
problem herein. 
HEARING DATE 
5. Date Secondly counsel for plaintiff without so much as 
a courtesy of a phone call has scheduled a date without conferring 
with the defendants office in any way, manner, or form whatsoever 
and accordingly and therefore is advised in advance that that date 
is inconvenient for counsel for defendant for reasons as set out 
in letter to plaintiffs counsel which is attached, therefore 
objection is taken to the date therein. 
PROCEDURAL DEFECT 
6. So that there is a record, this objection and notice is 
filed pursuant to provisions of law as follows: 
CJA Rule 4-501 "Motions" 
CJA Rule 4-504 "Written Orders, Judgments R Decrees" 
and failure to follow mandated procedure is a basis for automatic 
reversible error. 
[See: Glllmor v Cummings 806 P.2d 1205 (UT App. 1991)1 
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PRAYER 
Based upon this written objection prayer for relief would 1 
as follows: 
7. Language "with prejudice" should be deleted from the 
order. 
8. Hearing date be set to a different date and time with 
concurrence of both counsel and clerk to a date certain and 
agreeable. 
The basis herein for counsels refusal to approve as to for 
being reduced to writing and same having been expeditiously pos 
to counsel for defendant immediately upon date of receipt of th 
order attached. 4 
DATED this V day of 
Enclosure (2 pages) 
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WARD S. NEMELKA 
Attorney at Law 
r \sr 4aoo SOITII st/rre ioa 
IAIT LAKI CfTY. LT &4II7 
Steven Payton 
Attorney at Law 
431 South 300 East Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3298 
if..j.«r.«f.«.u..»n...u..,i!.!i..fi....rf..,.i.!? 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA " Wo. e a o e 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2046 EAST 4S00 SOUTH 
SUITE 103 
SALT LAKE OTY. UTAH $4117 
(501)272-4244 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP OTAH 
DEB HOUSTON a/k/a DEE 
HOUSTON KIRKBAM, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON HOUSTON, 
Defendant . 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 890901209 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
II Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Compel and for Sanctions I 
II came on regularly for hearing on the 27th day of November, 1991 I 
II before the Honorable Leslie Lewis, plaintiff being represented byi 
|| Richard S. Nemelka and defendant being represented by Steven f 
|l Payton and arguments having been made to the Court and the Court I 
|| having reviewed the file and the Court having found that | 
| defendant's refusal to comply with the Notice of Depositions and | 
i£pto appear at the same was intentional and a blatant disregard of | 
f|the Orders of the Court specifically -refusing to attend the I ^Deposition after so Ordered by Commissioner Peuler on the 20th I I 
i 
[i 
of June 1991 and good cause appearing therefore, XT IS HEREB 
' RDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That plaintiff's Motion to Compel and Renewed Mot 
| to Compel and for Sanctions is granted. 
j 2. That defendant's Petition for Modification be and 
[i 
same is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
3. That the issues of contempt and for attorney's fe 
Which previously were reserved for further hearing, shall be 
teard before the Honorable Leslie Lewis on the 11th day of ecember, 1991 at the hour of 3:00 o'clock p.m., or as soon 
{thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
j DATED this _ _ . day of December, 1991. 
I BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE LESLIE LEWIS 
[APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
[STEVEN PAYTON 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
! I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Order to Steven Payton, Attorney for Defendant, 4 31 South 30( 
East, Suite 40, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3298, this 2nd daj 
December, 1991, postage prepaid. 
r*rr\ 7 r\ nnnr/M tr-r 
STEVEN LEE PAYTON (#2554) 
Attorney for Defendant 
431 South 300 East, Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, IJT 84111-3298 
Telephone: (801) 363-7070 
fUgr&Yi&nCQyia 
Third Judicial District 
JAN17&2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEE HOUSTON, 
aka DEE HOUSTON KIRKHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON HOUSTON, 
Defendant. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
HEARING BRIEF 
[Hearing 1/17/92 (Fri.)] 
Civil No. 89-090-1209 
(Judge, Leslie Levis) 
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! FACTS 
November 27, 1991 (Wed.) this case came before the court for 
j| a hearing at which Richard M. Nemelka was present; however, 
plaintiff was not present. Steven Lee Payton appeared for the 
i defendant; however, defendant was not present. 
I 
| Apart from any discrepancy in the facts as represented by the 
i 
| plaintiff the court dismissed Defendants Petition For Modification 
I for reason it was a belief that the parties should follow the 
, rules. 
| New hearing was scheduled pursuant to an order of the court 
at which time counsel appeared and indicated that the defendant 
! had not complied with the direction of the court as to how the 
matter was to be handled. The court indicated it did not have the 
J same recollection however neither party was present. 
| The court then ordered all parties to be present and set a 
( new hearing date [1/17/9? (Fri.)Is however, objection hereto is 
taken and counsel is of the belief and opinion that lacking proper 
, notice and compliance with the court directive to plaintiff, 
' constitutional defects as well as procedural defects are NOT 
! waived. 
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EQUAL PROTECTION 
Equity demands and requires that the court if it is to be 
even handed should treat the parties equally. The court ordered 
the defendants petition to modify be dismissed [T-15 Line 10-12]• 
Basis and reason the court offered was that it was a sanction 
and the parties should follow the order of the court. 
Counsel had attempted to raise with the court the fact that 
the plaintiff did not come with clean hands and equity demanded 
that defendant be treated differently and the court indicated that 
I it would not consider such issue or argument. Furthermore the 
I court indicated that it had "reviewed the entire file" [T-17 Line 
i 
'I 14-153 and was familiar with the record in the case [T-14 Line 
! 25]. 
! FURTHER ISSUES 
The court on no less than three (3) separate occasions 
!' advised and indicated to Mr. Nemelka that if there were any 
I remaining issues he was to file "affidavit and a motion" and those 
i 
are set out as follows: 
I 
I T-16 Line 22-24 
• "You can file an affidavit and motion. I'll give 
| Mr. Payton, certainly, the opportunity to address that. 
, Anything else?" (Emphasis Added) 
i 
l 
t 
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T-17 Line 20-25t T-18 Line 1 
"THE COURT: As soon as there's a final order, 
you certainly may do so. And as I say, you certainly 
may address this issue of the further contempt proceedings 
when Mr. Nemelka files his motion in connection with that, 
clarifying what is to be heard, and we'll set it for a 
hearing. And also you can address the issue of attorneys 
fees at that time. (Emphasis Added) 
T-18 Line 7-11 
"THE COURT: I believe, as I understand it, that 
the contempt that he's alluding to -- and I've asked him 
to file a motion so it's clarified — had to do with the 
failure to pay support on the original order; is that 
correct Mr. Nemelka? 
Counsel for plaintiff has never, despite the fact that the 
court specifically indicated he was to file a "affidavit and 
motion" so that there was clarification, ever at anytime 
subsequent thereto filed any documents, affidavits, motion, or 
anything else in writing. As such and therefore the court cannot 
justify either going ahead with the hearing or taking any other 
action herein since the defendant had a right to rely upon the 
courts representations and even handedness requiring that it appl; 
the same standard to the defendant as to the plaintiff. 
Nelson v Jacobsen 669 P.2d 1207 (UT 1983) 
[Notice and adequate time for preparation required] 
Plumb v State of Utah 809 P.2d 734 (UT 1990) 
" [Notice of particular issues to be decided is required] 
Civil No. 89-090-1209 Page 
3rd D/C SLCo. 
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I 
i 
i 
PRIOR FILINGS 
| Counsel for plaintiff herein cannot go back and rely upon 
other things he may or may not have filed or matters filed prior 
| to the court determination. Plaintiff should have as a matter of 
"prudence" filed some document indicating how she wished to 
I proceed but at this juncture to hold hearings and proceed as the 
court has so indicated would certainly deny basic principles of 
I fundamental fairness which would assure perpetuity of free 
I government. 
li Article I Section 27 Constitution of Utah 
P "Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is 
essential to the security of individual rights and the 
perpetuity of free government". 
li It furthermore would be a denial of due process to the 
i 
defendant given that the court has specifically ordered certain 
! things to be done. To then proceed contrary thereto at this 
1
 juncture notwithstanding anything that has occurred subsequently 
could be a denial of due process, 
J Article I Section 7 Constitution of Utah 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law". 
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As a matter of equal protection if the defendant is expected 
to do things and otherwise proceed then he likewise should be abl 
to expect that the court shall give the same deference to its 
ruling when dealing with the plaintiff particularly in light of 
the court having indicated that it had "reviewed the entire file" 
T-17 Line 14-15 
"THE COURT: I've reviewed the entire file, Mr. Payton" 
PROCEDURAL ERRORS 
Counsel had filed an appropriate document before the 
Commissioner on every issue herein and as such he waived no 
procedural errors nor has he done so and he relies upon such 
non-waiver and case law. 
Glllmor v Cumroings 806 P.2d 1205 (UT App. 1991) 
FURTHER RELIEF DENIED 
In order to be even handed in this matter and consistent witl 
i the courts ruling to the defendant, any other and/or further 
t relief that the plaintiff may desire and seek is summarily denied 
, and the parties in the words of State v Nelson can take it from 
I' there. 
|' See: Martin v Nelson 533 P.2d 897 (UT 1975) 
J " ...@pg 897...The case is remanded with instruction 
• to vacate the judgment and let the parties take it from 
there...." 
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CONCLUSION 
The court may not through "raw judicial power" rule one way 
against one party and differently against another party when there 
has been a blatant disregard of the courts direction to counsel 
for the plaintiff and upon which the defendant relied. When 
counsel brought it to the courts attention the court said it "did 
not recall" that it had so directed or otherwise indicated that 
further pleadings were necessary; however, the transcript of the 
hearing in dispute clearly indicates that counsels representations 
to the court are correct and copy of the transcript, it being 
short, is attached hereto as an appendix. 
OBJECTION 
On the grounds and for the reasons as stated herein objection 
is had to further proceedings herein and any relief that the 
plaintiff requests should be summarily denied. » 
DATED this tf day of 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
* * * * * 
DEB HOUSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON HOUSTON, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 890901209 
* * * * * 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OP PROCEEDINGS 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
NOVEMBER 27, 1991 
MOTION HEARING 
* * * 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
MR. RICHARD S. NEMELKA, ESQ. 
Attorney at Law 
.2046 East 4800 South, Suite 103 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
MR. STEVEN LEE PAYTON, ESQ. 
Attorney at Law 
431 South 300 East, Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
COMPUTEPTZED Tr,*ucr"°TT>^ 
3 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; NOVEMBER 27, 1991; P.M. SESSION 
THE COURT: Let me note for the record that this 
is the time set for a hearing in connection with the matter 
of Houston versus Houston, 890901209. Both counsel for the 
plaintiff, Mr. Nemelka, and counsel for the defendant, Mr. 
Payton, are present. I notice the parties are not here. 
Is that correct? 
MR. PAYTON: For the defendant, that's correct, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And he did not anticipate being here 
today? 
MR. PAYTON: No, I think it's just on Mr. 
Nemelka's motion. 
THE COURT: Well it's most definitely on Mr. 
Nemelka's motion. I had assumed that at least the 
defendant v/ould be here, because what occurs today is 
definitely going to impact, here. 
But if you're here representing him, we'll go 
forward. Certainly we're not going to reschedule the 
hearing when itfs been scheduled so many times before. 
Let me indicate for the record that this is a 
matter in which there is a motion to compel, and for 
sanctions, that was originally filed by Mr. Nenelka on 
behalf of the plaintiff on May 16th of this year. There 
was also a plaintiff's renewal, or renev/ed motion for 
xP 
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sanctions that was filed on June 25th with the court. 
This matter has been scheduled on a number of 
occasions. On one occasion it was continued by the court, 
of necessity. On the last occasion that this was set, 
November 8th of 1991, we were set to go, Mr. Nemelka was 
present, the hour for the hearing came and passed without 
Mr. Payton being present, and finally we got a call 
indicating that counsel was before the Industrial 
Commission, and could not be present, and asked to have the 
matter set over. 
So it is on today in connection with the motion 
to compel and for sanctions. Mr. Nemelka. 
MR. NEMELKA: Thank you, Your Honor. Very 
briefly, I've kind of lost track of how many times we've 
noticed up Mr. Houston's deposition. I think maybe five or 
six different times. 
THE COURT: Let me just ask one preliminary 
question. I know there's not only the deposition of Mr. 
Houston at issue, but also the deposition of Marva, is it, 
Marva Houston? 
MR. NEMELKA: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Has either one of those depositions 
taken place? 
MR. NEMELKA: No, they have not. 
THE COURT: And neither one is set; is that 
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L I correct? 
2 1 MR. NEMELKA: No, they have not. Because Mr. 
i I Payton has specifically stated to us that neither one of 
I I them is going to show up. 
5 I THE COURT: I have reviewed all the 
5 I correspondence that's been attached to the motions. Z 
7 I don't want to curtail your right to say anything that you 
5 I feel to be meaningful in connection with this case, Mr. 
) J Nemelka. I want you and Mr. Payton to have full 
3 I opportunity to state your position. 
L J But I will tell you that I'm inclined to grant 
I I the motion to compel, and for sanctions. So my suggestion 
3 I would be that we let Mr. Payton address the issue, and then 
\ I you can certainly respond. Mr. Payton. 
5 MR- PAYTON: Your Honor, I'll be brief. Let me 
6 I just indicate a couple of things so the record is clear. 
7 I If a party comes in and they want relief under equitable 
3 I principles, they have to come with clean hands. And I 
9 I suppose it's been somewhat of a joke, at least between 
0 I counsel, but on one or another my client shows up and Mr. 
1 I Nemelka's client doesn't, or vice versa. 
2 I There have been a number of hearings before the 
3 I commissioner, and I believe if the court would note that at 
4 I one point in this matter I filed a certificate of readiness 
5 I for trial to see if we could get the matter in and get it 
cP 
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1 I heard. 
2 I I think most significantly is that it is our 
3 I understanding as to Commissioner Peuler's recommendation 
4 I when this issue came up for sanctions before her, number 
5 I one, she indicated with regards to the deposition, and 
6 I we've never ever had any notice from Mr. Nemelka's office 
7 J that there's ever been rescheduled subsequent thereto. I 
8 I did send him- -
9 THE COURT: Well, let me just say that I wasn't 
10 I born yesterday, and there's correspondence in the file that 
11 I clearly indicates from you to Mr. Nemelka—it's attached, I 
12 I believe, to his first, and maybe his second motion to 
13 I compel—that you would not be cooperating in allowing your 
14 I client to appear, nor his wife, at a deposition. So I'm 
15 I well aware of what the facts are in that regard. 
16 I MR. PAYTON: I suggest to the court, in the 
17 I interest of making a record, here—and I stand by 
18 I everything—that I suggest that I was the one v/ho filed 
19 I correspondence with the court as a matter of protection. 
20 I THE COURT: Well anyway, the correspondence has 
21 I come to my attention, and what it reflects about your 
22 I position, I think, makes it clear that you did not feel 
23 I your client should have to appear at a deposition. Is that 
24 I a fair statement, Mr. Payton? 
25 MR. PAYTON: Probably a fair statement, but I 
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think that the reasons are significant. Let xne indicate, 
the court mentioned his wife. I don't think his wife is in 
issue here, because her deposition certainly has never been 
renoticed after the commissioner's hearing. I don't think 
that that's an issue here today. 
THE COURT: You realize, Mr. Payton, that 
Commissioner Peuler, as a result of a hearing, ordered that 
the defendant have his deposition taken. You remember that 
and recall that? 
MR. PAYTON: That's correct. But the court was 
lumping them both together. I was trying to sort out 
what's not an issue. I don't think that the wife's in 
issue, because certainly she has never been noticed back up 
after we had a matter before the commissioner. 
THE COURT: We'll restrict ourselves to 
discussing the defendant. 
MR. PAYTON: We filed no objection to that, so 
that's not in issue here today, I don't think. 
With regards to my client, let me indicate that, 
without telling Mr. Nemelka how to do it, that there were 
objections. One of the problems in this case is, that came 
up with- - The commissioner indicated that sanctions and 
other matters, the last time we were before her, was that 
we ought to get this matter on the calendar and get it 
tried, and that all those matters should be dealt with 
r 
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together. 
I have a distinct and clear recollection that the 
last time we were before the commissioner the matter of the 
deposition of Mr. Houston came up, and she wanted it 
rescheduled. Mr. Nemelka has then never rescheduled. 
Now, I will apologize and stand corrected if that 
is wrong, but he certainly has never given us a new date 
within which to appear. Subsequent to the commissioner 
indicating that my client appear. 
THE COURT: Well, let me just indicate to you, 
Mr. Payton, that in the court's file, attached to Mr. 
Nemelka's renewed motion for sanctions, there is a letter 
on your law office stationery dated June 20th, 1991. After 
the title, "Dear Mr. Nemelka," it says in caps, "Deposition 
non-appearance." It goes on to say, "This letter is to 
advise you that client of the undersigned will not be 
appearing for the deposition scheduled this date." 
MR. PAYTON: That's correct. But subsequent to 
that was when we were before the commissioner. That's what 
I'm saying, is that when you put it in a chronological 
order, that letter originally was written, and we v/ent to 
the commissioner, and she ordered him to appear. And there 
has been nothing further from Mr. Nemelka since. 
Excuse me, I didn't interrupt you, counsel. I 
didn't persist in that position after the commissioner made 
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I a recommendation he appear. And there's nothing 
I subsequent. I originally took that position. I did not 
J persist in this after Commissioner Peuler ordered that he 
I appear. There has been nothing since then. 
J MR. NEMELKA: You asked to point out if you're 
I wrong, Mr. Payton, and you1re totally wrong. You read in 
I your letter, "We appeared at Commissioner Peuler'S on the 
I 10th of June." That's when she ordered your client's 
I deposition on the 20th of June, and he did not appear, and 
I you said he would not appear. We haven't discussed the 
I deposition with Commissioner Peuler since that time. 
I That's totally wrong. 
J MR. PAYTON: I won't interrupt, since the federal 
[ I rule is that you don't address matters to counsel, by rule. 
> I But if I could see the letter. One of the problems in this 
5 I case is Mr. Nemelka will send something- -
1 I THE COURT: Mr. Payton, why don't you, then, in 
3 I keeping with what you've just indicated is your practice, 
9 I address your remarks to me. If you have something that you 
0 I want to offer as an exhibit for me to consider, you're 
1 I welcome to. I believe I have everything in front of me. 
2 I I'll leave it to Mr. Nemelka to offer anything he wishes 
3 I to, and I'm certainly going to give him a chance to 
4 I respond. Is there anything you'd add? 
5 MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, if we had a date 
J£-
certain, we'd be happy to appear, as long as it's in 
conformity with the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
THE COURT: Mr. Payton, let me just put a 
question to you. You received, did you not, the motion for 
sanctions that was sent out approximately May 16th of '91? 
MR. PAYTON: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Did you also receive the renewed 
motion for sanctions? 
MR. PAYTON: Correct. 
THE COURT: Did you review them? 
MR. PAYTON: We have. 
THE COURT: And you understood that the motion to 
compel and the motion for sanctions went to the fact that 
Mr. Houston had not cooperated in a deposition. Did you 
understand that? 
MR. PAYTON: I'm sorry, I'm reviewing the docket 
text of what's filed with the court. 
THE COURT: Well, let me just note for the record 
that that- - I'm speaking, Mr. Payton. That a clear 
reading of the motion to compel and the renewed motion 
makes it clear that the underlying problem is Mr. Houston, 
the defendant's non-appearance at depositions. 
My question to you is, did you attempt in any 
way, seeing these motions to compel, in all the months that 
have followed—I mean we're now at November 27th, and the 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
11 
motion to compel was filed May 16th with the court—have 
you ever attempted to set up a deposition time with Mr. 
Nemelka? 
MR. PAYTON: Personally, no. It has been 
correspondence to him, however, and we- -
THE COURT: You mean the letters wherein you said 
that your client would not cooperate? 
MR. PAYTON: No, I don't. I mean we've been back 
and forth to the commissioner at least four times since 
then, and she indicated at our last appearance that all 
these matters should be consolidated and we should get this 
on for trial, period. 
I think we have a right to rely upon that 
representation. That issue has been'discussed ad nauseam 
before the commissioner, and I think as an officer of the 
tribunal, that even Mr. Nemelka has a duty to acknowledge 
that that's correct. 
One of the things here, as I indicated, with 
regards—and discussed with Mr. Nemelka—we talk about 
non-appearances, we appeared before the commissioner with 
regards to- -
THE COURT: No, we're not discussing 
non-appearances, except with reference to the deposition 
and the fact that it has not occurred, in violation of 
Commissioner Peuler's order. 
6*> 
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I I MR. PAYTON: Then I stand upon what I just said. 
2 We've been back before the commissioner. Her last 
3 I indication was that all these matters should be referred on 
4 I the trial calendar, and we should get this tried. Our 
5 I position is she thinks there has been enough fault to go 
6 I around for both sides, and we should simply put this file 
7 I housekeeping in order and get it done. 
8 I And that was the last thing that was said at the 
9 I last appearance before the commissioner, which, since the 
10 I time of the letter you speak, we've been back four times 
11 I before her. And I stand upon that. I think 1 have a right 
12 I to expect some reliance upon what she said, that that be 
13 I the case. 
14 I THE COURT: Anything further? 
15 I MR. PAYTON: No, ma'am. 
16 I THE COURT: Mr. Nemelka? 
17 J MR. NEMELKA: Very briefly, Your Honor. The 
18 I motion for sanctions, you've correctly pointed out, was 
19 I filed the 16th of May, because on three or four different 
20 I occasions he never showed up for his deposition. We filed 
21 I the transcript. 
22 I On the 10th of June, on another matter, a 
2 3 I pretrial, we appeared before Commissioner Peuler and she 
24 I specifically says, "This is not going to happen any more. 
25 I Your client shows up at the deposition on the 20th of June. 
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Irregardless, no excuses, he'll be there." 
The 20th of June rolls around. Mr. Payton says, 
sends me the letter, which I've attached it to our renewed 
motion, saying, "We're not coming." The 24th of June I 
filed my renewed motion, attached the letter, and said, 
"Hey, they're not coming." 
THE COURT: Mr. Nemelka, do you have a copy of 
the order or the minute entry from Commissioner Peuler 
concerning the deposition issue? 
MR. NEMELKA: After this period of time? 
THE COURT: The one that occurred at the June 
10th hearing. 
MR. NEMELKA: No, I do not. The June 10th, as I 
recall, Your Honor, was a pretrial, and I do not have- -
As I recall, it was a pretrial hearing. It was originally 
scheduled May 22nd, continued to the 10th of June, 
Commissioner Peuler's office. 
And we were in there and we discussed all the 
issues of the pretrial, and I said, "I can't go forward 
until I take his deposition." And she said, "Okay, it'll 
be set on that." But I don't have a copy of her 
recommendat ion. 
THE COURT: And there doesn't appear to be any 
dispute about that. 
MR. NEMELKA: And subsequent to that time we've 
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aware that the defendant has been represented by a number 
of different attorneys. 
All right, in connection with the plaintiff's 
motion to compel, and also renewed motion to compel and 
motion for sanctions, the motion is granted. I find that 
there is good cause for the granting of the motion. 
Specifically the defendant was directed or ordered by 
Commissioner Peuler to cooperate in appearing for a 
deposition on June 20th. 
Based on the motion, the sanctions I'm going to 
order at this time are that the defendant's petition to 
modify is dismissed. 
This is a very severe remedy, I'm well aware of 
that, but I'm making a finding that "the defendant's refusal 
to comply with the order of the court to attend his 
deposition is intentional and blatant, and clearly in 
contravention of a direct ruling from Commissioner Peuler. 
Additionally, I'm going to find that the rules of 
discovery have a purpose, and that there is no way that a 
lawsuit, that litigation can be conducted, fairly held, if 
the parties do not follow court orders and facilitate 
discovery. 
For that reason, the defendant's petition to 
modify is dismissed at this time. I'm going to ask, Mr. 
Nemelka, that you prepare an order to that effect. 
cP 
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MR. NEMELKA: May we also prepare an affidavit 
for attorneys fees? We've asked for attorneys fees in this 
matter. Or would you- - Let me go one step further. We 
have a contempt issue that needs to be heard in an 
evidentiary hearing. Commissioner Peuler has ruled that 
those issues of contempt for all of these things that he's 
done wrong should be heard at the time of the petition for 
modification. 
It being dismissed, then we want to notice up a 
hearing for the contempt issue. May we discuss the 
attorneys fees at that- -
THE COURT: When you say the contempt issue, 
you're not talking now about contempt in connection with 
the failure to appear at depositions? 
MR. NEMELKA: No. We're talking about his 
failure to pay the child support. 
THE COURT: All right. I believe that there's an 
order in place as to back child support, but if there are 
remaining issues in connection with that, you certainly may 
notice that up, and I think the attorneys fee issue needs 
to be addressed. 
You can file an affidavit and a motion. I'll 
give Mr. Payton, certainly, the opportunity to address 
that. Anything else? 
MR. PAYTON: One thing I need to speak to. I 
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appreciate what the court says, it's a drastic remedy. But 
in temper, tone, and taste- -
THE COURT: I'm sorry? 
MR. PAYTON: In temper, tone, and taste I 
restricted myself to the issue in the Nelson versus 
Jacobsen I reasonably thought would be here. And of course 
the court has discretion with regards to whatever remedy 
and fashion. 
But in terms of Mr. Nemelka's conduct, at one 
such hearing, and there's another where his client didn't 
bother to show up, or at least showed up the last five 
minutes, and I believe I began this with the fact, with 
regards to equity, that one must come with clean hands. 
THE COURT: I've reviewed the entire file, Mr. 
Payton. 
MR. PAYTON: I simply suggest to the court that I 
donft think it'll be any surprise that we intend to appeal. 
THE COURT: Do so. 
MR. PAYTON: But I want to make- -
THE COURT: As soon as there's a final order, you 
certainly may do so. And as I say, you certainly may 
address this issue of the further contempt proceedings when 
Mr. Nenelka files his motion in connection with that, 
clarifying what is to be heard, and we'll set it for a 
hearing. And also you can address the issue of attorneys 
18 
fees at that time. 
MR. PAYTON: May I suggest, however, to the 
court, so that the record's clear, if you dismiss the 
petition, then he doesn't have any basis to bring contempt, 
because it's based upon and predicated upon matters 
pertaining to the petition. 
THE COURT: I believe, as I understand it, that 
the contempt that he's alluding to—and I've asked him to 
file a motion so it's clarified—has to do with the failure 
to pay support on the original order; is that correct, Mr. 
Nemelka? 
MR. NEMELKA: That's correct, Your Honor. In 
regard to his refusal to pay the child support. 
MR. PAYTON: And the petition goes to that issue 
specifically, that he is without that ability. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry, it's without what? 
MR. PAYTON: He's without that ability. So I'll 
leave it to Mr. Nemelka to file whatever he need be. 
THE COURT: Fine. All right, that'll be the 
order of the court. 
MR. NEMELKA: Thank you. Your Honor. 
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